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Abstract 
Rescued from Japanese colonization after 36 years, Korea resumed 
independence as The Republic of Korea in 1948 grounded on liberal 
democracy. The democratic institution promised a system of separation of 
power, democratic rights and freedom for all people. In this context, local 
autonomy was experimented with but soon ceased due to internal instability 
and local government was suspended until the 1990s.  
Institutionally Korean central government undertook a steady shift toward 
decentralization over the past two decades or so, but that shift has more 
recently been tempered by the exercise of stronger central controls facing 
fiscal crises. This thesis argues that centralism is still a predominant ideology 
in intergovernmental relations despite the implementation of local autonomy. 
Central controls exhibited democratic change in some cases but the core 
nature of controlling local government has survived through institutional 
change appearing in different modes since the introduction of local autonomy. 
The democratic change in central control is declared to increase local 
autonomy. From this viewpoint, the democratic change in central control is 
assumed to improve the performance of local government based on the theory 
that the growth of local autonomy motivates local government to improve its 
performance. Financial crises were used to justify the revival of pervasive 
central controls. So this thesis is concerned with the relationship between 
central control and local performance in the context of fiscal crisis, whose 
focus is driven by the experience of fiscal crises over recent years in Korea. An 
extensive statistical analysis, drawing on a unique data base, reveals that, 
despite the local autonomy rhetoric, overall current central controls have a 
negative link with local government performance. Democratic change of 
central controls has not significantly improved the performance of local 
government. This evidence supports the view that even after the revival of 
local autonomy in Korea; central control plays a role of regulator rather than a 
role of constructive engagement with local government and emphasises 
institutional stability. Thus central government has not yet developed the 
creative potential of democratic local government and should more positively 
make an effort to establish democratic central-local government relations.   
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Chapter 1. Analysing Korean central-local relations 
1. The growing importance of local government  
Over the last decade from 2001 to 2010, expenditure undertaken by local 
governments increased by 0.4%, whereas central government expenditure was 
reduced by 0.8% in terms of general government expenditure in Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries (OECD, 2013). The 
level of fiscal decentralization varies considerably across countries but it is 
difficult to deny that total spending by local governments is gradually increasing 
as shown by the longitudinal statistics. This could also mean that, at the moment, 
local government is much more closely involved with our lives. However, has 
performance of local governments improved in line with its increased size and 
importance? Emphasis on government performance has been on the rise across 
many countries and this phenomenon appears likely to continue after the global 
economic crisis of 2007-8 (Talbot, 2010). Thus, literature on performance 
management and measurement in the public sectors has been thriving in recent 
years. Some commentators deal with the theory and method of performance 
management (Bouckaert G. and Halligan J., 2008; Talbot, 2010), others with 
performance determinants of local government (Andrews et al., 2012; Boyne and 
Enticott, 2004; Boyne et al, 2011; Walker and Andrews, 2015). There are 
comparative studies of policy of performance management and its development 
across the different countries (Pollitt, 2006; Christensen et al., 2003). 
Nevertheless these studies downplay the widely accepted reality that local 
performance might be affected by the dynamics of central-local government 
relations. 
The issue of central-local government relations can be rechristened as 
decentralization. Decentralization policy has been directly connected with the 
increase in local autonomy, which has been chosen as a favourite reform agenda 
over the last twenty years in Korea. Why has decentralization policy been so 
attractive to national politicians? Now why has local government become so 
important in Korea? As outlined in chapter 2, originally local autonomy was 
legally based on the Korean constitution but it could not be properly implemented 
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due to the Korean War and the unstable domestic situation. Then Korean local 
autonomy ceased again when, on the 16th May 1961, a military coup took place. 
Until the Local Autonomy Act was amended in 1988 local councils were legally 
prohibited and, even after 1988 the organizing of local councils was not seriously 
implemented. At the end of the 1980s however, Korea embarked on the path to 
full liberal democracy and democratic local government was seen as a vital 
component of those enlightened political reforms. It can be said that Korean local 
autonomy was partly resurrected in 1991 by election of local councillors and 
completely resurrected in 1995 by the direct election of top local government 
officials. Since then the consolidation of local democracy has been a consistently 
high priority goal for successive Korean governments. 
Local government is a multi-purpose institution which assumes responsibility 
for a broad range of functions such as articulation of political priorities, consumer 
of public finance, service provider and enterpriser. Colin Copus (2014) focuses 
on the political and service provision roles of local government in England and 
explores how the governing role links to service provisions which enable local 
politicians to make decisions that reflect their political preferences. The political 
role as an elected government has been frequently downplayed due to the 
embedded centralism. The implementation of local autonomy in Korea, thus, 
means to fulfil ‘political democracy’ to the public. Compared to the economic 
development, the level of political democracy deserves to lose the trust of people. 
In the mid-1990s determined pursuit of local autonomy could have heralded the 
change of power between central government and local government. But the 
initial measures to organize local councils by direct election and to elect the head 
of local government were perfunctory, undertaken without sufficient preparation. 
In fact, the choice of local autonomy has a determinate influence over central-
local government relations and demands a deeper discussion about democratic 
decentralization.  
In reality, local governments are at the forefront of delivering and providing 
the core public services on which citizens rely in their everyday life. Local 
governments lead the development and implementation of innovative solutions to 
new and pressing social problems (Walker and Andrews, 2015: 101). The volume 
of activity of local governments, as measured by their expenditure, is becoming 
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huge. In terms of the 2012 budget, Korean local governments spent 129 billion 
dollars, whereas central government spent 130 billion dollars (MOPAS, 2012). As 
revealed by the OECD Factbook 2013, from 2001 to 2010, whereas Korean 
central government expenditure decreased by 2.6%, Korean local government 
expenditure increased by 0.8%. If it is taken into consideration that a significant 
amount of social welfare activities are transferred to local governments in 
response to an aging society, expenditure of local government will continue to 
grow in volume. This trend in financial decentralization presumably reflects the 
expansion and complexity of local government roles. Thus it is timely and 
important to explore central-local government relations from selected cases in 
Korea in order to enhance the performance of Korean local government.  
Perhaps due to the historical retardation of local government in Korea there 
is a very sparse literature dealing with even the basics of the system and how it 
operates. There is almost nothing available in English language which provides a 
good scholarly review of Korean local government, and only a scattering of 
comparative studies which include Korea. This thesis therefore draws mainly on 
a Korean literature which is itself relatively modest. As the system of local 
autonomy has developed and matured over the past twenty years this absence of 
secondary literature has become an unfortunate gap in understanding 
comparative local government. It is unfortunate both for Korean reformers who 
wish to compare domestic developments with other national models, and it is 
unfortunate for scholars of local government who might wish to draw on the 
Korean experience. The rapid and admirable democratisation of Korea can 
hardly be fully understood without consideration of the growth of local autonomy 
which, together with Korea’s rapid and remarkable recent economic growth, 
makes it an important comparative model. This thesis therefore provides 
information and analytical insights which contribute to filling a research vacuum. 
2. Central-local relations in Korea 
2.1. The Constitutional Status of local government  
In terms of engagement with the theory of central local relations, it is necessary 
to understand the constitutional status of local government. The major structural 
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question is whether local governments possess general competence powers to 
do what is deemed necessary for the well-being of their community or they only 
undertake specific functions according to powers given them by central 
government (Goldsmith and Page, 2010: 34). The available typologies of local 
government systems are not comprehensive or fully satisfactory (Swianiewicz, 
2014: 292). Nevertheless, the most well-known typology is based on those of 
Page and Goldsmith (1987) and Hesse and Sharp (1991). In the Franco or 
Napoleonic group referring to Southern Europe, local government is highly 
protected in the constitution but local governments are restricted to those function 
that central government explicitly grants to local governments (Denters and Rose, 
2005: 10). In contrast the Anglo model refers to the UK and Ireland in which local 
governments are unprotected by the constitution but are similarly restricted to 
those functions that central government explicitly grants to local government (ibid: 
10). The local governments of the Middle European group such as German and 
Switzerland have more formal constitutional status. They are protected in the 
constitution and possess a general functional competence. In federal systems 
usually the state level of regional government has the constitutional responsibility 
for overseeing local government, while in unitary systems central government 
occupies the commanding position (Goldsmith and Page, 2010: 34).  
Korean local government belongs to the unitary system. The Korean 
constitution grants local autonomy to local government. The Korean local 
autonomy system is generally considered to be influenced by German local 
autonomy reflecting norms developed during the Japanese colonial time (Im, S.B., 
2008: 62). Hierarchical upper and lower tiers of local governments are 
established under the constitution of the Sixth Republic and granted legal 
personality, which is the typical appearance of German local government system. 
The German local governments do not have complete freedom in performing 
their tasks because ‘mandatory functions’ are assigned to local government by 
state legislation (Denters and Rose, 2005: 122). In this context, the Korean local 
governments deals with some mandatory affairs delegated from the central 
government in addition to voluntary local affairs. The sovereignty of a unitary 
state is indivisible so the devolution of sovereignty over to the local government 
cannot be conceded (Kim, C.S.,1998: 91). The people who argued for the 
introduction of organization autonomy in the early days of local autonomy in 
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Korea were mostly scholars who had studied the experiences of German or 
Japanese law. They had an opinion that the state is superior to local 
governments. These scholars’ opinions are reflected in the 6th Republic 
Constitution and the Act of Local Autonomy (Im, S.B., 2008: 63). Korean local 
government remains constitutionally protected from the political ideologies, 
policies and priorities of the state. Article 117 of the constitution stipulates that 
local governments must deal with what is deemed necessary for the well-being of 
their community and the protection of their property. Thus the existence of local 
government and local councils is protected by the Constitution but the state 
legislation can assign limitations on local government functions (see section 3.2 
of chapter 2). The Constitution permits the legislative autonomy of local 
government not ‘within the range that does not violate the laws’ but ‘within the 
limits set by the laws’. Functions of local governments can be limited by the 
authority of central government and the National Assembly. Despite the 
regulation of the constitution, thus, in practice Korean local government has 
always been subordinate to central control.  
Local political leadership is been a key element in efforts to achieve political 
democracy or to modernize local government. Types and effectiveness of 
political leadership differ according to decision-making structures and the loci of 
political power (Bochel and Bochel, 2010: 723).  Leadership is also affected by 
policies and practices transferred through the NPM paradigm, by the quality of 
elected politicians and senior officials and by the emergence of ‘governance’ 
which has tended to spread responsibility and has influenced the change of 
government relations. To classify the different government relations and the 
quality of leadership, commentators have defined different forms of local 
democracy; specifically representative, consensus, network and market forms 
(Sweeting and Copus, 2012; Bekkers et al., 2007). The nature of local 
democracy explicitly assumes a combination of political and administrative 
leadership in order to make autonomous choices but local democracies vary in 
their ability to digest the quality of leadership equally well (Rhodes and t’ Hart, 
2014: 47).  
The legal position about local autonomy of Korea tends to concentrate power 
in the hands of the head of local government compared to consensus democracy 
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which tries to share, disperse, and restrain power in a variety of ways. The 
Korean local democracy can be said ‘pendulum democracy’ in that the winner of 
the last election takes all. This electoral system of Korea fosters competition 
between a few political parties (see chapter 2). The Constitution acknowledges 
the existence of local government and their local council equally, but the Act of 
Local Autonomy attaches the stronger power to the elected executive mayor and 
governor rather than local council.  In order to strengthen accountability of 
elected politicians, the market democracy model emphasizes efficiency (Bekkers 
et al., 2007; 300). The market model suggests that the preferences of citizens as 
clients of government services should be more efficiently channelled to increase 
responsiveness of local government in the market democracy. Here the local 
council identifies preferences and wishes of residents and exercises legal 
controls over the executive mayor. The local council is the representative body 
and plays the important roles of legislation and audit. Its power is dispersed 
across all council members. In a complementary sense, to strengthen the ways 
of working together with local communities, co-governance has been developed 
and is essential for a healthy local democracy in Korea (Somerville and Haines, 
2008: 61). We come back to the constitutional standing of local government when 
considering the formal legal restrictions of the Korean local government in 
chapter 2, before going on to research the other aspects of institutions that 
operate the Korean local autonomy. Conclusions on findings about the 
strengthening constitutional position of local government are presented in the last 
part of the thesis.  
 
2.2. Central-local relation in Korea 
In accordance with the local autonomy revival in Korea from the mid-1990s, 
studies about local autonomy have come to quantitatively pile up and qualitatively 
deepen. Examination of new approaches to implementing decentralization 
stressed the alternatives such as restructuring into a federal state or 
differentiated decentralization according to the willingness and capacity of 
individual local government (Yu, J.H., 2002; Lee, G.W., 2002). Some studies 
introduced the reform of local autonomy in Japan or the UK: for example, the 
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moderating mechanism in central-local government relationship of focusing on 
the role of political parties in the UK(Goh, S.H., 2000 ); assessment of the 
process and contents of centring on abolition of delegated activities in Japan (So, 
S.C., 2002); newly formed central-local government relationships after the 
decentralization reform in Japan (Jung, D.J., 2003); comparative studies of local 
autonomy across countries (Kim, S.E, 2001; 2004). The drawback with these 
studies, however, is that since Korean local autonomy implementation has been 
in process for twenty years, the questions which identify how central-local 
government relations are best arranged are not clear to answer. There is no 
unique theory, ideal model or clear example which can simply be transposed to 
the Korean context.  
The arguments about central-local relations from forerunner countries can 
give a picture to help understand Korean central-local relations. In Britain, 
discussions of central-local relations based on the distinction between the agent 
and the partnership model until the 1960s was dominated by the myth of financial 
dependence and detailed control, and the parable of local autonomy (Rhodes, 
1980; 270). However, there have been a number of dimensions in the study of 
central-local relations such as the central government’s dilemma in controlling 
local expenditure (Hepworth, 1977); the asymmetric power underpinning both 
central intervention and local discretion (Marsh, et al., 2003); power-dependence 
(Thompson, 1967:30-31; Rhodes 1999; 72); the weak centre or ‘hollow 
government’ through the influence of political and professional factors like policy 
networks (Rhodes, 1996; 667). The power-dependence model sees power, in 
relative terms, hinging on a process of bargaining and exchange. From this 
perspective, the central-local relationship certainly isn’t evenly balanced, but local 
governments do have significant assets of their own that they can exploit: local 
knowledge and professional expertise, their networking, and above all their 
position as the elected representatives of their communities (Wilson and Game, 
2006: 186).  
Similarly, Muramatsu noted that Japanese central-local government relations 
changed from vertical control to a horizontal competition model. The vertical 
administrative control model refers to the central-local relations of Japan during 
the early post war period (Muramatsu, 1997:28). He suggests characteristic 
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elements of the vertical control model; first, the agents of delegated powers were 
governors (or mayors) alone. Initially even though local councils could debate the 
conditions of the implementation of delegated tasks, the legal structure made it 
impossible for them to participate in decision making regarding these tasks. 
Second, local governments’ vulnerable financial status depending on the central 
government’s subsidies created a position of superiority for the centre over 
localities; although many operations in central public policies were delegated to 
local authorities, their independent financial power was eroded by central 
government. Third, the system whereby administrative officials were dispatched 
from the centre to work for regional governments made it easy to enforce, on the 
local level, administrative standards established at the national level. He also 
suggests a more recent model of “horizontal political competition” to interpret the 
central-local relationship in the age of regional development and in the period of 
citizens’ movements and leftist local government. This perspective emphasizes 
the central government’s control over a local area in the implementation of 
industrial policy, but also analyses political processes at the parochial level that 
combine the power of business and labour (Muramatsu, 1997:35) 
For a considerable period since the beginning of local autonomy, central-
local relations in Korea can be seen through the agent model in which local 
authorities implement national policies under the supervision of central 
government, rather than the partnership model in which local authorities have 
considerable discretion in designing and implementing their own policies. In 
addition, the unique history of being ruled by Japan for 36 years and the 
centralized bureaucracy tradition make Muramatsu’s model more appropriate for 
understanding Korean central-local relations. During Japanese occupation of 
Korea from 1910 to 1945, Japan changed the many political and administrative 
systems of Korea under centralism to the same as those of Japan (Nam, C.W., 
2010; 213). As a result, the Japanese model of vertical control affected the 
Korean central-local relations on the basis of a similar legal and political 
paradigm.  
 
However, the vertical central-local government relationship has faced the 
demand for change since the central government was confronted by politically 
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autonomous localities in the mid-1990s. The Kim Dae-jung government (1998-
2003) adopted decentralization as a preferential policy to improve political 
democracy in Korea. The Roh Mu-hyun government (2003-2008) labelled as ‘the 
Participatory government’ conspicuously paid attention to the establishing of new 
central-local government relations. These presidents were so pro-local 
government because they were those who had led the democratic movement 
and replaced the authoritarian regimes (see section 2.5 in chapter 2). The 
Committee on Innovation and Decentralization (CID) was in charge of the 
government reform (CID, 2007). The road map for decentralization of CID was 
“from government to governance, from government to civil power, from centre to 
locality, from alienation to participation”. In particular the vision for “the 
government being with residents together and constantly self-innovative where 
creativity and diversity of local communities are respected and the society is 
based on discretion and responsibility (CID, 2007)” suggested the new central-
local relationship. Therefore affairs concerning resident services such as 
education, police, welfare, and facilities management of social infrastructure were 
planned to gradually transfer to local governments. Along with this, the redesign 
of fiscal institutions like the local tax arrangements was discussed to improve 
fiscal autonomy. New partnership relations between central and local government 
were proposed to alleviate pervasive central controls as an ideal relationship 
model in many government reports (MOPAS, 2004; Kim, S.E., 2004). It was 
agreed that central-local relations must not be simple superior-subordinate 
relations any more.  
The trend of the reforms is that the central government gives more discretion 
and power to the local government and avoids direct central intervention in local 
autonomy. Nonetheless, the imperative to secure greater efficiency remains in 
place and central government began to replace direct central control with indirect 
controls through an emphasis on ‘performance’. Specifically, Joint Performance 
Assessment (JPA, see chapter 4) was produced by the dual pressures of giving 
more local autonomy and increasing indirect central controls. It has been known 
to contribute to improving central-local government relations by focusing on 
performance rather than direct controls and by reducing internal regulations. 
Central government regulates inefficiency or a waste of budget using the 
traditional tools such as audit and inspection to find out the cost of services 
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provided by a local government. Before JPA, local government struggled to 
respond to more than 70 kinds of individual assessments carried out by multiple 
central departments as well as audit and inspection by BAI. Although Michael 
Power (2005), and O’Neill (2002) criticise evaluation-obsessed trends which they 
find gives expression to low trust phenomenon which exerts control over once 
self-governing professionals. This is justified by the argument that the 
government bodies must be responsible for their performance to the public 
because they are publicly owned and receive public funding by nature (James, 
2000: 329).  
With the public area’s focus on performance, more permissive regulatory 
initiatives are demanded in order to achieve the goal of decentralization. This 
change can be examined through the changes of Korean local governments’ 
fiscal institution which was motivated by the experience of the Korean financial 
crises in 1997-8 (see chapter 3). Korean central government introduced the new 
financial frameworks of program budgeting and an accrual accounting system but 
also reformed the local tax system and undertook the major step of introducing 
local income tax for the purpose of increasing local autonomy (see chapter 5). 
That was the ground-breaking change in the government sector in the half 
century since Korea gained independence in 1945. This reform definitely entails 
a change in the way public officials make policy decisions. The new financial 
framework was stated to enhance accountability and transparency of local 
governments’ performance.  
This thesis endorses a theoretical perspective that maintains that democratic 
change of central-local government relations is conducive to improved local 
performance. This positive relationship develops because democratic controls 
exercised by central government induce an increase in local autonomy. In turn 
increased local democracy allows flexibility and diversity of policies appropriate 
for the different conditions of a local government. Since there is the positive 
relationship between the level of democracy and the efficiency of the public 
sector across countries (Adam, A. et al, 2011), increased local democracy has 
the potential to be more accountable to voters than in an authoritarian regime. 
This mechanism induces the democratic politicians to produce the public good in 
a more efficient way both by responding to locally articulated preferences and by 
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meeting those preferences with a sensitivity to local conditions. They are 
motivated to achieve greater efficiency in order to remain in power (Adam, A. et 
al, 2011). The empirical studies suggest negativity bias in the impact of 
performance on electoral support for incumbents (Boyne et al., 2009; James and 
John, 2007). They found that incumbents in local authorities in the ‘‘poor’’ 
performance experienced a substantial reduction in aggregate vote share at the 
election following publication, but there was no equivalent political support for the 
high performers (Boyne et al., 2009: 567). 
The evolutionary central-local government relations since extending local 
autonomy are supposed to impact the performance which local governments 
seek to achieve. This study pays attention to the central controls in the 
transitional period of the central-local government relations and their effect on 
local government. The issue of the effect of central control on local government 
also opens up the possibility for reform and the development of policy either 
between sectors or between countries. The overall purpose is to contribute to the 
debate about productive reform in regard to central-local relations and 
performance and we accordingly come back to this debate in the concluding 
chapter. 
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3. Research questions, theories and hypotheses  
It is widely accepted that the Korean central-local government relations have 
been changing and continue to do so. We remain, however, uncertain about what 
it is changing into. The purpose of this present research is to examine how 
central government exercises control over local authorities and how specific 
central-local relationships impact a local government’s performance, considering 
the sustained Korean policy direction toward decentralization stated by central 
government. The pervasive centralism in the hierarchical central-local 
relationship in Korea is analysed from the perspective of history against a 
background of political developments which moved only recently in the direction 
of major democratic reforms which are gradually becoming embedded in political 
culture and institutions (see chapter 2). In fact, Korea has maintained rapid 
economic growth with a centralized government system. The government has 
been highly interventionist in almost every field of policy. According to many 
empirical studies (Wade, 1990; Cotton, 1992) the economic success of Korea 
benefited from the centralized government control during the whole period of the 
development era. In this respect Korea presents a classic model of a successful 
‘developmental state’. 
    Ironically, over the last twenty years of local autonomy in Korea, central 
government has been continuously pressured to transfer power to local 
government. The central power appeared to be mitigated as multiple controlling 
mechanisms were gradually reduced in the policy process.  By the chance of the 
financial crises (see chapter 3), the NPM style reform was imported in the effort 
for decentralization and thus central controls changed towards indirect ways of 
performance assessment or policy monitoring (see chapter 4). This study will 
argue that the new fiscal framework of local government appeared to increase 
local autonomy and local responsibility but at the same time it contained the 
alternative mechanism by which central government exerts a deep influence on 
local government (see chapter 5). During the recent global financial crises, 
however, Korean local government experienced a substantially reduced level of 
autonomy because the central government exerted hard control over local 
government spending, pushing local government to use up more budgets by the 
second quarter for the purpose of balanced stimulation of the economy over the 
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year. The Keynesian styled-expanding fiscal policy seriously reduced local fiscal 
autonomy because the local governments were required to comply with the 
central government regardless of the local fiscal conditions. Facing troubled 
economic conditions, Korea also enforced policies at the national level with a 
thorough consistent argument and resorted to coercive controls of local 
government despite the changed central-local relation in the era of local 
autonomy. The issues of central-local relations can be reinvented in the ironic 
situation in which central controls contrive a survival despite the political demand 
for local autonomy. This thesis seeks to explore the relationship between 
evolving central controls and local autonomy which is expressed by local 
performance. It is assumed that there is a positive relationship so that a reduction 
in central control will create an improvement in the performance of local 
government although, of course, we have to take care in defining ‘performance’. 
This assumed relationship can be explored and perhaps confirmed by statistical 
testing of available data. This thesis can draw on officially derived data sets 
dealing with the performance of Korean local government. The following chapters 
explore various aspects of central-local relations and the economic and political 
environment in order to hypothesise relationships and directions of causation. 
Those relationships are then subject to statistical testing in chapters 7 and 8 
which provide important and original quantitative evidence. 
    In building up to the quantitative chapters the possible relationships between 
central controls, crises, and the performance of local government will be linked in 
chapter 6. Assuming that the change for less control and greater local democracy 
since the extending local autonomy in 1995 was challenged by the financial 
crises, central controls may not in those circumstances support or increase local 
performance. With knowledge about the relations between central control and 
local government performance, we are better equipped to judge the effect and 
traits of government controls in policy making and the enforcement process. The 
statistical case study is based on the institutional achievements of the 
performance assessment system of Korean local government which is noted in 
chapter 4 and the fiscal reform of the Korean local government which is 
discussed in chapter 5. Thus we can estimate the degree and nature of local 
autonomy and how Korea’s fledgling democracy has evolved. Also the generic 
conclusion of this thesis will contribute to providing a theory and establishing a 
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desirable policy model for central-local relations and performance in developing 
countries where centralism dominates the overall public sector or there is a need 
to design new central-local relations.  
    Although the performance benefits of all the different aspects of strategic 
management for local government have been examined (Andrews et al., 2012; 
Walker and Andrews, 2015), there is not so much literature that examines the 
relations between central controls and the performance of local government. 
Federico Revelli (2010) proposes interesting literature on the relation between 
government spending and public service outcomes using a performance 
measure of CPA (Comprehensive Performance Assessment) and panel data 
(2002-7) of the UK. His empirical evidence suggests that local public expenditure 
in excess of centrally set spending standards has a detrimental effect on 
performance. In this study, the performance assessment is yielded by 
combination of assessment of the level and the cost of services. The mandatory 
level of services forces inefficient governments to spend more than a 
performance-maximizing strategy would imply, and to reveal themselves as bad 
performers (Revelli, 2010: 193). Walker and Andrews (2015) found by meta- 
analysis evidence of strong positive performance effects resulting from local 
government management such as staff quality, personnel stability, and planning. 
Their finding suggests networking with other actors in the external environment of 
local government is also important to find a route for higher levels of local 
government performance. Prior studies, however, overlooked the well-perceived 
phenomenon that central controls in central-local government relations also can 
affect local government performance. In this sense, this study raises the question 
how the change of central controlling modes impacts local government 
performance.  
    During the last two decades change of central controls over local 
government in Korea showed distinct patterns: the trend of increasing local 
democracy since the local election in 1995 ceased as a result of an increase in 
central controls again due to the financial crisis in 2008-9. Thus this study is also 
interested in how financial crises had an impact on the effect of central controls 
on local performance. Central controls can be classified into various modes in 
order to investigate whether the different modes lead to different effects on local 
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government performance. Drawing on well-regarded existing theories, modes of 
central control can be classified into three components which are employed to 
make the subjects comply: coercive, normative and remunerative controls 
(Etzioni, 1975). Coercive controls are measures undertaken by central 
government to influence local government by means of formulated rules and 
directives which mandate the local government to act in accordance with what is 
ordered and conceive the threat of sanction (Vedung, 2003: 31). Coercive 
controls are not any more preferred policy instruments because they might impair 
the policy effort of central government in the era of local autonomy. The Korean 
local government, however, has again recently experienced coercive controls due 
to financial crises. Reappearance of coercive controls can be said to be a return 
to centralism against local autonomy. Second, remunerative controls mean in this 
study that central government controls the amount of local income by the means 
of local tax policy. Remunerative controls are related to limited local fiscal power 
and are traditionally popularly used as policy instruments. Third, normative 
controls of the current study refer to more democratic modes of central control in 
the changing central-local government relations. Normative controls theoretically 
mean ‘moral persuasion’ or ‘exhortation’ and divert attentions from the strong 
means of government (Vedung, 2003: 114), and thus it can be said to relate to 
‘democratic’ central controls. They cover attempts at influencing people through 
the transfer of knowledge; the communication of reasoned argument; and the 
dispensing of advice (Vedung, 2003: 32). Each mode of controls exercised by 
central government is supposed to allow different levels of autonomy of local 
government, which impact local performance. The increase in local autonomy 
may improve local government performance because, as we mentioned above, 
the democratic politicians tend to produce the public good in a more efficient way, 
in order to remain in power (Adam, A. et al, 2011). Positive benefits from 
normative and remunerative controls are expected for local government, while 
coercive controls are expected to have a negative effect. Also this thesis takes 
into account the moderating effect of financial crises which might change the 
original effect of central controls on local government performance. The 
fundamental arguments of the research are presented in the following 
propositions. 
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1. The central government’s controls over local government will impact 
the performance of local government 
2. The effect of central controls on the performance of local government 
will vary with the different modes of central control. Normative controls and 
Remunerative controls are likely to enhance the performance of local 
government and on the other hand Coercive controls are likely to reduce the 
performance of local government.  
3. The financial crises effect is likely to negatively affect the effects of 
each mode of central controls on local government performance. 
 
The first proposition is more connected with theories of institutionalism (North, 
1990) and central-local relations (Rhodes, 1999; Muramatsu, 1997), along with 
broader public management (Walker and Andrews, 2015; O’Toole and Meier, 1999). 
The core function of central controls is stipulating rules to which local government 
is subjected (North, 1990: 4). Due to unbalanced power distribution between 
central and local government thus unilateral controls exercised by central 
government are almost certain to affect the performance of local government. 
This argument is consistent with the seminal concept of ‘the bureaucratic 
phenomenon’ of central-local relations (Crozier, 1964), the degree of the power of 
central government and the discretion of local government inevitably influence 
the performance local government. Crozier (1964: 108) concluded that 
centralization has caused the power of decision-making to be located at a level 
where personal influence is difficult to exercise, because of the number of people 
involved and the lack of immediate reliable information. Therefore there are 
mismatches between central decisions and local conditions for policy 
implementation which might cause inefficiency. It is less able to coordinate 
services and adapt central dictates to varying local conditions. The centralized 
paradigm embedded in central-local relations can affect local governments’ decision 
making as a systematic impediment. As a result of this, local government 
performance is likely to be undermined by central controls.  
The second proposition is related to theories about policy instruments or 
policy strategies (Etzioni, 1975; Vedung, 2003), along with theories of central-
local government relations. Policy instruments are the set of techniques by which 
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central government wields the power in attempting to ensure support and effect 
or prevent social change (Vedung, 2003: 21). The common theme of the 
literature on classification of policy instruments is a voluntary-mandatory principle 
underlying the scheme: how policy processes are regulated by government 
authority, and how they are left up to the voluntary actor. The effect of different 
modes of central controls on local government may be varied according to the 
degree of coercion exercised by central government. Coercive methods may 
sacrifice the value and interest of local government therefore we can imagine 
they would have negative effects on local performance. On the other hand, 
remunerative and normative methods may allow more choices and more 
appropriate strategies for local conditions when they understand the local needs 
better and are exerted as a supporter.  
Broadly the variation of local performance by different modes of central 
controls can be reviewed from the perspective of strategic management, when 
we assume ‘power-dependent relations’ between central and local government. 
Within the strategic management frame of local government, it is difficult to 
explain the effect of central controls because different modes of central controls 
are passively given by central government. Nevertheless Walker and Andrews 
(2015) suggest ‘networking’ with other actors in the external environment of local 
government is also important to find a route for higher levels of local government 
performance. The mode of central controls can be one of the objectives of the 
negotiation between central and local governments from the perspective of 
power-dependent relations. 
Turning to the third proposition, the moderating effect of financial crises is 
associated with public management theory. Parallel to O’Toole and Meier’s (1999) 
well-known model, local government performance is influenced by buffering the 
organization from environmental influence and by exploiting opportunities in the 
environment. In this sense, financial crises distort administrative goals and 
processes and finally affect the cost of services provisions. A local authority’s 
ability to avoid fiscal crisis directly affects its ability to sustain its current level of 
services (Honadle et al., 2004). It is possible not only by the operation of 
administrative aspects but also by the crisis itself which creates a falloff in 
performance.  
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In response to the central controls, local government may take the form of 
compliance or disobedience according to their different political and economic 
strategies. However, this study anticipates high levels of local government 
compliance and limited exercise of disobedience based on a few premises. First, 
central government designs effective central controls to encourage compliance of 
local government. To do this, the centre can employ a variety of policy 
instruments to put local governments under controls. There are instruments of 
internal policies which aim at local government’s conduct as the administrative 
actors in the public sector such as budget policies, and organizational reform. 
Second, in general, local governments in Korea are not expected to disobey 
central controls because of centralized political culture, financial dependence on 
central government and lack of legal means for local governments to exercise. 
Third, the role of party in local politics is not developed to the extent that the party 
exercises important initiatives for disobedience over central government policies. 
In particular, due to the regionalism the same party frequently occupies both local 
council and local executive, which is likely to hamper the council’s effective 
scrutiny over the local executive. For these reasons, Korean local politics has 
been criticized as being ‘non-political’ and just exists as a vehicle of 
administration (Goh, S.H., 2000: 269).   
The scope of this study is restricted to South Korea. It deals with the Korean 
central-local relations featured in the area of fiscal institutions and the 
performance of local authorities. The control modes exerted by central 
government are observed through the local authorities’ fiscal institutions such as 
budget, spending and tax in which, usually, central government directly or 
indirectly exercises its intervention. The main argument that this research would 
like to explore concerns the impact of institutional transformation in modes of 
central control over the last decade after implementing local autonomy and how 
the change of central control impacts local authorities’ performance. Also, this 
study employs a longitudinal research design by using panel data from 1998 to 
2010 to identify the determinants of performance. This time frame is appropriate 
not only to acquire some considerable amount of statistical data regarding local 
government performance but also to get meaningful explanations. During this 
sampled period a variety of policies were introduced and changed for the 
purpose of government financial reform in accordance with the New Public 
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Management paradigm, which we will explore in chapter 5. The quantitative 
research is centred on the performance of the regional governments in Korea. 
These governments share the key characteristics of local government as outlined 
in chapter 2 but the choice also reflects the more pragmatic availability of data 
because the JPA applies at the regional government level. The detailed data 
collection of JPA is explained in Appendix 3. The JPA measure of performance 
that is analysed here has a number of attractive features. It is a very peculiar 
performance measurement tool because central government directly assesses 
the performance of local government, which annually reports on its findings and 
categorizes Korean local authorities in a ‘consistent, comparable and transparent’ 
way like the previous case of CPA in the UK (Lee, D. O., 2009). JPA combines 
information on public service level and quality with a three performance category 
scale (poor to excellent). As discussed below, the conclusions that can be drawn 
from the analysis of relations between central government and regional 
government are robust and can be plausibly employed to characterise broader 
relations between the centre and all Korean local governments. 
 
4. Methodology and research design  
This research employs two major methodologies to make arguments and to 
generate and substantiate hypotheses. Historical institutionalism theoretically 
underpins the arguments of the stability of central government controls (chapter 
2); the Korean financial crisis was influenced by the previous liberalization policy 
in the 1980s (chapter 3) and influenced the financial reform in the 2000s (chapter 
5). Historical institutionalism similarly informs the synthetic interpretation of 
statistical findings and theoretic analyses (chapter 9). At the same time, a 
quantitative method, especially the fixed effect panel data model, will be used to 
prove a string of hypotheses on the effect of central controls of local government 
(chapter 7).  
The basis of historical institutionalism is that ‘the policy choice made when 
an institution is being formed, or when a policy is initiated, will have continuing 
and largely determinate influence over the policy far into the future’ (Peters, 2012: 
70). The logic of historical institutionalism has evolved as the concept of path 
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dependence emerged to explain the change of institutions. Path dependency is a 
trajectory that is likely to be followed in the absence of other pressures such as 
crises or major changes in policies and institutions. Institutions range from the 
rules of a constitutional order or the standard operating procedures of a 
bureaucracy to the conventions governing behaviour or relations of organizations. 
Thelen and Steinmo (1992) indicate the meaning of institution by using instances 
from formal government structures such as legislatures through legal institutions 
such as electoral laws to more amorphous social institutions such as social class. 
Scott (2014) provides a broad definition of institution: ‘institution consists of 
cognitive, normative and regulative structures and activities that provide stability 
and meaning to social behaviour’. From these definitions, institutions are 
understood as not only structural components of society but also in terms of the 
cognitive features that they use to explain political phenomena.  
Guy Peters (2012: 74) notices that although there is some discussion of 
formal structures and of procedure within institutions, the concept of the influence 
of ‘idea’ stands out in the historical institutionalism literature. For example, Peter 
Hall (1989) turns from more structural explanations of economic policy to focus 
on the influence which ideas have on policies; in this case the impact of 
Keynesianism and monetarism on policy. In this sense, the idea which has 
influenced central-local government relations in Korea is the impact of enduring 
centralism and nascent local democracy on policies. There are several factors 
strengthening centralism and chapter 2 will explore the origin and history of 
centralism of Korea. Facing the demand for increasing local autonomy, central 
government did not in practice reduce its domination over local governments but 
instead changed the mode of central controls to a more democratic way. The new 
‘idea’ of local autonomy was the motive for a string of reforms and was embodied 
through institutions. Chapter 5 will investigate the changes of the central controls 
by looking at the fiscal institution. In this context, historical institutionalism is a 
very appropriate tool to explain Korean central-local relations. Its analytical 
framework, premised upon the enduring effects of institutional and policy choices 
made at the initiation of a structure, is suited to explain the persistence and the 
evolution of patterns of central controls in Korea.  
The second major methodology is a quantitative analysis which is employed 
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to seek answers to the arguments specified above through a statistical case 
study. Quantitative research was often conceptualized as the polar opposite of 
qualitative research which emphasizes the need to understand society as social 
actors perceive and interpret it for the purpose of discovering underlying 
meanings and patterns of relationships (Johnson and Christensen, 2008). 
Qualitative and quantitative researches have philosophical roots in the 
naturalistic and the positivistic philosophies (Newman and Benz, 1998:2). 
Quantitative research employs cause and effect thinking, reduction to specific 
variables and hypotheses, use of measurement and observation, and the test of 
theories to develop correlations and hypotheses pertaining to social phenomena 
(Creswell, 2003:18). In particular, measurement is the critical process for the 
quantitative method because it provides the fundamental linking of concepts and 
ideas to empirical observation and facts. Therefore measurement validity must be 
ensured, which is achieved when numeric categories or scores meaningfully 
capture the idea contained in the corresponding concept (Adcock and Collier, 
2001). The quantitative method is better suited for this empirical research 
because it uses performance data which has been created by a great zest for 
performance measures in Korea. 
Specifically, the fixed effect panel data model is employed in a statistical 
analysis (see chapter 7). In panel data we can control a certain type of omitted 
variables called unobserved heterogeneity. The benefit of a fixed effect model is 
to correct unobserved heterogeneity and to establish causation using a 
regression coefficient. The unobserved individual heterogeneity is treated as if it 
is non-random and maybe correlated with observed individual heterogeneity. The 
problem of fixed effect is that time-invariant independent variables are left off in 
the analysis, but the current thesis is free from this drawback. The fixed effect of 
explanatory variables is the average effects in the entire population or 
organization, expressed by the regression coefficient. The fixed-effects 
components of this research incorporate year dummy and local government 
dummy to control the year difference and jurisdiction specific effects. The fixed 
effect estimator will always give consistent estimates but they may not be the 
most efficient (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005: 699). Therefore, the fixed effect panel 
data model is the most appropriate method for the statistical model of this thesis.  
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The statistical data do not always provide, in and of themselves, precise 
answers to the research inquiries but if the research employs well-controlled and 
meaningful variables for the objective explanation to test the hypothesis, 
empirically valuable solutions can be taken. For this work the most appropriate 
variables are incorporated in this research (see chapter 7). First, dependent 
variables in this research are the performance of local governments assessed by 
the Korean central government through JPA. They use the performance score of 
sixteen regional governments from 1999 to 2012 JPA (see Appendix 4). Second, 
the explanatory variables in order to verify the three hypotheses employ the 
different modes of central government controls along with the financial crises. For 
operationalization of central controls as explanatory variables, a nominal quantity 
is allocated to each specific mode of normative, remunerative and coercive 
controls in the area of fiscal institutions. Financial crises are measured by the 
economic growth rate. The regulations and statistical data of both financial 
policies and a financial crisis come from MOPAS and Local finance open system 
(lofin.mopas.go.kr). Third, control variables include the external and internal 
factors that possibly influence local government performance such as per capita 
GRDP, the political party in control of the region, and tenure of the governor or 
mayor.  
From these variables, two statistical models, the individual effect model and 
the combined effect model are established. The first model examines the 
individual effect of each mode of central control on local government 
performance. The second model examines the interacting effect of each central 
control mode with the financial crises. Data used in control variables were 
collected from the Korean Statistical Information Service (http://kosis.kr), the local 
administration information system of MOPAS (www.laiis.go.kr) and the internet 
websites. The statistical methods will be specified in greater detail in chapter 7. 
Consequently, two major methodologies are in complementary relation in 
developing the logic and arguments of this research. The historical 
institutionalism provides the understanding about central controls, financial crises, 
and the conclusive application of empirical findings, whilst the fixed effect panel 
data model allows us to test hypotheses and prove whether the current central-
local government relations militate in favour of local government. 
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5. Structure of the thesis 
This thesis consists of nine chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the background, 
purpose, questions, theoretical basis, scope and the methodologies of the 
research. The key question is how central controls have influenced local 
government performance since the transition toward local autonomy, with the 
moderating effect of financial crises. 
Chapter 2 mainly deals with central government’s control and local 
autonomy in Korea. Regarding local autonomy in Korea, the history and the 
institutional background are researched. At the same time, the following points 
related to central control by the Korea government are examined; what are the 
political cultural sources of central control; how it is exerted; how much opposition 
it generates; whether it is productive or destructive; and what direction future 
reform should take. Therefore Korean central-local relations which were 
historically formed will be understood in the process of local autonomy 
introduction and enforcement. 
Chapter 3 is dedicated to the understanding of fiscal crises. To analyse the 
concept, traits and theory of crisis, the well established literature on crisis is 
investigated. This helps in understanding different kinds of crises such as a 
state’s economic crisis and local government’s fiscal distress. Studies of crises 
such as the Korean financial crisis of 1997-8 and the global economic crisis of 
2007-8 will examine how these crises affected the financial policies and 
institutions of central and local governments in Korea.  
Chapter 4 concerns performance measurement of Korean local government. 
Following the review of the recent trend for performance management in some 
fore-runner countries, the introduction and development of performance 
management systems in Korea are examined. A profile of performance in Korean 
local government explains the comparison of performance management of local 
authorities with that of central government, and then Joint Performance 
Assessment, which is used as performance data in the statistical analysis of this 
study, is researched.   
Chapter 5 describes the fiscal policy and institutions of Korean local 
government. Following the investigation of the motivation for fiscal institutional 
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reform, a string of fiscal institutions such as program budgeting, accrual basis 
accounting, shared tax, and local income and consumption tax are explained. In 
particular local financial policies are looked into focusing on how central 
government keeps exercising its control and how local autonomy is increased 
and decreased in a specific fiscal policy.    
Chapter 6 explores conceptual links between central control, crisis and local 
performance in order to provide a theoretical framework for the research 
hypotheses. First, theoretical grounds about the relationship between central 
government control and local government performance are examined. Then a 
series of hypotheses are established to prove the effect of each mode of controls 
exercised by central government on local government performance, taking into 
account financial crises which are assumed to have a modulating effect.  
Chapter 7 establishes the research models and defines the variables of the 
models in order to undertake robust statistical analysis with sufficient theoretical 
and practical possibilities for the empirical verification of the arguments. After 
conducting the statistical simulation, chapter 8 enumerates empirical results and 
explores the pattern of findings regarding the relations between central controls, 
fiscal crises, and local performance.   
Chapter 9 expands the arguments reflected in the empirical results by 
revisiting the research questions and deploying insight drawn from historical 
institutionalism.  With up-to-date institutional changes this chapter explores the 
policy implications of this study: what direction future reform should be in, how 
effective control can be as a way of enhancing the performance of local 
governments, and what a desired path could be for central-local government 
relations.  
The final chapter summaries this research, emphasizing all important 
findings and suggesting lessons for the development of central-local relations. It 
also outlines the distinctive contributions made by this thesis whilst taking 
account of the difficulties of this research with some implications for further 
research.  
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Chapter 2. Central controls and local government in 
Korea 
 1. Why central controls? 
The argument of this thesis is that since local autonomy was introduced in the 
mid-1990s, the democratic change in central controls can be expected to have 
positively influenced local government but, due to the recent financial crises, this 
link might be attenuated. In this context, this chapter investigates the institutional 
origin of central controls and its impact on the formation of local autonomy in 
Korea. Central control is used in this research is a synonym for central 
government’s regulating and steering of local government in central-local 
government relations. Controls can be defined, in abstract parlance, as whatever 
keeps the state of any given system within some desired subset of all its possible 
states (Hood et al, 2004: 5). This can be properly applied to the relations of 
central and local government. Central government exerts control over local 
governments in order to ensure equity between local governments, to strengthen 
their accountability, and to ensure their compliance with national policy. The 
central government makes institutions and policies resulting in central 
government being involved in the personnel, organization and finance of local 
government in formal or informal ways.  
    However, controversy has existed regarding whether central controls have a 
constructive or damaging effect on local government. Localism believes that 
central government distrusts local government; the centralist approach could 
aggravate policy problems because central government is remote from the actual 
issues being faced locally (Jones and Stewart, 2012). Hepworth (1977:11) 
indicated the centrally operated controls which would be designed to influence 
local spending would lead to a shift of power to central government and would 
reduce efficiency. Michael Power (2005) criticized the UK’s audit explosion in that 
it provided only a precarious reassurance while potentially undermining an ethos 
of professional self-regulation. On the other hand, centralists believe that the 
large number of regulations and directives, detailed prescription and guidance 
are necessary ways to effectively control local government. The Local Autonomy 
 36 
Act of Korea, as well as the Localism Act of the UK, contains many examples of 
ministerial powers to issue orders and regulation (Jones and Stewart, 2012). The 
World Bank seems to incorporate those positivist views. It observed that regimes 
with formal oversight of the public sector were one of the critical success factors 
for the public service reform efforts which the World Bank sponsored over the 
1990s (World Bank, 1999).  
It seems clear that recently central controls have gradually evolved to new 
modes, confronting the changed policy environment, although the coercive 
aspect in central controls came through strongly in the past. There has been a 
pronounced shift toward an increase in autonomy and performance of local 
government with a simultaneous attempt to increase centralized controls over 
management and strategy. Chapter 5 will look at this trend in the fiscal 
institutional changes. During the most recent period there has been a substantial 
development of performance assessment as central controls move toward 
indirect not formal and external control. In particular, the NPM styled reform in 
early the 2000s was based on the assumption that in the absence of coercive 
controls, local compliance to the new system is best achieved by developing 
shared norms and commitment rather than through passive accommodation. 
This research focuses on central controls in the context of the central-local 
government relationship. The tendency of central controls may be traced from the 
recursive history of centralism and decentralism. Central controls have been 
persistent since the kingdoms which for centuries governed the Korean peninsula. 
The tradition of state ordered rule over local government had been anticipated to 
change, since the Korean local autonomy system for the first time was 
institutionalized in 1949 after the foundation of the Republic of Korea. As noted in 
chapter 1, however, without any substantial fruit, local autonomy had ceased to 
exist by 1991 because of a military coup; and at last was resurrected in 1995. 
Considering this transition, the questions cannot be avoided regarding what has 
happened to central control in each historical stage; and what opposition the 
persistence of central control has caused. This part focuses on the historical 
legacy of centralism on the local autonomy in Korea. In studies of historical 
institutionalism the period division is formed according to standards based on 
empirical data or putative breakpoints to track the path of an institution (Thelen, 
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2006). The general approach to division of the period is to follow the exogenous 
shocks along the path and evolution of an institution. The origin of centralized 
path dependence is the period of the Goryeo (918-1392) because since then the 
factors of central control have been seen, though it was piecemeal and 
intermittent during that period. In the Chosun Dynasty (1392-1910), however, 
centralism dominated public areas and reached all parts of the localities. 
 
2. The history of centralism in Korea  
2.1. Pre-war period (A.D. 10thC- 20thC) 
The Chosun Dynasty was a highly centralized authoritarian regime influenced by 
Confucianism as the ruling principle. The central government exercised absolute 
power in every sphere (An, B.M., 1997:316). The control over local government 
by the centre had no legal limits and was based on the monistic order view of 
Confucianism. This perspective emphasises monolithic and centralized ruling as 
a rational system. Chosun employed the province to control local agencies. The 
provinces were intermediate bodies, standing between the state and the 
municipalities, which were directly controlled by central government and at the 
same time had control of interpretations of the law and exerted judicial power in 
the municipalities. The provinces of the Chosun Dynasty were called ‘Do’ which 
are the basis of today’s provinces, namely the upper local government level. The 
central government dispatched state bureaucrats to the province (Do) and the 
municipalities (Gun and Hyun) which were established under Do, therefore local 
administration of the Chosun period was operated by powerful state bureaucrats 
and actually central control reached all over the country.  The origin of the ‘Do’ 
provinces and the dispatched bureaucrats can be seen in some regions but not 
every region even in the Goryeo Dynasty (Han, Y.W., 2004:199).  
In Korea’s highly Confucian society, centralism is supported by the special 
ideology of Confucianism as well as by the local administrative system. 
Confucianism is based on the direct, obedient confrontation between ruled and 
ruler. ‘Obedience was deeply ingrained:  the government – an encompassing 
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control mechanism built into the home, extending to clan, academy, or family – 
organized administration and education so that no large group could exercise 
right and responsibility (Henderson, 1968: 25)’. Government and administration 
entwined with religious precept and thus innovation and change were fettered 
and lack of alternative careers whetted political concern (ibid: 26).  
Confucian principles were intensified as social values through strong 
doctrine and impressive texts, rites and ceremonies, which were complex and 
demanding. As for the common people it was costly to participate in the dominant 
value system. Confucianism aggravated the problem of insufficient general 
participation in the political, ethical, and religious system (Henderson, 1968: 25). 
The political ethics based on Confucianism, however, could be applied to 
allow traditional local autonomy principles, according to Korean studies (An, C.S. 
and Kim, M.H., 1994: 14; Park, D.S., 1979: 321): for example, the local agencies 
called Yuhyangso, Hangyak and Hyangchung were advisory agencies for local 
officials dispatched from the centre; these agencies were not as part of national 
bureaucracy but as an expression of the autonomy of the local community. 
However, these were not representative agencies of residents but monopolised 
by a few powerful families to protect their status and prestige from local officials 
rather than to promote all residents’ interests and welfare. Therefore, it is difficult 
to call it an ‘autonomy system’ which in today’s language means that ordinary 
people participate in governing their community under their own intentions and 
responsibilities.  
In summary, the persistence of highly centralized government control and 
local government structures was found in the pre-war Goreyo and Chosun 
Dynasties over very long stretches of time. Particularly in Chosun, the religio-
political combination served to knot society together into an obedient whole, 
which while it did work for enormous centralization, it fettered the autonomous 
systems. 
 
2.2. Japanese Colonial Rule (1910-1945) 
The Japanese invasion can be considered as an exogenous shock which 
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affected Korean socio-political institutions. Chosun lost full sovereign status in 
1910 and was under colonial rule for 36 years, falling under the direct rule of the 
monolithic administrative institution of the centre. Changes in the socioeconomic 
context and political balance of power resulting from the Japanese rule produced 
the institutional dynamism in which central control, as the old institution, was put 
to a different end. As a new actor, Japan pursued its goal, militaristic colonial rule, 
by changing existing political administrative structures. In 1914, as a preliminary 
preparation for the major change, Japan began to reorganize Korean local areas 
into 13 Do(regions), 12 Bu(cities), 220 Gun(counties) and 2521 Myeon (towns) in 
order to effectively control the nation (Choi, B.G., 1990). During the first decade 
of annexation, Koreans were denied all access to political power (Henderson, 
1968: 101). In the early 1930s, evolutionary changes occurred in central-local 
government relations; a full local institutional reform was carried out by the 
colonialists, which followed Japanese state-directed local autonomy and 
implemented bureaucratic control over the localities after the Japanese model 
which originated from Germany. The local organization, ‘Do’ as the upper local 
government, and ‘Bu’ and ‘Eup’ as the lower local governments were established 
and entitled to be corporate entities divided into an executive government and a 
legislative body(Choi, B.G., 1990). The executive mayor was appointed by the 
Japanese government and held the position of a chairman for the council as well. 
However, under the Japanese colonial rule its centralism and sternness 
dominated society rather than allowing local autonomy (Park, D.S., 1979: 321; An, 
B.M., 1997:317). 
The power of legislation too was restricted by the law; the head of the 
executive body could also be the president of the legislative body and thus could 
constrain the power of legislation; most of all, the right of the people to vote was 
too limited (Choi, B.G., 1990). For example, in the election system, an equal 
number of candidates to the number of representatives was recommended by 
authorities and automatically elected regardless of the vote. The fundamental 
feature of Japanese rule was militarism so the path of centralism was continued. 
The bureaucracy as a symbol of public power reigned over the different political 
and social forces, and was undemocratic and authoritarian toward people. Even 
after a major institutional change in local government systems, there was 
sufficient force for the tendency of central controls to be sustained for a 
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considerable period. Critically in theory it said there was institutional change but 
in practice central control and changed institutions intrinsically constrained 
political participation by the people. 
 
2.3. The foundation of the republic (1946 – 1960)  
In the aftermath of independence from Japan, Korea was, for three years, under 
the direction of the U.S military government. The US military authority chose to 
retain Japanese colonial agencies for a while rather than destroy them because 
the US army had not made any preparations and measures for governing Korea. 
The Republic of Korea grounded on liberal democracy was resumed on 
15thAugust in 1948. The Korean legislators created a western constitutional 
democracy with American advice. The constitution was an uneasy mixture of 
democracy and autocracy (Henderson, 1968:158). It provided a system of checks 
and balances, separation of power and gave people democratic rights and 
freedom. Local autonomy was stipulated as one of the democratic institutions (An, 
C.S. et al., 1994: 274). However, there were discomforting signs that power 
converged on a strong president. In the same year, the central government 
regulated the succession of the prior administrative districts based on the 
Japanese colonial era’s province system (Choi, B.G., 1990), and the 
establishment of state bureaucrats in all local organizations (NA, 2013).The idea 
of a constitution for democratization was too ambitious for the actual political and 
administrative condition of Korea. America’s attempt in Korea to build new 
cohesion around democratic institutions had, in an unplanned setting and with 
prevailing centralism, been overwhelmed by autocracy (Henderson, 1968). 
Finally the Local Autonomy Act stipulating the first modern local institutions 
ever in Korea was enacted on 4th July 1949. However local councils could not be 
formed right after the Act was passed due to continuing disturbances in public 
security. Local elections at first were scheduled to be carried out at the end of 
1950, but, after once more being postponed by the Korean War, finally became 
operative in 1952. 
The Local Autonomy Act was exploited for the political manipulations which 
formed the ground work for the Liberal Party’s long term seizure of power (see 
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below Figure 2-1). The law was revised to appoint the executive mayor and 
governor by central government, and for the chief executive to get central 
government’s approval regarding matters which previously needed the vote of 
local councils. President Syngman Rhee was widely known for trying to expand 
his rule by exploiting the local autonomy system. The prospect for Rhee’s re-
election in 1952 through the National Assembly was bleak because at that time 
the National Assembly was dominated by the opposition, Democratic National 
party 1 . By contrast, the President held strong popular support outside the 
National Assembly. The President attempted to mobilize local politicians who 
were favourable to his government, and tried to go further in order to revise the 
Constitution for direct presidential election (Lee, D.G. 1996). His attempt to shape 
the Constitution in favour of a system of direct presidential election was an 
eventual failure. 
The 1st Republic came to an end through the April revolution which was a 
popular uprising in April 1960 led by labour and student groups (see below Figure 
2-1). The overturn of the Rhee autocracy brought to the helm a democratic 
regime. The 2nd Constitution stipulated that the method of election for the head of 
local government should be regulated by law and residents should directly elect 
at least the head of municipalities. However, the peaceful regime was overthrown 
by a military coup in 1961. After the establishment of a military government, for 
more than thirty years the Republic of Korea was ruled by dictatorship and a 
military government with high centralized government control.  
 
2.4. The military regime (1961- 1992) 
The 3rd Republic, created by the 5.16 military coup (see below Figure 2-1), 
carried the banner for national security and economic development, and 
reinforced the centralization of power. The committee for military revolution 
abolished all local councils through a national declaration. The military regime 
criticized the local autonomy system as inefficient, corrupt and conflict-raising on 
the grounds of the experience of local autonomy in the previous governments. 
                                               
1
 At that time the president was indirectly elected by national assemblymen (Lee, D.G., 1996) 
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Efficiency based on centralization and uniformity was believed to be the best 
principle for modernization. 
From the institutional perspective the suspension of local autonomy was 
perpetuated by the provisions and interpretations of the Constitution and related 
law. The Constitution of the third Republic stipulated that matters related to the 
organizations and management of local autonomy should be regulated by a law, 
however the enactment was postponed so that local autonomy could not be 
implemented. According to the Constitution of the 4th Republic (Yushin 2 
Constitution) local councils should not be formed until the unification has been 
achieved. The Constitution of the 5th Republic delayed extending local autonomy 
on the pretext of the weak local financial base.  
The dominance of a strong central control in the rapid industrialization 
process created a path dependency for a distinctive pattern of central-local 
relationships different from that of the western democracies (Bae and Sellers, 
2007). Highly capable Korean bureaucrats controlled finance and resources 
through national banks (Chang, 1995; see section 2 of chapter 3). ‘Five year 
economic development plans (Five-Year Plan)’ provided administrative and 
financial aid to highly competitive industries. Central government selected 
regions and cities for industrialization. In this process, regional and local 
developments were dependent upon the central government’s policies (Bae and 
Sellers, 2007).  
As economic conditions improved enough to meet subsistence level, a 
variety of values began to appear in society. A substantive means for 
democratization was needed because the centralized authoritarian regime had 
taken power over a long history (Lee D.G., 1996). Decentralization was one of 
the alternatives providing potential limits on a centralized system and 
bureaucracy. People regarded local autonomy as the most effective system for 
democratization to expel centralized authoritarianism in the areas of politics, 
economy and society. From the mid-1980s opposition parties and the people 
insisted on an urgent and strong local autonomy system and suggested, as one 
of the urgent problems. 
                                               
2
 Yushin means to change an old system to new one.  
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In response to the hectic democratization movement, a special declaratory 
speech was delivered by Roh Tae-woo, the presidential candidate of the 
ruling Democratic Justice Party, on 29 June 1987. In the declaration, Roh 
promised significant concessions to opponents of the incumbent authoritarian 
regime and promised to amend the constitution to provide for the direct election 
of the president and to strengthen local autonomy. Consequently, by the National 
Assembly members of the 6th Republic, the Local Autonomy Act was fully revised 
to extend local autonomy in 1988. In essence, the revision aimed to increase 
local democracy but also included many examples of ministerial control over local 
government; for example, the Ministry of Interior could control the establishment 
of administrative organizations and stipulate the maximum number of local public 
officials of local governments (Im, S,B., 2008: 65). 
The authoritarian military regime emphasized the national economy and 
security, and suspended local autonomy to strengthen central control. The 
economic success of the ‘developmental state’ model which Korea pursued 
provided a form of legitimisation but also provided a basis for decentralisation 
and democratisation. Central control had persisted because the local autonomy 
implementation did not happen despite revisions of the law. This supports the 
argument that from the perspective of historical institutionalism ‘founding political 
institutions tend to establish or codify a particular distribution of power and 
authority which tend to reproduce itself’ (Ikenberry, 1994:20). 
 
2.5. The 6thRepublic to present day (1992-) 
The ruling party of the 6th Republic was unfavourable to local autonomy although 
President Kim Young-sam, elected in 1993, promised full-fledged local autonomy 
in his campaign and a law was passed in parliament that the election of the head 
of localities should be carried out in June 1995. Just before the local election date, 
June 27, 1995 set by the law, several politicians raised their voices to defer the 
local election once again. However, even politicians could not act against public 
opinion which felt strongly that local elections and autonomy should not be 
deferred any more. With the growth of civic political awareness, people believed 
that an autonomy system was needed to deal with the centralized bureaucracy 
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and local politics. In 1995 when all kinds of council members’ terms terminated, 
four sorts of elections took place for council members, and the heads of regional 
and municipal governments (Park, C.W., 2002). These were carried out at the 
same time in spite of the hesitations of the government party and leading 
politicians. These integrated elections have been implemented every four year 
since then.  
Four distinct sources of institutional change can be found that possibly 
encouraged the creation of local autonomy as an alternative to central controls. 
First, the development of the economy produced a situation in which the 
previously latent democratization of central-local relations and local autonomy 
suddenly became salient, thereby laying the groundwork for local autonomy as 
one of the sources of institutional dynamism, the interaction of institutions and the 
political process (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992:16). The average economic growth 
rate of Korea from 1981 to 1990 was 9.1%. As economic conditions greatly 
exceeded the subsistence level in the 1980s, the 6th Constitution opened the 
legal possibility for local autonomy. People conceived the idea of democratizing 
the centralized authoritarian government by a local autonomy system.  
Second, the political balance of power experienced ‘critical junctures’ during 
which the usual constraints on action were lifted. A radical thrust or drastic reform 
and revolution arose among disadvantage groups (Lee, J.S., 1996: 61). The 
unbalanced regional development was attributed to the policy of the authoritative 
governments. The political roots of social problems were unveiled. For example, 
a confidential document was opened to the public, which contained the politically 
sensitive revelation that the National Security Planning Agency (NSP) had 
investigated the possibility of reorganizing the administrative districts before 
elections and of postponing the local elections, in February 1995 (Lee, D.G., 
1996:134). The opposition party launched a political attack on the undemocratic 
practices of the NSP operation and the government plot to delay the local 
election. This laid a political burden on the government and the ruling party. A 
series of political situations opened up opportunities for the opposition party to 
alter the trajectory of local autonomy.  
Third, political actors adjusted their strategies to accommodate changes in 
the institutions themselves. A grand coalition among the Democratic Justice Party 
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(governing party), the Unification Democratic Party, and the New Democratic 
Republican Party was achieved in 1990 to create a concentrated ruling party, the 
Democratic Liberal Party3 (see Figure2-1). Many people considered this coalition 
as the retreat of democracy. The leading group felt the strong necessity of 
breaking the political impasse they experienced after the merger of the three 
political parties, although the majority of assemblymen were not so individually 
favourable towards having local elections. The opposition leader, Kim Daejung 
took the initiative in opening up the democratic society by attacking the hesitating 
government, calling for it to yield to his demand for comprehensive local elections 
(Lee, D.G. 1996: 139). As a result, the governing party and President Kim Young-
sam had no choice but to succumb to the public demand. 
Fourth, the power of public ideas was an important factor for the changing of 
institutions. People strongly asked the government for fully-fledged local 
autonomy (Lee D.G. 1996: 134) and the issue of local autonomy became 
suddenly important. Public sentiment against central control on the basis of the 
social and economic development assisted in encouraging extended local 
autonomy. In this environment, the staunchly conservative bureaucrats were 
slowly changing their minds toward local autonomy in the light of public opinion. 
Also a string of public education campaigns and debates contributed to enabling 
the ordinary citizen to appreciate the value of local autonomy (An, C.S. et al., 
2002: 33)  
In conclusion, it can be observed that institutional change was brought about 
through interactions between politicians and institutions. Enforcement of local 
autonomy was a challenge for centralism, though various central controls 
remained effective. Institutional changes were incremental and critical to bring 
out a major change in the future. In the analysis that follows, we will look at how 
these centralizing trends impacted Korean local autonomy. Certainly the centrally 
operated controls which would be designed to influence local government 
seemed to lead to a shift of power to local government but in reality maintained 
the control of central government. 
                                               
3 Kim Young-sam of the Unification Democratic Party was a democratic activist who opposed the 
military dictatorship under Park Junghee but unexpectedly merged his party with aristocratic 
military parties (Democratic Justice Party and New Democratic Republican party) to position 
favourably in the 1992 presidential election.  
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Figure 2-1. Path of governments and parties in Korea  
 
    Source:  reorganized from ‘The history of party’ in Korea JoongAng Daily 15/06/09’ 
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3. Characteristics of local autonomy in Korea  
3.1. The rationale of local autonomy  
Centralized bureaucracy has been the dominant concern in the history of 
administrative reform in Korea (Jung, Y.D., 1999: 8) as noted above. In countries 
with a comparatively short history of modern democracy and uncultured political 
systems, the matter of local autonomy was mainly discussed in the process of 
democratization in the 1980s (Kim, M.H., 1994).  
The reason for which local autonomy is demanded can be extended to the 
theoretical groundings of local government. First, local government contributes to 
bringing about democracy and affording opportunities for political participation 
(Sharpe, 1970; Ola, 1984). Because local government encourages political 
activities such as turning out to vote in elections, interest group activities and 
participation, and provides a forum for the argument and discussion of political 
issues, it functions as a buttress of democracy (Tocqueville, 1969: 675; Mill, J.S., 
1910: 385-390). It promotes equity in the political sense that it provides broad 
opportunities for citizens to participate in public policy.  
Local autonomy of Korea was considerably influenced by the democratic 
theory. In much of the literature local autonomy came through as a democratic 
principle based on popular sovereignty in the process of establishing the overall 
institutions of a modern nation-state (An, C.S.and Kim, M.H, 1994: 275; Lee D.G., 
1996; Kim, M.H., 1994). Local autonomy began to be discussed as one of the 
main issues in Korea in the heat of the pro-democracy movement of the 1980s. 
Finally the dynamic political interaction over a decade brought about the 
implementation of local autonomy to increase democracy in Korea. 
Second, in the aspect of efficiency, local government is closer to the citizens. 
When local government is judged by its success in providing services up to a 
standard measured by a national inspectorate’, because of its closeness to an 
area, it can provide certain services far more efficiently than the central 
government. Local government can exercise ‘authoritative horizontal coordination’ 
– it can achieve effective ‘joining up’ at the local level which should enhance 
efficiency (Sharpe, 1970) 168). The advantage of local government over central 
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government is that it is more likely to know the inimitable characteristics of each 
locality and adjust the administration of the service accordingly. Sharpe(1970; 
166) further put forward that the performance of efficient services is so 
compelling that, if local government did not already exist, field agencies manned 
by staff residents would be created in its place.  
This efficient perspective of local government was not supported at least in 
the early stage of introduction of local autonomy in Korea, as the favourable 
attitude towards a centralized governing system continued over a long history; 
additionally when implementing local autonomy for the first time in the 1st republic, 
various inefficiencies were witnessed. As a result people were unlikely to 
consider local autonomy as an efficient organization (Lee, D.G., 1996). It seems 
clear that any readjustment in central-local government relationships has been 
aimed at enhancing efficiency of local public service provision and delivery rather 
than empowering local democracy or autonomy. Since performance management 
was introduced in the public sector, national audit and inspection have mainly 
checked whether local governments meet nationally agreed standards. 
Third, in the respect of balanced development, policies and programmes 
implemented by local government with the support, arrangement and monitoring 
of central government would decongest monolithic central control and gradually 
introduce a greater national cooperation through the interaction of local and 
central government (Ola, 1984: 15). It appears that if local government is well led, 
it is in a better position than central government to stimulate initiatives, cultivate 
citizenship and policy learning, and encourage drive and experimentation in the 
people.  
The view of the balanced development is highlighted from the point that a lot 
of policy experiments are carried out first at the local level by the central 
government and attempts to reconstruct the infrastructure necessary for 
improving residents’ way of life are successfully enforced. Certain polices such 
as the public transportation system, the construction of schools, and 
management of sewage facilities without leaks and clean water systems have 
developed far better than the respective policies by central government. Local 
government’s leading role in the balanced development incorporates the positive 
views of the increasing importance of local government.  
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In conclusion, currently all three perspectives of democracy, efficiency and 
balanced development are demanded from the role of the Korean local 
government. In reality, the lack of political power and the controls exercised by 
central government always hamper local government from exerting their best 
ability. The next part looks at how the institutions of Korean central-local relations 
have sustained central controls.  
 
3.2. The legislative power of local government   
Korean local government is based on the principle of local autonomy in the 
constitution. The constitution includes a section for local government. Article 117 
stipulates “local governments shall deal with administrative matters pertaining to 
the welfare of local residents, and may enact their own provisions relating to local 
autonomy, within the limit of laws and regulations”. The constitution apparently 
permits the Korean local government to have ‘a power of general competence’ 
unless laws and regulations specify otherwise. The constitutional status of local 
government in Korea embodies no formal principal of ultra vires. This might mean 
that the local government has the ability to engage in any activities not expressly 
prohibited by national laws (Park, C.M., 2003:12). However, the formal 
institutions do not fully elucidate the actual working of central controls in the 
central-local government relations (see section 2 in chapter 1). The central 
government makes use of delegated legislation to control local government 
through executive and ministerial regulations. For example, central government 
can regulate the expense of local council member’s activities and monitor the 
legislation of ordinance of local government by the ministerial regulations 
according to Article 33 and 33-2 respectively of the Local Autonomy Act. More 
importantly central government applies a narrow interpretation to the power of 
general competence of local government. According to Article 15 of the Local 
Autonomy Act, “local government may enact ordinances within the laws and 
executive regulations”. When it comes to the rights and the duties of residents, 
the central government has maintained the view that local government requires 
clear powers of delegation mandated by national laws (Kim, J.S., 2006: 9). In 
particular, administrative guidance is the most controversial tool the central 
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government uses to control the local government’s salient decisions. The central 
government’s intervention in the businesses of local government is often not 
explicitly based on laws made by the National Assembly and hence, local 
government is vulnerable to politically motivated control of the central 
government (Park, C.M., 2003:13). The local government is subject to the de 
facto ultra vires rule and lacks meaningful autonomy and discretion in the 
management of local affairs (Park, C.M., 2003:12). In conclusion, although local 
governments have their fields of responsibility, they may not exercise general 
legislative power, or such power is at best limited as in the United Kingdom. 
  
3.3. Fiscal dependence on the centre 
Fiscal autonomy is the authority through which the local government can collect 
the finance needed for dealing with administrative matters pertaining to the 
welfare of local residents, and independently manages the financial resources 
that the local government collects. Korean local government raises finance from 
three sources: independent income (local tax, fees and charges), 
intergovernmental transfers (local shared tax and grant) and borrowing.  
The most important means to mobilize resources is taxation which is the 
most basic factor in the emergence of the nation state, political institutions and 
the idea of ‘citizen’ with obligations as well as rights (Tilly, 1995:227). The taxes 
which the Korean local government can impose are determined by law, with the 
rates of local taxes varying only within a limited range. The local council does not 
have the authority to decide the items taxed or the rate of local tax, but it is 
through the central government that most standards like taxed items, rate and 
assessment rules of local tax are regulated in the form of law. Over the past ten 
years or so, the transferring of tax sources to local government has rarely been 
done, because Centralists think that local government has inadequate 
accountability and self-discipline. The distribution ratio of tax revenue sources 
between central and local government is eight to two, though the size of local 
government expenditure has grown much faster than that of the central 
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government4.  
Much of growth in local government was financed by intergovernmental 
transfers before the introduction of local income tax (see chapter 5). Transfers 
include local shared tax, grant and provincial & metropolitan revenue sharing to 
achieve a national minimum for public services (KRILA, 2011). Especially local 
shared tax accounted for 12% in 1991 but gradually increased to 19% of total 
local income in 2014. The bulk of grant grew from 8.1% in 1991 to 21% of total 
local income in 2014 (LOFIN, 2015). This type of grant is hypothecated to 
specific services such as construction, sewage disposal facilities and social 
welfare programmes. Conversely, the matching fund mechanism of grants, 
meaning that local government must bear a certain portion of the fund as well, 
sometimes proved to threaten local financial stability. The problem is that the cost 
of matching fund projects grows faster than own-generated revenue and local 
government lacks available resources. In particular, decentralization of increasing 
social welfare programmes put local government in the financially vulnerable 
condition. A local public finance structure enhanced by intergovernmental 
transfers has a propensity to lead local government to become dependent on 
intergovernmental transfers instead of expanding self-financed revenue (Jung, 
J.F. et al., 2004). The MOGAHA controls of local government access to borrowing 
for capital purpose, as a result, local government’s funding by borrowing is 
considerably limited. 
A majority of Korean local governments experience low levels of financial 
autonomy. As of 2004, more than half of them depended on the central 
government for more than 70% of their budgets (Park, C.M., 2003). This proves 
most local governments in Korea tend to spend far more than what they collect 
through self-financed revenue. Consequently their financial discretion gets 
reduced and they have to desperately depend on central government for 
supplementing their annual expenditure as well as for financing their capital 
projects. Thus central control of local finance is exceedingly tight, while local 
discretion to shape spending priorities is slight. 
                                               
4
 During recent years, the average ratio of central and local expenditure of overall government 
budget was about 40% to 60%. 
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3.4. The functional base of local government  
The respective functions of local governments and the central government are 
not clearly defined and many policy decisions are made at the central level. The 
Local Autonomy Act lists the functions of the provinces and metropolitan 
governments and the basic level localities, and those that remain under the 
prerogative of the central government such as diplomacy, defence, tax and the 
judicial system. Daily public services that residents rely on are provided by local 
government from picking up the garbage and cleaning the streets, to care of the 
elderly and vulnerable. These local government affairs have a degree of central 
government involvement, although local government is legally stated to be 
responsible for the residents’ social welfare, the development of agriculture, 
commerce and industry, the improvement of living environment, the promotion of 
education, culture, the civil defence system and fire service. It is notable that, 
although the constitution gives local government a general grant of authority, the 
law excludes police functions from its purview.  
Table 2-1 Functions of local government  
Function Expenditure 
Billion ￦ % 
General public service 17,103 9.6 
Disaster prevention & Civil defence 3,550 2.0 
Education 10,357 5.8 
Culture &Tourism 9,399 5.3 
Environmental Protection: water, waste management, nature protection  17,664 9.9 
Social Welfare: basic livelihood support, marginal class,  
childcare, senior citizens & juveniles,  
38,782 21.9 
Health: medical service, food & medicine safety 2,590 1.4 
Agriculture, Forest, Fishery 12,712 7.1 
Economic affairs: Industrial promotion, Investment attraction 3,890 2.1 
Transportation: roads, city railway, public transportation   18,321 10.3 
Regional development: water supply, housing, community 14,760 8.3 
Science & Technology 777 0.4 
Reserved Budget and Others 27,080 15.3 
 176,992 100 
 Source: adapted from Local government Finance Yearbook (MOPAS, 2013) 
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The local government also has no direct control over the provision of educational 
services within its geographic boundaries (Park, C.M., 2003:12). Especially in 
education, there is a large discrepancy between the size of local expenditure and 
the extent of local autonomy. The central government assumes the primary 
financial responsibility for education while autonomous educational bodies deliver 
the educational services, acting as agencies of the central government (KRILA, 
2011). 
The functional base of Korean local government was substantially weak but 
recently has been strengthened with decentralization policies (Park, C.M., 2003: 
12). Although it is difficult to strictly compare the distribution of activities between 
central and local government, only one-fourth of state functions were classified 
as local in 1997 according to a government study (Park, H.J., 2002).  Since the 
political devolution, beginning of local autonomy, in 1991, central government has 
decentralised the power in different ways and to different degrees. When 
transferred activities which were transferred in the Roh Mu-hyun government and 
the Lee Myung-bak government are taken into account, the current function of 
local government would be estimated as less than one-third of total state 
functions. Moreover the human resources and finance which should have 
accompanied the devolution were not properly passed on to local governments. 
Therefore a variety of issues like the improvement of the professionalism of 
devolved services, and diverse decentralization methods according to each local 
government were discussed. 
Another notable example of shallow functional base is the presence of 
single-purpose government appointed agencies not subject to local electoral 
control but rather under central administrative control (Park, C.M., 2003: 12). 
These special agencies, whose work is parallel to that of local government, 
greatly narrow the scope of local government. The original objective was to 
decentralise certain limited activities that the central government must do and 
local government cannot undertake because of their specialty. They are Post, 
Correctional Service, Regional Construction Management Administration, Patriot 
and Veteran Affairs, Regional Tax Service, Customs, Meteorological Office, Small 
&Medium Business Corporation and Public Procurement. The scale of them 
increased enormously during the 1990s and their influence over the local 
 54 
community are beyond local government authority. Therefore, the proliferation of 
single-purpose government appointed agencies breaks up the structure of local 
governance and undermines the existence of any meaningful local autonomy 
(Park, C.M., 2003: 12). In short, local autonomy was begun with the expectation 
of increasing democracy, efficiency and balancing regional development. 
Nevertheless, the current local government system has multi-dimensional issues 
to be solved. Political rearrangement with emphasis on professional competence 
is needed to overcome the issues and increase local democracy. 
4. Local governments in Korea 
4.1. External and internal structure 
Korea is a unitary state like the UK, where governmental power is delegated by 
the central government to local governments. All the regions are treated alike and 
all institutions are directly under central control (Rhodes et al., 2003: 6). Korea 
has a two-tier system. The reorganization of local government has been a 
political agenda over recent years. Sejong Sepecial Self-governing Metropolitan 
City was created in 2012 and then Chungju-Si and Chungwon-Gun were merged 
in 2014. As a result, South Korea consists of 17 regional governments and 226 
basic local governments as of January 2015. The regional government is very 
large organization and includes the Special Metropolitan City of Seoul, and 6 
metropolitan cities (metropolitan Si), Sejong Sepecial Self-governing Metropolitan 
City, 8 provinces (Do), and Jeju Special Self-governing Province (see Figure 2-2). 
The local (municipal) level is composed of municipalities, such as 75 autonomous 
cities (Si), 82 rural districts (Gun) and 69 autonomous urban districts (Gu) 
(MOGAHA, 2015a, see Figure 2-2 ). This two tier structure of local government 
has been influenced by the Japanese model.  
There are currently over 3,692 elected council members and 226 mayors 
and 17 metropolitan and provincial executive presidents serving on 243 regional 
and municipal local governments, having on average about 202,000 inhabitants 
(MOGAHA, 2015b). As of December 2014, there are 278,330 local public officials 
including regional and municipal local governments (MOGAHA, 2014), which is 
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half the level of the 615,490 national executive government officials. The number 
of regional government (metropolitan Si and provincial Do) officials is 78,896 and 
municipal local (Si/Gun/autonomous Gu) government officials is 199,434 
including officials in towns and villages (Eup/Myeon/Dong) (MOPAS, 2010).  
 
Figure 2-2. Two-tier structure of the Korean local government  
 
 
As for internal structure, the form of local government in Korea reflects 
democratic institutional principles such as a separation of powers, and checks 
and balances (see Figure 2-3). Executive power belongs to the chief executive, 
the mayor or governor, while legislative power belongs to the local council5. The 
political management structure of local government is similar to that of the strong 
mayor- council system in the USA.  
A governor or mayor represents the local government and has the 
responsibility for the staff and resources of all frontline business areas. An 
                                               
5
 In the UK, the term of local authorities created by and exercising responsibilities conferred by 
Parliament in the UK, is often used interchangeably with council (Wilson and Game, 2006: 93); 
however, in Korea, the term of local government is understood in a limited sense an executive 
body of local authority; in a broad sense both an executive body and a council.  
 
 56 
executive body of local government is endowed with appropriate legal power and 
independently exercises its power at its own discretion under the range derived 
from the constitution. The governor administers and enforces affairs delegated to 
the head by Acts and may delegate part of the affairs under their competence to 
an auxiliary or administrative organs under their control. The arrangement of local 
government departments in Korea is similar to that of the council departments in 
the UK: some provide services direct to the public such as transportation or 
social services; some provide a servicing role for other departments such as 
finance or personnel; each department is headed by a chief officer. 
 
Figure 2-3. Organization Chart of Seoul Metropolitan City 
 
 
Local councils represent citizens’ interests and the powers to supervise or 
scrutinize local administration. Local councils have authority to decide by 
resolution the following: enactment, revision and abolition of Municipal 
Ordinances; deliberation and confirmation of a budget; approval of settlement of 
accounts; imposition and collection of user fee, commission, allotted charges, 
local tax and entrance fee; establishment and disposal of public facilities; 
acceptance and resolution of petitions; matters concerning interchange and 
cooperation with foreign local governments (KRILA, 2011).  The local council is 
composed of standing committees (finance and economy, culture & tourism, 
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construction, transportation, education, administration, environment and water 
resources, health and welfare, city planning management, public safety), special 
committees and council secretariat supporting committees and councillors (see 
Figure 2-3). The regular session of each local council is held twice each year, in 
June or July and in November or December. The chairperson can convenes the 
extraordinary session within fifteen days.  
The mayor is provided with superior power and authority, greater than that of 
the local council, in the aspect of legal, administrative and personnel resources 
(An, C.S. et al., 2002: 24). The mayor and the local council are officially stated to 
share budgeting, legislation of ordinances and other policy-making functions. 
However, the power of local government is organized in favour of the mayor over 
the local council. For instance, the mayor has the authority to appoint local 
bureaucrats; to submit a budget of expenditures and revenues; and to veto 
ordinances passed by the local council (Park, C.M., 2003: 19). This practice 
reflects a path-dependent tendency of the old centralized bureaucracy originating 
from the tradition of Korean politics. The more direct reason for the executive 
mayor’s strong power is that the Local Autonomy Act and local administrative 
institution stipulates the authority of the head of local government much more 
widely than that of the local council (An, C.S. et al., 2002: 21). The power 
structure focusing on the executive mayor hinders the checks and balances 
through the distribution of power, and damages the essence of local autonomy 
from the perspective of democracy. 
The governor (or mayor) and the councillors are popularly elected through 
partisan ballots. Thus government structure primarily embodies the principle of 
political accountability. In contrast, the rest of local officials are not elected but 
appointed based on merit. The local bureaucracy, which has long developed 
professional norms of administration, is the core of local government. Therefore 
we can say that the structure of local government embodies the principle of 
administrative efficiency (Park, C.M., 2003: 18).  
 
4.2. Elected local politicians 
Popular authorization of local government is a minimum condition for democracy 
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in the local political sphere. Before 1995, the executive governor and mayor of 
the local government were appointed by the central government. Since 1995, 
local government has been subject to popular elections rather than central 
appointment. Mayors, governors, and councillors are currently chosen in partisan 
elections. Local councillors had been chosen in a single-member ward system 
(first past the post) until the local election in May 2006 without any form of 
proportional representation. Currently, multi-member ward system is in operation 
with some form of proportional representation. The local governor election is first 
past the post (NEC, 2013). Despite increasing popular opposition to the 
politicization of local governance, the influence of national political parties in local 
elections appears to have increased rather than decreased (Park, C.M., 2003: 
15). 
Over the past elections, local electoral turnout gradually declined but has 
recently showed a slight increase. More than two thirds (68.4%) of the electorate 
cast their ballots in the first local elections for the governors and mayors in 1995 
but in the subsequent local elections people showed less interest in the direct 
participation in politics, however, recently turnout has been improved again with 
54.5% in 2010 and 56.8% in 2014. Popular enthusiasm for a grassroots 
democracy has recently gone up again because of the ease of political 
participation through a variety of internet technologies, like Chadwick’s (2006) 
discussion.  
In the aspect of electoral politics in Korea, four common features can be 
shown. First, local politics has been subject to central politics. The national 
parties put forward candidates for local elections in all local authorities. Regional 
level elections appear to follow a similar pattern to national elections, therefore 
parties and regions have been critical factors in winning elections (Park, C.W., 
2002: 79). Even though elections have been focused on a local area, the issues 
involving the “politics of daily well-being” have been rarely heard. Instead the 
parties’ participation has taken the local election as an appraisal of the central 
governing group. Those nationally endorsed candidates in the regional election 
tend to win. By contrast at the basic level elections, the effect of national parties 
is a relatively less important factor so the various social backgrounds have an 
impact on the election (Kim, S.W., 2004). 
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Second, there has been a propensity of voting based on regionalism. 
Consequently a certain central political power monopolized the local political 
elites in certain localities. For example, the election in 2006 split the nation into 
three politically opposing regions: the Democratic Party occupied the Southwest 
region, Honam (Jeonnam, Jeonbuk and Gwangju),  the Hannara Party the 
Southwest region, Youngnam (Gyeonnam, Gyeonbuk, Daegu and Busan) and 
the United Liberal Democrats the Middle of South Korea (Chungbuk and 
Chungnam)  
Third, progressive groups gradually entered into local politics. 
Representatives of civil groups and outside organizations ran for the 1991 
election as independent candidates but most collapsed. However, from the 1995 
election, progressive candidates were occasionally elected and showed the 
possibility of being elected to local politics. In the 2002 election, the Democratic 
Labour Party rallied the force of labour and nominated candidates for governor 
and mayor positions, and received a subsidy: the first time for a national minority 
party (see Figure 2-1).  
The social background of elected persons is one of the important elements 
in estimating the representativeness, capacity and the power structure of local 
politics. Regarding their career and experience, the proportion of political elites 
elected from professional politicians increased as local elections were carried out 
periodically and a higher re-election of incumbents became prevalent. In 
particular political elites of the regional government revealed a higher level of 
professional career than those of the basic local government. This means that 
the local council is also a kind of power structure and governing elites become 
hierarchical and ranked according to the level of power (An, C.S. et al, 2002: 
295). This reflects the political power structure in which the National Assembly is 
superior to regional councils which are, in turn, superior to basic local councils.  
There were many local councillors with the background of being self-
employed entrepreneurs in construction, commerce and agriculture. Thus in each 
jurisdiction, generally wealthy business owners controlling the community entered 
into the local politics. In this context, it is difficult to say that local elections 
brought about a new penetration of political elites previously excluded from the 
local political power (Park, C.W., 2002). Recently the participants in local 
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elections have become more diverse. Especially, this trend is evident in that 
independent politicians have noticeably increased in contrast to those nominated 
by parties in local districts since 2000 (Park, M.H. et al, 2011). This means that 
the political competition has started to create a different structure between a 
candidate from the age-old dominant party and independent candidates in 
localities, in contrast to the two-party system in the early days of local politics. 
 
4.3. Party politics in local government 
Political parties have had a fundamental impact on democratic representation 
and on the conduct of elected local politicians (Copus, 2004b). Local democracy 
tends to be based on the bottom-up party politics not on the centre’s mobilization. 
Party plays a role of dispersing the centralized power to the locality and citizens. 
‘Parties detect demands from civil society, articulate philosophies and policies, 
and bundle these together and re-present them to the voter at elections. They 
select candidates for public office and provide voters with competing political 
platforms and political leaders from which to select’ (Copus and Erlingsson, 
2012).  
    Korean local politics has struggled to embed democratic local political 
mechanism based on the parties system. Parties of Korea could be seen as a 
two-party system (see above Figure 2-1) although parties have been 
continuously merged and divided in detail and their names have been changed. 
In accordance with the interests and strategies of the national parties, there has 
been controversy and policy change regarding parties’ selection of candidates 
whenever the local elections approached. ‘The democratic oriented party’ 
insisted on party participation in local elections for the realization of local 
democracy and ‘the conservative oriented party’ opposed it. As a compromise, 
parties were not allowed to nominate candidates for the council member 
elections in basic local government before the 2006 election. This skeptical policy 
stance opposed to parties’ participation in local elections, would cause local 
politics to remain subordinate to central politics, and caused political strife and 
confusion in the local administration. The expectation that local autonomy should 
focus on service provision roles rather than a political role, reflects the 
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authoritative political culture or the underdevelopment of democratic institution in 
Korea. If local autonomy did not embrace a political function, the rationale of local 
autonomy would be narrower. According to one analysis (Copus, 2014), the 
recognition of political roles of local government is achieved through the service 
provision role in British local politics. This analysis shows how well party politics 
integrates with services provision in local politics by defining priorities and 
applying party policies. Without parties it is difficult to ensure the political 
sustainability and accountability of local government. If the political parties 
nominate candidates for local district head and councilor, citizens should have a 
stronger interest and more eagerly participate in Korean politics and parties as 
well. The candidates nominated by a party could organize the campaign and 
compete on policies with support from that party so they could be in a better 
position to win a seat. The point is not the politicization of local government but 
the constraints of local autonomy which impede the local politics. In this sense, 
from the election in 2006 to now, nomination by a party has been applied to all 
local elections. Since then local political democracy in quality rests on the role of 
parties and the citizens’ choice in the process of election.  
    The party system based on consistent regional support is important to 
understand party politics of Korea. The advent of party regionalism came in 1988 
when Kim Dae-jung mobilized the regional cleavage which had existed only as a 
potential cleavage until then. As a result, the Democratic Party became a main 
party in the Honam regions (Kang, M.S.,2005). Since the local election in 1995, 
‘the democratic oriented party’ occupied the Honam region and ‘the conservative 
oriented party’ dominated Youngnam region. The dominance of parties based on 
regionalism has hampered the local democracy, because the same party 
dominates the local executive and local council. They preferred to decide policies 
behind the scenes according to party loyalty and political ideology rather than the 
legitimacy granted from the citizens. In this case, actually the check and balance 
between two bodies cannot be expected. 
    Fortunately, the strong regionalism seems to be gradually weakening. Since 
the election of 2010, cases of individuals elected by non-regional factors, such as 
the party’s manifesto, have started to show. For example, the mayor and the 
majority of members of the local councils in Gangwon and Gyeongnam were 
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occupied by different parties regardless of the regionalism; as a result the 
coherent party loyalty and political affiliation was not ensured in the policy 
process. Most partisan regional governments are gradually being exposed to the 
possibility for change at any time by the citizen. The mayors and governors 
evenly came from both parties in the elections of 2010 and 2014. The majority of 
councillors came from the Democratic Party in 2010 and came from the Saenuri 
party in 2014. As experiences of local autonomy accumulate, participants in the 
local elections are likely to become more diverse. Especially, politicians from the 
progressive parties and non-partisan politicians have noticeably increased (Park, 
M.H. et al, 2011). The political competition forms a different structure between a 
candidate from the age-old dominant party and independent candidates but 
previously it was shaped by the two-party system in the early days of local 
politics. These changes in local politics suggest that the Korean parties need to 
move from an election oriented party to a policy party which knows what the local 
concerns are and has policy making capacity, and then forms the day-to-day 
democratic practices. Political party linkages have the potential to increase local 
compliance in central local relations. For instance, if an elected mayor was 
nominated by the party nationally in control, local government which is under 
direct control by that politician is likely to become more cooperative in 
implementing policies which the national party supports. Indeed, as chapter 8 
demonstrates, there is evidence of an improvement in local government 
performance due to party linkages. 
 
4.4. Understanding regional governments   
Regional governments play a major role in hierarchical central-local government 
relations in Korea. Regional governments are located in the middle of the 
hierarchy so they are directly influenced by central controls. They exercise the 
political leadership to influence basic local governments within their region or to 
collectively express local demands and initiatives to central government. And it is 
the level of regional government whose performance is assessed and formally 
announced through JPA. That is the reason we focus on understanding the 
regional government. Performance data of regional government will be analysed 
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in the later statistical study of chapter 7 and 8.  
Regional governments are multipurpose authorities that provide social 
services, regulatory services such as land use planning, waste management, 
housing, libraries, leisure services and welfare benefits; but education is provided 
by the other educational entities. They operate within the same broad institutional 
framework set by central government but a variety of dimensions of the 
autonomy of local governments has been emphasized since the popular 
elections and the revival of local autonomy in 1995. As Table 2-2 shows, 
generally there is a simple classification of special/metropolitan cities and 
provinces (Do). Provinces (Do) may be compared with ‘eight English regional 
governments’. Then we have the two massive and influential metropolitan 
regions of Seoul and Gyeonggi-Do in which 50% of the population is 
concentrated around these capital regions: the population of Seoul and 
Gyeonggi-Do is respectively 10.2 million and 11.3 million.  
The Korean regional government has the strong mayor and weak council 
system. The executive body consists of an elected governor or mayor, two or 
three appointed vice-governors or vice-mayors, tens of directors and thousands 
of officials. A national civil servant is appointed to one of vice-mayor positions by 
the President and oversees the affairs of the local government and supervises 
the local officials. The appointed central officials system is a similar to the French 
prefect system. While the French prefect also acts as coordinator and supervisor 
of central government field agencies (Hancock et al, 2011: 351), the Korean 
system is confined to controlling local government. The local council is composed 
of elected council members and has the structure of chairperson, vice 
chairperson and standing/special committees, as we noted above. Local public 
officials enter the local governments through open competitive employment and 
are paid by local government. Seoul is the largest employer among the local 
governments: there are 15 thousand local officials and Gyonggi-Do is the second 
largest local government with 9 thousand local officials; the averagely 
metropolitan city has 5.6 thousand local officials and provinces (Do) 4.0 thousand 
local officials.  
The regional governments’ budget is 98 trillion KRW (55 billion GB), 64% of 
the total local governments’ budget of 150 trillion KRW (84 billion GB). The 
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amount of finance is shown in Table 2-2. There are 8 regional governments 
whose financial size is under 5 trillion KRW and the average budget of each 
regional government is 5.1 trillion KRW. When expenditure of regional 
governments is classified by UN COFOG (Classification of the Functions of 
Government) standards, social welfare is the largest expenditure by total local 
governments, accounting for 30 trillion KRW 20% of the whole budget (KRILA, 
2011; see Table 2-1). But in the regional level, the largest expenditure is 
education, followed by logistics and transportation: they account for respectively 
23% and 15% of regional government budget; in contrast social welfare is just 
7.6% of budget (MOPAS, 2012). This means that a considerable amount of the 
budget of regional government is being transferred to the autonomous 
educational bodies.  
 
Table 2-2. Overview of Korean regional government (MOPAS, 2013) 
Regional 
Government 
Population 
(million) 
Area 
(Km
2
) 
Budget 
(billion \) 
GRDP 
(billion \) 
Self-
reliance 
Ratio (%)
6
 
Metro- 
politan 
City  
Seoul(special) 10.2 605 20499 283651 88.8 
Busan 3.5 768 8358 62691 52.1 
Daegu 2.5 884 5301 37550 48.6 
Incheon 2.8 1032 6229 59294 65.8 
Gwangju 1.5 501 3226 26580 42.0 
Daejeon 1.5 540 2953 27991 51.9 
Ulsan 1.1 1060 2316 69113 62.5 
 Sejong  0.1  465  864 - 45.4 
Province Gyeonggi 11.9 10171 14802 243031 60.1 
Gangwon 1.5 16787 3584 30284 21.4 
Chungbuk 1.6 7433 3080 38520 24.1 
Chungnam 2.1 8630 4553 84928 28.3 
Jeonbuk 1.9 8067 4384 38086 18.6 
Jeonnam 1.9 12256 5808 62589 13.5 
Gyeongbuk 2.7 19029 5761 81705 21.4 
Gyeongnam 3.3 10533 6329 86454 35.2 
Special Autonomous 
Do 
Jeju 0.6 1849 2840 11129 24.9 
                                               
6
(independent local taxes and non-taxes income (A)) / ((A) + dependent income) * 100  
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Figure 2-4. Political map of Korea 
 
5. Conclusion: the institutional context of local 
autonomy in Korea  
Central controls stem from Korea’s long administrative history and survive in 
every corner of local government affairs. Korean local autonomy has been 
formed through an unusual trajectory in a different way from western countries. 
From the perspective of institutions, there are four distinct features behind the 
creation of Korean local autonomy resulting from the persistent centralizing trend 
and central controls. First, authoritarian culture is deeply embedded in Korea as a 
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result of the legacies of long standing centralized rule based on Confucianism 
and 35 years of Japanese colonialism. Bureaucratic culture has been formed in 
the early stages of development of the state through the centralized bureaucrats 
leading growth (Kim, J.S., 2006). Locality is just a subordinate mechanism under 
the authoritarian administrative state. In this respect, local autonomy is 
recognized as the autonomy of lower organizations, namely administrative 
autonomy. An authoritarian administrative state contributed to ensuring the 
effectiveness and consistency of the public administration and resisted any 
emphasis on diversity and fostering of democracy. 
Second, the financial capacity of local government is weak compared to 
central government. The expenditure of local government occupies almost 60% 
of the national budget but the financial size and the taxation structure of local 
government are overly unbalanced. Due to the insufficient physical resources, 
local governments have no choice but to depend financially on the central 
government. In this sense, the introduction of local income tax and local 
expenditure tax in 2010 is an unprecedented progression in the central-local 
government relations, which will be discussed in chapter 5.  
Third, political regionalism prevails in the fragile local politics. The situation 
where the central power holds sway over the local community becomes part of 
the background from which regionalism can be mobilized in central politics. This 
has intensified regional rivalries because people have noticed the development of 
a particular region from which a strong political figure has emerged and who has 
then seized power for a long time; on the other hand, other regions have been 
excluded in that development and central support. As a result, regional cracks in 
local elections have become as deep as those in national ones. In all local 
elections held since 1995, a majority of the electorate voted for parties that were 
identified with their region of residence, namely their hometown parties. For 
instance, in the Youngnam region, which has been a stronghold of the Grand 
National Party(GNP), the percentage of elected GNP mayoral candidates was 50% 
in 1995, 68% in 1998, 87% in 2002, and 86% in 2006(NEC, 2013).  Local party 
politics have been impeded by regionalism and have been constrained by acting 
as power basis of the central party politics. This has caused regret about the 
realities of local autonomy and sarcastic indifference over local politics  
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Fourth, great power is concentrated on the chief executive. Korean local 
autonomy has been developed in the ‘strong mayor and weak council form of 
government’ for a long time. The presidential system emphasizes shared control 
and balance between the two bodies. But, in practice, the authoritarian political 
culture and the legal stance which gives the general authority to the mayor but 
the detailed individual regulation to the council member disturb power distribution. 
The power structure focusing on the executive may damage the essence of local 
autonomy from the perspective of democracy.  
This chapter has reviewed the hesitant evolution of effective local autonomy 
in Korea. It has been driven by a national expectation of greater democratisation 
which has inspired a series of political initiatives to create viable local democracy. 
There has been a steadily developing confidence in the ability of local 
governments to operate effectively and there are promising indications of the 
development of constructive party-political dynamics. But the performance of 
effective local democracy has evolved in the shadow of pervasive central controls 
and has been marked by trial and error, by experimentation, and, as we will see 
in succeeding chapters, by quite contrasting performance in the disparate regions. 
Nonetheless, there has been a significant move away from autocratic central 
control towards a central-local relationship marked by dialogue, partnership and 
softer controls embodying incentives and systematic co-operation. Since 1997, 
however, the development of local democracy has encountered obstacles 
created by national economic and fiscal crises. Faced with pressing challenges to 
economic growth national politicians and officials have reawakened traditional 
norms and expectations and have reverted to greater central control. Thus this 
study is also interested in how financial crises had an impact on the effect of 
central controls on local government performance. In this context, the next 
chapter looks into the fiscal crises and the Korean experience.  
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Chapter 3. Fiscal crises: the context and the Korean 
experience 
1. The context, responses and approaches  
1.1. The various dimensions of fiscal crises 
This thesis seeks to prove the argument that the democratic trend of central-local 
relations has matured since the popular election of local politicians but the 
financial crisis in 2008 interrupted this change and thus central government took 
back its strong mode of controls in Korea. Fiscal and economic crises can be 
important challenges which deviate institutions from the established path. While 
the 1997 economic crises constituted a sufficient challenge to bring forth changes, 
the recent economic crises demonstrated a paradoxical reversal of institutional 
change, that is, the more democratic ideology that had been guiding central-local 
relations for a decade seemed to revert to more conventional centralism. In this 
sense, this chapter focuses on the institutional dimension and on the effects of 
fiscal and economic crises. The Korean crises will be differentiated between the 
financial crises at the national level and local government’s fiscal crises. This 
division of fiscal crises will be applied in the later chapters’ statistical analysis.  
‘Financial crisis' is a problem in financial markets like the 1997 Korean 
financial crisis or the 2008 global economic crisis. Financial crisis is perceived 
when a booming financial market, being full of speculative investments and 
cheap foreign loans, begins to deflate; euphoria morphs into despondency and 
then there is a pause in the increase in asset price, and expectations over 
mounting loss further reduce confidence and cause financial markets to shrink 
fresh loans to the extent where new loans are not available (Kindleberger and 
Robert, 2005: 84).  
A key dimension of fiscal crisis is the response of the financial markets and 
of the government. In practice governments borrow to bridge financial shortfalls. 
The reason why the fiscal deficit of each country deteriorates is the large scale of 
fiscal policy. A fiscal crisis only really emerges nowadays when the government 
debt becomes so substantial that lenders are no longer willing to lend due to the 
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increasing debt of the country or uncertainty of the market. The market’s loss of 
confidence deteriorated the financial conditions of the Asian governments in 1997 
(Krugman, 2008: 94). Therefore fiscal crisis can be caused by the judgement of 
the financial markets or by the fragility of the financial markets themselves – 
lenders may stop lending even though the deficit has not changed. This is 
important because it introduces a dimension of external perceptions and it leads 
to change in political leadership and encourages central government to remove 
the political leadership – which gives an incentive to avoid fiscal crisis.  
Also there are cyclical and structural dimensions of fiscal crises. The former 
is short term and corresponds with the swing of the business cycle; the latter is 
long term and reflects the changes in the economy which are beyond the control 
of government (PLMD, 2006: 185). In general if viewed from the perspective of 
economic cycles that markets are allowed to find their own level, cyclical fiscal 
crisis is the price for the surplus expenditure that that people became 
accustomed to in a prosperous economy. Cuts in public expenditure are not 
tolerable or popular in the era of electoral politics. For example, in the 1970s and 
1980s local fiscal crises happened due to the increase of transferred activities to 
local government and the cut in subsidies by the fiscal deficit of federal 
government in the USA (ACIR, 1985: 1).The latter structural fiscal crisis springs 
from the embedded fiscal deficit, which means the chronic imbalance of revenue 
and expenditure of government. The volume and composition of government 
expenditure under the constant and given government revenue are not 
determined by rationality but rather are structurally determined by social and 
economic conflicts and hence government expenditure tends to expand beyond 
its revenue. Korean local government’s fiscal crises in the late 1990s resulted 
from cyclical fiscal stress that happens in a conjunctural recession (Gwak, C.G., 
1998: 330). However the Korean local governments are now gradually being 
exposed to structural fiscal pressures due to the increase of transferred activities 
to local government and constrained local revenues. Elected mayors tend to be 
reluctant to increase elastic local tax, with which they can adjust the tax rate 
within the legally permitted range, in order to gain re-election. We will further 
investigate the local government fiscal crises of Korea in the last part of this 
chapter.  
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1.2. To whom is there fiscal accountability? 
Fiscal crises have become a widespread global issue since the 2008 global crisis. 
In particular, the main challenges such as economic depression, an aging society 
and unemployment disturb governments’ attempts at successfully putting the 
brakes on public spending. As a result, high accumulated sovereign debt has 
risen to the level of fiscal emergency. The Debt to GDP ratio had already 
exceeded 107% in OECD countries in 2012 (OECD, Economic Outlook no 95). 
Fiscal crises provoke the issue of fiscal responsibility which is concerned 
with annual budgeting, long term financial planning and management of 
acceptable levels of debt. When things go seriously wrong the public tends to 
look for leadership and responsibility from presidents and politicians (Peters, 
2011:77). President Kim Young-sam was blamed for the 1997 economic crisis 
because of the forced globalization policy and lack of supervision of the financial 
market. Finally the 1997 economic crisis caused a power change for the first time 
in the following presidential election in 1998. The financial inquiry commission 
investigated whether to hold the ministers of MOFE and senior politicians of the 
Presidential Office responsible for the policy failure.  
If a local leader wrongly managed the finances and did not meet the national 
priorities, that local leader should be fiscally accountable to central government 
from the current centralist approach of MOGAHA and MPB which are in control of 
local financial management, taxation and borrowing. Local governments which 
were diagnosed to have fiscally stressed conditions were monitored to implement 
the financial austerity plan by MOGAHA. Once the central government 
recognizes a possibility of fiscal crisis, it is likely to exert more intensity of control, 
with the necessity of regulating, intervening and coordinating something unfit and 
unregulated. In this context, the commentators refer to crises as a moment of 
decisive intervention (Hay, C.,1999: 323).  
The responses to the global financial crises tend to strengthen regulations 
about government expenditure and benefits of social welfare. The centralist 
approach considers it important to tighten management of local fiscal policy lest 
local government should waste tax money on unnecessary and improper things. 
Financial and fiscal crises, thus, impact the modes of central controls on local 
governments. The change of control modes can affect the productivity, efficiency 
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and democratization of controlled subordinate organizations, that is local 
governments. The experience of the 1997-8 Korean economic crises 
demonstrated the voluntary compliance to central controls and acceptance of 
accountability for the national crisis. At that time local government was still 
preoccupied with the old centralism. The short experience of local autonomy had 
failed to change local political culture, which seemed to make local government 
internalize the accountability of the national economic crisis, although the policy 
response over financial crises deferred decentralization and sacrificed the value 
of autonomy and democracy. Here we can see local governments in Korea 
admitted the vision and the detailed plan of, and positively cooperated with 
central government, which resulted from the centralised political culture and the 
unitary and homogeneous structure of the state. On the other hand, during the 
recent fiscal crises in 2008-9, local government showed slightly different 
behaviour. Local politicians were dubious about the nature of the crisis and 
opposed coercive central controls, which meant local government tried not to 
take responsibility for the national crises. With more lessons and experience of 
local autonomy, local government and politicians perceived the political reality 
and rejected local responsibility. 
When it comes to local fiscal crises, the more democratic model argued that 
local politicians should be made accountable to the local electorate. Devolved 
authority allows local politicians to raise taxes locally and they are responsible for 
spending and managing the finance. If the state needed financial aid as a result 
of their changing economic position such as structural (i.e. ‘the influx of high need 
residents’ or ‘loss of high income business’) or social and economic problems (i.e. 
recession), local government units should be allowed to go bankrupt and the 
local population would only have themselves to blame for electing an 
incompetent leader (Musgrave, 1980: 568-9).  
Neo-Marxists consider the fiscal crisis of the state as arising from the 
structural imbalance of income and expenditure of the state in the process of the 
public finance’s expansion (O’Conner, 2002). They put the fiscal accountability on 
the interdependence between the monopoly capital and the fiscal state (Pinch, 
1985). Monopoly capital dependent upon state expenditure continues to insist on 
growth in public spending to allow further capital accumulation of monopoly 
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capitalists and serves only to expand production beyond the level of demand; 
social capital is expenditure required for profitable private accumulation, in 
contrast, social expense is socialized for the legitimating function (O’Conner, 
2002: 6-7) and thus there is a structural disjunction of spending and income of 
the state, creating a fiscal crisis of the state. The interdependence between 
monopoly capital and the state results in unemployment, welfare expenditure and 
further pressures upon the state to increase social capital expenditure which 
finally creates a fiscal crises of the state (Pinch, 1985).  
Crises make us concentrate on how governments have grappled with fiscal 
crises and what are the best ways of responding to them as well as the 
implication of the effect of fiscal crises in the political area, particularly in central 
and local governmental relations. As local autonomy develops in Korea, in 
principle local government should be accountable to their citizens, because the 
important legitimacy of local government comes from the democratic electoral 
process. It is citizens’ votes that prevent local government from being an 
administrative arm of central government and endows local government with 
political power (Copus, 2010: 431). In practice, due to the embedded centralism 
and hesitant evolution of local democracy, however, local government has been 
accountable to central officials. When local government is faced with fiscal crises, 
policy decisions generally tend to migrate upwards to central government. As we 
reviewed in chapter 2, the local autonomy system constrained by central 
regulations supports this view of the reality.  
 
1.3. Responding to fiscal crises 
One of the main issues emerging from recent fiscal crises has been the different 
policy responses about how best to respond and resolve fiscal crises. 
Governments have political choices in the sense that there are always policy 
alternatives available, and the choice of alternatives reflects policy priorities. The 
priority of government after the great economic depression was to ensure that the 
financial system worked properly. A series of government interventions 
redesigned the system so that governments avoided big disasters: the banks 
were placed under tight regulation and international movements of capital were 
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also limited (Krugman, 2008: 189). What government needed in the financial 
crises that started in 2007 was to stabilize financial markets. To do this, 
government had to show commitment to dealing with the crisis of confidence. 
The rules were changed to strictly regulate the market. People were expected to 
participate in sharing the difficulties and in the governmental reform. Therefore 
the high level of performance wages for bail-out bank workers was considerably 
criticized. Cognitive understanding accepted the signal of the market instead of 
the account of government officials.  
    Political institutions and culture shape the experience of financial crisis; in 
turn the financial crisis can repair a perceived weakness of government and 
reshape politics (Richardson and Copus, 2011: 17). It is productive to note that 
different policy responses emerged from the UK, USA and Korea in the financial 
crises. In the UK the financial crisis had a major impact on public finances with 
debt to GDP ratios increasing from 47% of GDP in 2007 to 101% of GDP in 2012 
(OECD, 2012). The Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition agreement planned 
for cuts including￡6 billion efficiency saving in 2010 (Richardson and Copus, 
2011: 9).  The government bail-out of the banks and guarantees on loans and 
deteriorating tax revenue have contributed to increasing debt. However there had 
been limited debate on the financial crisis, with little attempt to analyse and 
explore the failing of the regulatory system; instead the focus of discussion 
shifted to a concern about public expenditure (Mullard, 2011: 25). In seeking to 
repair public finances, the response of the coalition governments has been to 
seek reductions in public expenditure on pensions, social security and health 
provision.  
By contrast, in the USA, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) was 
established to explore the role of the regulatory system since January 2010 and 
they published their final report in 2011 (Mullard, 2011: 25). The Obama 
government reformed the financial regulation, abolished Quangos and regional 
planning bodies and operated Emergency budget with rapid cuts and in tax 
increases (Richardson and Copus, 2011: 9).    
In Korea, the reform after the 1997 crisis started from the perception of the 
structural vulnerabilities originating from the condensed economic growth over 
the last half century. The financial inquiry commission was operated by the 
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National Assembly to take testimony and investigate responsibilities. The central 
government prepared the proper regulatory framework. Four sectional reforms 
were undertaken in finance, business, labour and the public sector, in the 
aftermath of the crisis (MOFE, 1999). The Korean government provided rescue 
funding of 14% of GDP of the year of 1998 for the purchase of toxic assets, the 
take-over of banks and the protection of depositors. In seeking to repair the 
budget, the government maintained the austerity policy and announced job cuts 
and mergers in some services. However, debt to GDP increased from 12% in 
1997 to 35% in 2012 (NBO, 2014; OECD, 2012).  
Seen from the experiences over the past fiscal crises, government provided 
the necessary funding to stabilize the financial sector, while the spill over to the 
real economy resulted in a major increase in unemployment as well as 
deterioration of social welfare. The finances needed to bail out the financial 
sector have resulted in policies of austerity toward public provision and the 
OECD has argued that more reforms are needed to address the scars from the 
crisis and boost growth (OECD, 2012). 
 
1.4. Analysis from the perspective of historical institutionalism 
Coping with crises can be understood from the lens of historical institutionalism.  
With regard to the causes of institutional change, this approach highlights the 
factors such as institutional dynamism, institutional restriction and ideas. In this 
context, crisis is usually one of the exogenous shocks or endogenous sources 
which can disturb for the time being the ‘institutional equilibrium’ which enables 
the ruling group to maintain its hegemonic positions (Thelen, 1999:392; Collier & 
Collier, 1991: 759). From more gradual approaches to change (Thelen and 
Steinmo, 1992), fiscal crises can be endogenous sources. In this aspect, fiscal 
and economic crises may constitute a sufficient challenge to the established 
pattern to produce movement toward a new institution through incremental 
adjustment rather than the more radical departures from the status quo (Peters, 
2011: 76) 
    Fiscal and economic crises might be capable of creating a ‘punctuated 
equilibrium’ which recognises the discontinuity of institutions and the enduring 
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likelihood that institutional change tends to return to institutional equilibrium. 
‘Historical juncture’ or ‘critical juncture’ is the moment when social relations and 
institutions are newly installed and transformed in response to the political or 
economic crisis. From the critical juncture perspective Colin Hay (1999: 329-330) 
points out that crisis provides a critical moment which facilitates transformative 
change. He demonstrates a model of transformation of the institution in response 
to crisis, ‘building on the distinction between conjectural and structural crises’ and 
demonstrates how the reproduction of institutions is secured through periodic 
state intervention or a new trajectory being imposed upon the enduring features 
of an institution. Therefore the temporality of crisis emerges as a critical and 
strategic moment in the transformation of the institution. This perspective has an 
obvious affinity to the ‘punctuated equilibrium’ model of institutional change and 
the model of gradual versus revolutionary institutional change.        
Fiscal and economic crises might have potentially contradictory effects on 
existing policy-making arrangements from the perspective of historical 
institutionalism. The political system would revert to its more conventional pattern 
of governance after some deviations from its more established path at the time of 
crises (Peters, 2011: 76). Alternatively, fiscal and economic crises may provide 
the pressure required to disrupt an existing political arrangement and produce 
new patterns of governance. The reactions to these crises may be different 
across countries because they perceive differently the nature of fiscal and 
economic crises under their various political, economic and cultural backgrounds. 
History matters for understanding political dynamism because history provides 
experience and experience can change the beliefs and preferences of citizens 
and their elites (Steinmo, 2014: 2). Korea responded differently to the past two 
financial crises. The 1997 economic crises played a role of changing existing 
political power and producing the new fundamentals and NPM styled governance. 
However the financial crises in 2008-9 made Korea revert to a traditional mode of 
centralism, as a paradoxical reversal of historical institutionalist explanations 
which fall back on the external shock when they explain the institutional change. 
This revert to centralism since the financial crisis supports the well-known 
proposition that during a crisis decision-making tends to be centralised, which is 
found in crisis management literature and from decision-making analysis in the 
public sector,  as was also suggested by Guy Peters (2011: 76).  
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Chapter 2 observed centralism and governmental relationships from the 
historical institutionalism perspective; accordingly this chapter identifies what past 
decisions influenced the economic crisis and local fiscal crises and how they 
moulded the institutional changes after these crises. First we will make the point 
that the Korean economic crisis was related to government reform and discuss 
how it affected local government. Then we will explore the experiences of local 
fiscal crises and policy responses. In chapters 7 and 8, how financial and fiscal 
crises at the national and local level, as independent variables, respectively 
influence the performance of local government will be researched. This issue is 
related to the effect of policy responses over the different crises. In particular, we 
will employ the analysis of Scott (2014) and investigate the three pillars of 
institutional changes: regulatory, normative and the cognitive aspect of institution. 
 
2. Financial crises in Korea  
2.1. Legacy of the past 
The stunningly rapid advance of the Korean economy marked a substantial 
deviation from historic stagnation. Korea in 1997 was not far short of being a 
developed nation, with per capita income comparable to that of southern 
European countries (Krugman, 2008: 96). However, the Korean economy 
became vulnerable and unstable because it was at fault by allowing market 
irregularities and moral hazards as a result of the institutional vestige of the past.  
Historical institutionalism is concerned with contingency and the unintended 
consequences of policy decisions previously made and with a focus on the path 
dependence of institutional stability (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002; Hay and Wincott, 
1998; Peters, 2012). According to this approach, a process of liberalization by the 
Economic Planning Board in the 1980s took Korea down long pathways that are 
difficult to reverse. Parallel to the Japanese economic success (Johnson, 1982: 
8), Korea has been based on ‘the developmental state model’ in which the 
Economic Planning Board played a role in establishing state-lead economic 
development strategies and the system of putting business management under 
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the state. The state’s role in the economy was shared with the private sector in 
order to effectively achieve economic goals; in contrast, these specific political 
economic structures consequently caused the misallocation of resources, 
collusion between business and political elites, unproductive rent-seeking 
behaviours and moral hazard. In particular, the Korean government controlled the 
entire internal and, especially, cross-border financial flow very tightly (Chang, 
1998: 736). In the 1980s financial liberalization policies were ‘cautious and slow 
in terms of order and speed’ (Park, 1996: 252) and therefore the financial market 
was still under the control of the state. 
Then, the subsequent institutional changes of the Korean government during 
the 1990s relaxed its control over the financial sector and varied the policies of 
financial liberalization: reform included foreign exchange liberalization; capital 
markets opening to foreign investors; interest rate deregulation; more managerial 
autonomy for the banks and lower entry barriers to financial activities (Chang, 
1998: 737). It can be argued that by means of a series of self-inflicted wounds of 
financial liberalization, the Korean government loosened virtually all control over 
financial institutions. The lack of or insufficient regulation is often advanced as an 
alternative or contributing factor to the financial crisis (Bernanke, 2010). The 
huge scale of liberalized financial policies created novel and complicated 
problems between the state and the private sector, especially in relation to the 
banking sector and the hugely leveraged corporate sector. This was because the 
state was hamstrung between a highly effective bureaucracy that sought to 
regulate the corporate sector and a political ruling group that, relying on the 
financial support of chaebol: big business, ended up circumventing the best 
efforts of the bureaucrats (Woo-Cumings, 1999: 117). At last, in the very 
vulnerable year of 1997, the government failed to monitor properly the foreign 
borrowing activities of the inexperienced private sector and consequently, by 
precipitating financial vulnerability, generated an unintended financial crisis.  
Chang (1998: 739) argues that various liberalization measures announced in 
1993 and the post-1993 financial liberalization in Korea were critical in generating 
the crisis. In particular, ‘the decision of the Kim Young-sam government in 1993 
to apply for membership of the OECD also subjected Korea to further external 
demand for financial market liberalisation’ (ibid: 739). Those liberalization 
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measures instituted very substantial capital account liberation and the result was 
‘a mushrooming of foreign debt’. For long-term foreign borrowing, detailed 
information and permission from the Ministry of Finance and the Economy 
(MOFE) were required, which led the borrower to contract short-term loans and 
allowed poor asset-liability management to go unchecked. The 1997 Korean 
crisis was not the result of excessive government intervention that encouraged 
‘moral hazard’, but the uncoordinated and excessive investment by the private 
sector, financed by imprudent amounts of short-term foreign debt (Chang, 1998: 
739). Krugman (2008: 97) also agreed that the Asian economies were more 
vulnerable at that time partly because they opened up their financial markets and 
took advantage of international lenders in order to run up their substantial debts. 
Consequently the financial liberalization policies of the Korean government 
precipitated a major vulnerability of cross-border financial flow. 
In addition, the Korean critical junctures can be identified in industrial and 
economic development from the 1960s to the 1990s. At this period, the 
government developed favoured industries and controlled very directly the 
allocation of investment. This was possible because in Korea all banks were 
nationalized in 1961 with the advent of the government of Park Jung-hee (Chang, 
1995: 153); even though banks were privatised in the 1980s, the government 
maintained its control. The Korean government controlled finances and industry 
from the 1960s to 1980s; liberalized the financial system in the 1990s; eventually 
after the 1997 economic crisis Korea had to enforce the drastic reforms of 
opening its domestic market and of ending the feeding of favoured business at 
the trough of the state, paying the price for the bail out money from the IMF. The 
Korean government had to go through a financial emergency by re-establishing 
the basic organization logic in conformity with global standards and undergoing 
structural change at that critical moment. The IMF demanded that Korea allow 
foreign ownership of corporations, and an opening of domestic financial markets 
to foreign banks and an end to government encouragement of loans to favoured 
industries (Pempel, 1999: 236) 
In conclusion, from the perspective of historical institutionalism, the financial 
liberalization of Korea over the past twenty years has given rise to a new pattern 
of financial institutions. Specifically the rules were changed to liberalise and 
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internationalise capital flows; the norms were changed to give credence and 
authority to market signals; and the cognitive framework evolved to accept 
judgements and prescriptions emerging from financial markets and institutions 
rather than from the officials and ministers of central government. This 
institutional transformation led to unintended results in the shape of gradually 
intensifying financial vulnerability and eventually the 1997 financial crisis. The 
1997 crisis came from the institutional changes which created the ‘critical 
junctures’ of institutional developments and variations of finance. But the financial 
crisis reinforced the influence of markets and of financial liberalisation which 
made it important to appreciate the dangers, as well as the benefits, of market 
friendly financial institutions. 
 
2.2. Political debates  
The Korean crisis was caused much more by under-regulation than by corruption 
or any other side effects of an overly close relationship between business and the 
government. However, there was a debate surrounding the internal causes of the 
Korean financial crisis including: unnecessary government intervention and policy 
failure, confused and belated crises decision-making, and the development of big 
conglomerates with governmental support and their unlimited business 
expansion. The first issue was about policy failure. Although the economic team 
of the government depleted the foreign reserves by $ 26 billion under the 
snowballing current-account deficit, it failed to defend the foreign exchange rates 
and which finally led to the exchange market crisis in 1997 (Lee, W.J., 1999). 
This means the excessive government intervention brought about the disaster. In 
addition, the president delayed the bankruptcy of a big conglomerate, KIA, for 
fear of triggering a large chain of enterprise bankruptcy. The enterprises’ failure 
caused a chain of bank and financial company bankruptcies, another pillar of the 
1997 financial crises. This reminds us of the importance of the highest level of 
decision making by the president, prime minister and central government.  
Also the crisis reporting system was criticized as not properly working within 
the government. The economy team of the government did not give prior notice 
about the seriousness of the exchange market to the president and the necessity 
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for IMF involvement was reported to President Kim on 14 November 1997, only 
six days before the Korean government requested IMF bailout on 22 November 
1997 (Lee, W.J., 1999). It was revealed in the economic hearing after the crisis 
that due to the disorder and delay of reporting and decision-making by the 
government, Korea had no choice but to accept more demanding conditions for 
the bailout. 
Most of all, the fundamental source of the financial crisis was rooted in the 
state’s developmental strategies of the past. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, 
the Korean government compulsorily pushed many private sector firms into the 
required new industries with carrot and stick approaches such as subsidies and 
threats to cut off loans from the state owned banks (Chang, 2010: 128). These 
selected firms became the big conglomerates, the chaebol.  The growth of 
chaebol relied on ‘informal networks between government officials and business 
elites’. Chaebol enjoyed fame for a long time in expanding a variety of 
businesses with comparably easy loans from the bank and protection from the 
government, which caused the poor management of enterprises and banks. 
There was industrial polarization: during the period that chaebol were prosperous, 
other medium and small sized enterprises, which had been ruled out of this 
special relationship, experienced recession in spite of an economic boom (Song, 
I.J., 2012: 23). These discriminatory developmental strategies led to excessive 
unfairness and corruption. Most of all, the government could not control the evils 
of reckless management by the big conglomerates, chaebol. Therefore, many 
politicians made use of the financial crisis to attack the pro-business 
governmental policies and required restructuring throughout all economic and 
social systems. 
As soon as the 1997 financial crisis swooped down on Korea, the internal 
reforms for ‘economic’ democratization foundered. The IMF assistance had come 
with a host of conditions including the requirement of structural changes in the 
Korean financial system and in public governance (Pempel, 1999: 226). Korea 
faced the situation where the liberalising economic reforms that had previously 
been debated, but never implemented, had now to be carried out following the 
external pressure of the IMF. Newly elected President Kim Dae-jung 
opportunistically made use of the IMF conditions as they were congruent with his 
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own reform agenda which included re-established financial institutions.  
 
2.3. Institutional changes  
From the perspective of historical institutionalism, the 1997 economic crisis had 
an influence on the ‘three pillars of institutions’(Scott’s,2014: 60), rules, norms 
and cognitive frameworks, the three defining components of an institution. First, 
regulatory rules were changed to restructure the systems and reduce the 
economic uncertainty of the market. The government implemented the structural 
reform over the four sectors: finance, corporate, government, and labour, to cure 
structural problems germinated in the process of a fast growing economy. 
Through the restructuring of the finance sector, most of the improper conventions 
of the corporate financial sector were eliminated and the capital adequacy ratio of 
Korean banking institutions was enhanced. The financial supervisory system was 
changed to match the global standard. The subsequent bankruptcy of 
conglomerates and accompanying credit crunch required emergency 
restructuring of the corporate sector. The central government established the 
standard for restructuring but stood back from the direct implementation of 
restructuring. If the government had initiated and intervened in restructuring the 
corporate business sector, it would have caused inefficiency as well as a 
controversial debate about preferential choices between the revitalized and 
excluded enterprises (Park, Y.C., et al., 2000: 55). Therefore the bank that 
provided credit loans was assigned to adjust restructuring as a creditor through 
autonomous negotiation (MOFE, 1999: 129). Considering the level of the sector-
wide insolvency and the aftermath of financial restructuring on the economy and 
financial markets, the restructuring was conducted in the order of comprehensive 
financial companies, banks, securities firms and credit agencies. For encouraging 
the flexible labour market, the Korean government chose employment 
coordination which enables the enterprise to dismiss their workforce due to their 
business managerial needs. The Korean Tripartite Commission of labour, 
management and government was established in order to arrange the process of 
discussion and understanding between parties over the reform agenda (MOFE, 
1999). The government sector restructured itself through cutting the workforce, 
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reorganizing and privatizing the central and local government, executive 
agencies and state owned enterprises, which all changed the structure and 
framework of the government sector. 
Second, in the normative pillar, people were expected to participate in 
overcoming national financial crises. Therefore values such as efficiency and 
saving were preferred at the level of individuals as well as organizations. Norms 
were changed to accept downsizing or reduction of almost all work fields in order 
to enhance efficiency and to be normalized. Most of Korea seemed to accept the 
blood shedding from the reconstruction of every part of systems. In order to 
relieve the anxiety of people and in order to exhibit the government’s endeavour 
in overcoming the crisis at the same time, the government drastically cut down 
the staff and organization of the public sector. Even the merging and selling of 
Korean companies to foreigners was considered as a necessary solution to avoid 
closure and for company to survive in the recession. Moreover in both the public 
and the private sectors operating systems were reinvented to stress performance 
criteria. This encouraged the new organizations to work well and enhanced the 
accountability of government agencies, and raised the profile of performance in 
the process of work. Therefore, according to the performance they achieve, 
companies and agencies became conscious of the shame or honour on the basis 
of their performance and a new norm of improved performance was established.  
Third, the cultural-cognitive pillar took the change of the established systems 
and the self-improvement for granted. Entire communities, mobilised partly by a 
sense of national sacrifice and patriotism, reached the conclusion that without 
change they could not survive and could go on to confront another crisis. The 
Korean government acknowledged the structural vulnerability of the financial 
sector and injected an astronomical amount of public funds built on a national 
consensus, and conducted the forceful restructuring of banking institutions, which 
contributed to restoring the creditworthiness of the country (MOFE, 1999: 115). 
The self-improvement culture began to nest in the corner of public and private 
organization standing on the base of the reformed structure and system. In 
conclusion, institutional changes in response to the financial crises extensively 
occurred to the extent which gave a chance to diagnose the problems of the 
regulatory system of Korea and resulted in changing the norm and cognitive 
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perception of people.  
 
2.4. The effect on local government  
The financial crises have held back the trend of expanding decentralization and 
local autonomy. Central government could not endure what it saw as local 
governments’ reckless management. The scale of local government debt 
increased by 12.5% in 1996 and by average 10% or so for the several years 
before 2000s (MOGAHA, 2001: 233). First, in the regulatory aspect, the 
experience of financial crisis engendered more efficient auditing and continuous 
monitoring of local government. In this sense, the performance assessment such 
as JPA was emphasized and BAI continued to recruiting officials for the 
inspection and audit of local government. This meant central government did not 
trust local government after confronting critical crises even though formally 
central government was on the way to transfer part of their authority and 
responsibilities to local government. Centralists believe that local governments 
are congenitally so irresponsible that they need to be regulated. Particularly the 
digitally integrated financial system has been connected between central and 
local governments in order to monitor local government’s fiscal condition as well 
as to enhance the central government’s capacity to collect information about local 
government’s spending. 
Second, from the normative aspect, local government was not expected to 
take responsibilities and to achieve performance corresponding to the politically 
self-governing bodies. Distrust over local government did not allow some 
generosity within which local government could experiment and fail with a variety 
of policy implementations. People considered autonomy at the local level to be 
too early for the inexperienced local administration.  
Third, partly some began to accept diversity and democratization emerging 
from local government and encouraged the sharing of best practices across the 
sectors, however cognitive culture, in the form of a sense of national crisis and 
patriotic fervour, did not allow the desired extension of local autonomy to become 
embedded. If local government failed to manage its finance, local government 
was accountable to the central government and to the elected legislature 
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therefore centralism prevailed over the public sector.  
In conclusion, the experience of financial crisis at the national level 
negatively influenced institutional changes. Central government produced more 
regulations to prevent fiscal crises at the local level. These regulatory changes 
produced a negative normative perception over the extension of local 
government and local autonomy. As a result, cognitive understanding reverted to 
the historically grounded assumptions where centralism prevailed in the entire 
governmental relations.  
3. Fiscal crisis of local government in Korea 
3.1. Legacy of the past 
Local finance management constituted a matter of central and acute concern 
within the larger issue of public finances. Local expenditure has risen steadily but 
revenue has not kept the same pace. The equilibrium of sustained centralism has 
been punctuated by way of a series of local autonomy reforms. The drastic 
change to popular local elections forced local government to meet the citizens’ 
legal demands, on the one hand and to enhance the competency of the locality 
on the other hand under the competitive milieu, as we noted in chapter 1. The 
immature local electoral politics, without sufficient learning and training in self-
governing over the history of Korea, has led to a kind of pork-barrel politics of 
mayors and thus expansion of financial demands. Korean local governments 
started to experience fiscal distress due to the economic depression and reduced 
tax income after the 1997 economic crisis. In the late 1990s and the early 2000s, 
the number of local governments that could not afford to pay remuneration by 
self-financed revenues increased from 28 in 2000 to 32 in 2004 (Kim, C.S., 2005).  
Nevertheless, the Korean local governments seem to be less accountable to 
local fiscal crises due to the central government’s institutional control of local 
finance. Most resources and legal and administrative authority remain under the 
control of central government. The fiscal regulations, such as budget compilation 
guidelines, the multi-year financial management plan and the local finance 
diagnosis and analysis, prevent local government from facing fiscal crises. For 
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example, as a result of local financial diagnosis and analysis, if a local 
government was revealed to be potentially under fiscal distress, it would be 
designated as ‘a diagnosed group’ to be under the intervention of MOGAHA. 
Actually, most diagnosed groups were basic local governments but four cases 
were regional governments: Jeju in 1999, Busan and Daegu in 2001, and 
Gwangju in 2002 (see Table 3-3). These diagnosed groups had to receive 
financial consultations from the centre and implement the financial austerity plan.  
  
Table3-3 Diagnosed groups in fiscal distress (MOPAS, 2011c) 
FY Regional government                    Basic local governments  
1998 Yangsan, Seochun, Daegue Junggu  
1999 Jeju                     Donduchun, Uiryeong , Daegu Namgu  
2001 Busan, Daegue          Busan Gangseogu, Daegue Seogu, Incheon Namgu  
2002 Gwangju,                Gymje, Dangjn, Hampyeong, Namjeju 
2003 Seogwipo, Ulreung,Yechun, Incheon Yeonsugu  
2004 Osan, Gurye, Chulwon, Busan Donggu 
2005 Gangreung, Bonghwa 
2008 Siheung, Chilgok, Busan Donggu 
2009 Gyeongsan, Muan, Daejeon Yusunggu 
2010 Donhae, Youngduk, Incheon Namgu 
 
 
Since the 2008 global economic crisis, concern with local government fiscal 
crisis has come to the fore again. The Lee Myung-bak government had an 
overarching priority for vitalizing the economy and this priority tended to drive the 
response to the global economic crisis. It involved an increase in public 
expenditure through draining their local rainy day funds and issuing government 
bonds. As a result, as Table 3-4 shows, the financial indicators demonstrate how 
the financial consolidation of Korean local government deteriorated in 2009: the 
consolidated local government balance was in deficit for two years; the increased 
rate of local debt payment means that local government finances stiffened.  
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Table 3- 4 Local government’s fiscal indicators   
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Consolidated balance1  0.02 -9.89 -1.40 1.84 
Local debt payment rate2 2.83 2.49 2.53 2.96 3.06 
Independent income growth    -0.53 5.85 6.90 
1
 (total income-expense &loan) / (consolidated fund) * 100 
2 
debt repayment/ settled general revenue 
Source: The analysis of local government finance FY 2011 by MOPAS 
 
The concern with local government’s fiscal crises gave rise to changes in the 
fiscal institutions of local government. The early-warning system was introduced 
in 2011 in order to monitor the financial condition and detect problematic issues 
of local government (MOPAS, 2010). The legal standards on which central 
government is able to warn of a fiscal crisis and intervene in a local government’s 
financial management are established in the Law of Local Government Finance 
(see chapter 7). For example, when the amount of debt burden exceeds more 
than 40% of the total amount of aggregate budget, the central government can 
consider it as a local fiscal crisis and intervene in their financial management. 
Based on this standard, the regional governments whose debt to budget figure is 
over 40% from 1999 to 2012 are in the following Table 3-5. The new regulations 
seem to play a precautionary role of preventing local fiscal crises, because there 
has been no case included in the 40% rule since the effective regulations. 
 
Table.3-5 Local fiscal crises calculated by the debt to budget of 40%  
Year Regional government with fiscal crisis  
2000 Gwangju (56%), Daejeon (54%), Ulsan (43%), Jeju (54%) 
2001 Busan(53%), Daegue(55%), Gwangju(48%), Daejeon(47%), Ulsan(43%), Jeju(43%) 
2002 Busan (45%), Daegu (70%), Gwangju (44%), Daejeon (41%), Jeju(40%) 
2003 Busan (42%), Daegu (66%), Gwangju (43%) 
2004 Daegu (67%), Gwangju (41%) 
2005 Daegu (65%) 
2006 Daegu (44%) 
2007 Daegu (41%) 
Source: debt/ budget*100 calculated from the financial data (lofin.mohaga.go.kr) 
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The institutional factors which influenced the financial conditions triggering 
the fiscal crisis can be said to be an extension of local autonomy. The 
implementation of local autonomy suddenly increased the financial demands but 
under the constraint of local finance local government was easily led astray into 
debt. Local authorities overspent because they thought they would be bailed out 
by the central government. The contour of local fiscal imprudence seems to be 
controlled to some degree in the sense that from tables 3.3 and 3.5 the level of 
debt and overspend was falling over the period before the recent global crisis. 
This phenomenon may be connected with the intensified controlling tools such as 
performance measures or local finance diagnosis and analysis through which 
local governments have track record of local responsibility.  
According to a poll of 16 regional governors conducted by a Korean 
newspaper in 2005, governors responded that the financial independence of local 
government was one of most pressing requirements for development of local 
autonomy (Yoon, H.I., 2005). They asserted that the central government should 
decentralize finance and extend the local tax base. As the demand for more and 
better public services provided by local government has grown more than 
proportionally, local governments have been caught by the two pressures of 
financial stress and demand for better services. Under the pervasive centralized 
governmental relations, the conflict between rising public expectation and the 
limited capacity of local government gave rise to the improper management of 
some local governments such as incurring excessive debt and irresponsible 
expenditure.  
The local autonomy of Korea over the past twenty years has given rise to a 
new pattern of the institutions of local government. Specifically the rules were 
changed to give the right to choose the local leader to the local population. Thus 
theoretically local government should be responsible to the local population but 
due to pervasive central controls local leaders hold fiscal accountability not to the 
electorate but to central government. The norms were changed to give financial 
and administrative discretions to local governments. Local governments were 
expected to take responsibility for local problems and to spend the budget under 
the necessary and proper demand of the local population. But sometimes, local 
leaders surrendered to moral hazard in allocating resources and showed the 
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behaviours of crony capitalism. The cognitive framework evolved to accept 
autonomous judgements and behaviour emerging from local governments rather 
than from the authorities of central government. This institutional transformation, 
extending local democracy, led to unintended results in the shape of gradually 
intensifying the fiscal burden of some local governments. 
 
3.2. Political debate 
The increasing debt of local government began to attract political attention by 
centralists and national politicians who criticized the ‘moral hazard’ and qualities 
of the heads of local governments (Jin, J.H., 2000). The sudden change of the 
local politics milieu since the popular election of mayors led to a demand for a 
considerable amount of investment and thus a considerable amount of the local 
government budgets were funded by issuing bonds. This is supported by the 
argument of Clark and Ferguson (1983) that the heads of local government, due 
to political reasons, tend to ‘spend now and pay later’ which can cause a fiscal 
crisis of local government. The scale of local government debt increased annually 
by 10% or so for the several years since the time when the early elected mayors 
were inaugurated after popular elections (MOGAHA 2001). In the same context, 
Korea Daily reported that the financial self-reliance ratio decreased in basic local 
governments after the popular elections for mayors(Korea Daily , 29 June 1998); 
this suggested that mayors were likely to implement popular policies in order to 
gain re-election and thus to increase the likelihood of lax financial management 
(Sa, D.H., 1999: 418). 
On the other hand there was another voice that the debt of local 
governments in Korea was not serious to the extent that it raised concerns about 
the possibility of a fiscal crisis or bankruptcy and instead it just resulted from 
cyclical fiscal stress that happens in the conjunctural recession (Gwak, C.G., 
1998: 330). Whereas the USA and Japan operate a programme of fiscal 
reestablishment and bankruptcy law for local government, Korean local finance 
management is based on the structural dependency on central government 
through the general component of local shared tax and the limitation of bond 
issuing and taxation by local government. Therefore on one hand it is difficult for 
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local government to go bankrupt under this institutional mechanism; on the other 
hand it can provide an incentive for local governments’ moral hazard. 
Moreover, there was an argument criticising the tendency for central 
government to retain the finance and authority. The commentators against 
centralism argued that regardless of the endeavour of local governments, the 
current central-local power structure has a tendency to produce deterioration in 
the financial conditions of local government (Park, H.J., 2010). In contrast, the 
scholars and civil groups argue that more positive devolution can enable the local 
government to exercise creative and autonomous management. From the same 
perspective, regional governors responded that the central government was 
stingy in transferring authority and finance, and straightforwardly disbelieved local 
government (Yoon, H.I, 2005).  
More fundamentally the debate mentioned above seems to be generated 
from ‘the inability of local government to limit its range of responsibilities’ as 
Sharpe (1981: 7) noted. Local government in Korea is positioned under the 
double pressures of increased demand from citizens and control by the centre. 
Therefore local government lacks the perception and control over ‘either the 
supply or the demand side of its role as a general government’ (Sharpe, 1981: 7). 
The argument of Sharpe is so appropriate that the Korean local government, 
which easily falls into the temptation of omnipotence and gives rise to fiscal 
emergencies, deserves to consider it.  
 
3.3. Policy responses 
Unlike the cases of American municipalities, European local governments’ fiscal 
stress did not precipitate fiscal bankruptcy. Under the comparatively strong power 
of central government in Europe, the centre’s timely and proper fiscal control 
seems apposite over local government (Sa, D.H., 1999: 430). This point is 
consistent with the path dependent arguments of Ikenberry with regard to 
European statism. He noted that many European polities constructed centralized 
administrative systems which preceded the spread of basic democratic 
institutions; this served to strengthen the role of bureaucracy, and provided 
government with the capacities to actively engage in the subsequent round of 
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state-formation, and was later expanded upon during periods of economic crisis 
(Ikenberry, 1994: 15). The same argument could clearly be applied to Korea. 
The Korean government has considered institutional countermeasures 
preventing the fiscal crisis of local government under the conditions of economic 
depression since the 1997 economic crisis. First, the most important policy 
orientation of local governments was fiscal austerity (MOGAHA, 1998). According 
to Korea Economy, the central government wanted to enforce fiscal austerity in 
local government by raising the possibility of local fiscal crises (Korea Economy 
23 April 1998). Central government was obliged to promptly support subsidies 
and local shared taxes in the fiscally stressed local governments, and urged them 
to adjourn new financial projects. Due to both the reductions of central 
government revenue transfers such as subsidies and of local government’s self-
financed revenues like local tax, many on-going projects had to be discontinued 
as well as limitations placed on new businesses. The fiscal austerity of local 
government was the corollary of the central government’s policies after the IMF 
bailout: the central government, for fiscal consolidation, lowered the increasing 
rate of government expenditure budget by 3 percentage points less than the 
economic growth rates and significantly reduced government bond issuance in 
order to lower the deficit (MOFE 1999: 222). Likewise, in streamlining the public 
sector, local government reduced its workforce by around 35,000: 12% of the 
total local public officials in 1998, and again cut about 21,000 local officials from 
1999 to 2001(MOGAHA, 2001; 2002). 
Second, the financial analysis and diagnosis covering local government was 
implemented to identify the financial condition of all local governments from 1998 
(MOGAHA, 2000a). This was a measure in response to the need for fiscal 
consolidation, increasing demand for public services and popularly elected 
mayors’ reckless management. As for those local governments judged to be 
improperly managing their finances, they entered a financial diagnosis process in 
order to identify the factors of their fiscal distress, and they were encouraged to 
enforce a plan of financial consolidation on their own. In this diagnosis process 
there was a committee for financial diagnosis which comprised financial experts 
from private institutions, a circle of scholars and the working groups of 
experienced public officials who were all involved in practically analysing the 
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condition of local government. As a result, up to the present date, 36 cases of 
local governments since 2000 were diagnosed through this institutional scheme 
for the consolidation of local finance (see above Table 3-3).  
Third, accrual accounting was enforced for the purpose of introducing the 
concept of business management and ensuring consolidation and effectiveness 
of local pubic financial management (MOGAHA, 2001). In addition, transparency 
of budget and accounting was needed to obtain appreciation and understanding 
of financial management by citizens. Under this financial environment, MOGAHA 
designated two local governments as project agencies, organized the task force 
team in 1999 and ordered the development of the standards and a digital 
programme of accrual accounting to the consortium of an accounting firm, IT 
corporation and KRILA in the same year. Through a good deal of public hearings 
and workshops these standards and the digital system of accrual accounting was 
checked and applied to the project agencies.  
MOGAHA more carefully examined local bond issuance, local financial 
investments and loans of local government. According to a survey of budget 
officials in local governments, the most effective mechanisms for preventing a 
fiscal crisis are (in order of significance): financial analysis and diagnosis, the 
examination of local bond issuance, and the evaluation of financial investments 
and loans (Cho & Shin, 2008:18). Local government can issue bonds for capital 
projects and the emergent restoration after a disaster within limitations. The bond 
limit issued is within 10% of the previous year’s budget considering the total 
amount of debt and its payment plan. This needs the confirmation of MOPAS 
when it relates to projects of local government development. On the other hand, 
the analysis of local financial investments and loans is carried out to analyse all 
kinds of factors relating to the project and the conditions possible in the future in 
order to evaluate the appropriateness and priority of the financial project.  
Last but not least, after the global economic crisis impact on local 
government’s fiscal conditions, the early-warning system and the central 
government’s fiscal intervention in the fiscally emergent local government were 
established in 2011, as we noted above. These systems are to monitor the 
financial condition, to detect problematic issues and to prevent fiscal crises of 
local government (MOPAS, 2010). In this way, after financial crises central 
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government devised a variety of policy instruments so that central government 
can indirectly control local government. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This chapter focused on the experience of fiscal crises at the national level and 
the implication for local accountability in the policy context of Korea. The Korean 
financial crises in 1998 came from the lack of government controls of the market 
due to a series of internal liberalization policies and external globalization like a 
runaway horse. The policy of globalization and liberalization previously taken by 
the Korean government created a changed set of financial institutional 
arrangements which precipitated the unexpected fiscal crises in 1997-8. The 
financial crisis at the national level had broader and serious consequences. The 
changed rules for the globalization of Korea transcended the imaginable 
boundary within which the government worked, and thus provoked the issue of 
fiscal accountability at every level of government. With hindsight central 
government was premature in granting discretion and responsibility to newly 
autonomous sectors of the state. Accountability of local government, in this 
context, was questioned because local autonomy was believed to be more 
inefficient and irresponsible than central government. Local government 
appeared to waste its budget which was dysfunctional in completing local 
democracy. Therefore in order to regulate local government, the new rules were 
established to monitor the fiscal condition and the progress of activities of local 
government (see chapter 5). In the centralist approach, local government cannot 
be trusted. Due to the experience of the financial crisis, the little professional 
discretion which local government had exercised until then was exposed to and 
over-ruled by the centre to ensure financial transparency and responsibility of 
local government. There are tight central controls of finance, limitation of local 
powers of taxation and borrowing and strong modes of central audit. Under this 
interpretation local government is subordinate to the central government. The 
institutional change to increase central control on local government dynamically 
affects the perception of local politicians and professional officials who are 
regarded with distrust by central government. Dynamics of historical 
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institutionalism warns that policy responses to the financial crisis could divert the 
path of democratic central-local relations after local election. Increased central 
controls inevitably influence the performance of local government by reducing 
self-satisfaction and enhancing audit fatigue. 
Fiscal crisis at the local and national levels therefore revealed flaws in the 
operation of local autonomy but also revealed the dominance of the centralising 
tendencies within the state. That revelation provides a useful perspective and in 
practical terms illustrates the need for more determined reform if local democracy 
is ever successfully to be embedded. 
Therefore we need a more democratic approach. Based on localism, elected 
local politicians should be made accountable to the local electorate. It is 
necessary to establish trust in central-local government relations and to do this 
central government should concede corresponding policy authority and discretion 
to local government. This would allow them to raise taxes locally but make it clear 
to local people that the local politicians are responsible for managing the finance 
and spending the budget. Even if local government units faced fiscal crises, they 
should be allowed to go bankrupt and the local population would only have 
themselves to blame for electing incompetent or unrealistic leaders. Considering 
the practical possibility of working in the current centralist model in Korea, the 
policy instruments of transferring more authority and responsibilities to local 
government should be continuously pursued to cure the corrosive effect of 
distrust in the system resulting from policy responses to the national fiscal crises.  
The thesis returns to the effect of fiscal crises in chapter 6 in which the 
negative effects of intensified central controls are explored in greater depth. That 
chapter goes on to establish some hypotheses about the effect of fiscal crisis on 
local performance. Those hypotheses are tested in chapters 7 and 8 and the 
thesis presents an assessment of crisis effects in the concluding chapter. But first 
we go on to analyse issues of performance in chapter 4 and outline the dynamics 
of Korean fiscal institutions in chapter 5. 
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Chapter 4. The evolution of performance 
management and its impact on central-
local relations in Korea 
1. Introduction  
This thesis elucidates the impact of critical moments in the central control of local 
governments, where the central government began to give more power to local 
government in the name of local autonomy but this trend seemed to be 
interrupted by financial crises and a step back to traditional centralism, as shown 
in chapter 3. The questions of the earlier chapters, thus, are how the evolving 
central controls have influenced local governments over the last decade and how 
financial crises affected the mode or the effect of the central controls. So we 
explored the theoretical and empirical context of Korean local autonomy and 
financial crises in chapter 2 and 3. In particular, the impact of central controls on 
local government will be measured and interpreted through the lens of the 
performance of local government. Much expanded local autonomy is supposed to 
positively relate with the performance of local government. This is grounded on 
the theoretical and empirical evidence regarding the relation between political 
democracy and performance in the public sector (see chapter 1). The spread of 
performance management in the public sector brought an abundance of empirical 
studies using performance information. This chapter focuses on what brought 
Korea to manage performance in the public sector and how performance 
management affected central and local government relations. This issue of 
performance management links with the statistical analysis in the later chapters, 
because we will investigate what the effect of central control is on the variation of 
local government performance in chapters 7 and 8.  
There have been continuous efforts to create well-performing government 
throughout history. The scope of control of bureaucracies and government has 
been reformed in similar ways even among different countries. The classic 
bureaucracy was preoccupied with rules, hierarchy and inputs. At this stage, it is 
relatively important to measure input and specifically, input can be regulated in 
terms of policy requirements. But the new public management seeks to 
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transcend bureaucracy with an emphasis on outputs and results. The focus of the 
control of government has been changed toward enhancing accountability of 
government in accordance with the change of the public sector paradigm. 
Managing performance in the public sector is based on the principle that if 
performance is rigorously monitored, accountability can be promoted to enhance 
the quality of public policy(Heywood, 2000: 117), by providing sufficient access to 
information to make critical and informed judgments and applying appropriate 
sanctions in the event of blunders or under-performance.  
The key concepts of performance management popularly used in countries’ 
models cover measuring performance, performance information, performance 
monitoring, assessment and performance reporting. According to an OECD study, 
managing performance is a process in which objectives are determined, 
managers have flexibility to achieve them, actual performance is measured and 
reported and this information feeds into decisions about programme funding, 
operation and reward or penalty (Curristine, 2005). Korea drew on other 
developed countries’ reforms and adopted a variety of performance management 
systems in the 2000s. As a result, performance assessment has grown out of 
policy evaluation over the last two decades. Individual and multiple policy 
evaluation and assessment were integrated into the present structure of the 
Government Activities Assessments (GAA). The result of GAA generates 
incentives and penalties for an organization and individual staff. The nature of 
this assessment is said to emphasize both of the aspects of policy evaluation and 
performance assessment at the same time, unlike other countries’ cases such as 
the capacity review of the UK, the management accountability of Canada or the 
policy evaluation of France (MPF 2013). Thus the evaluations of policy and 
programmes, in which the central controls of local government were formally 
expressed, are naturally linked to local government performance through the 
GAA scheme. As we will explore in much greater detail below, the local 
government performance assessments in the GAA will be used in the statistical 
analysis in the later chapters. It is better known as the Joint Performance 
Assessment (JPA) which enjoys consistency grounded on the institutional 
stability of the performance assessment system of Korea. The data of JPA is 
collected objectively and justly by the government operated assessment 
committee and the final result is opened to the public annually.  
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To understand the broad context of performance management in the public 
sector, this study will explore the recent policy direction and general concepts 
about performance management. Then we go on to examine the reform of local 
government performance management and its impact on central-local 
government relations in Korea.  
 
2. Managing performance in the public sector 
2.1. Evolution of managing performance in many countries  
The performance-oriented paradigm has been popular in developed as well as 
developing countries since the 1990s. Many commentators from different 
countries examined the performance-oriented paradigm. Bouckaert and Halligan 
(2008: 49) confirm that ‘the penetration (by performance measurement) was 
significant by the mid-1990s’. A UK specialist, Talbot (2005), saw the rise and rise 
of performance as an issue in public sector theory and practice. To some extent 
there seemed to be an agreement that the new paradigm could play a role as a 
driver for the competitiveness of government. Many governments have spent 
more resource and time on performance measurement or performance 
management compared to the past (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004: 91). 
Performance measurement assists managers and other stakeholders to evaluate 
the organizations’ achievements and progress. The performance measured is 
used in devolving the power to managers through competition and decentralized 
decision making.  
    In response to the fiscal conservatism over recent years, performance 
management has been restructured or used in reducing government 
expenditures in order to reduce the fiscal deficit and improve the efficiency of 
government. These trends can be found in many countries. The UK initially 
highlighted performance as a method to improve public services; these were top-
down performance management, emphasizing competition in service provision 
and citizen’s choice (Bouckaert and Halligan 2008: 135~7). However the fever of 
performance management appears to have dampened down due to the fiscal 
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deficit. The Public Service Agreements were abandoned before the 2010 election 
(Timmins and Gash, 2014) and with the abolition of the Audit Commission, the 
Comprehensive Area Assessment ended in 2010. Instead the National Audit 
Office helps public service managers improve performance and service delivery. 
The Civil Service Reform Plan in June 2012, following the 2011 Open Public 
Services White Paper, which called for a smaller, more strategic civil service, 
highlighted the need to change the way services are delivered and for a more 
radical approach to reducing the government’s cost base (NAO, 2013). The Local 
Audit and Accountability Act 2014 provided the C&AG (Comptroller and Auditor 
General) of the National Audit Office with powers to conduct Value for Money 
examinations of local authorities for specified purposes.  
    In the USA, the tandem structure of the Government Performance and 
Result Act (GPRA) and the Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART) linked 
strategic objectives to outputs and resources (Bouckaert and Halligan 2008: 136). 
However the Obama government abandoned PART and introduced High Priority 
Performance Goals. This is a new form of performance management to choose 
and concentrate on priority goals. Departments and agencies are asked to name 
specific goals as the most important in the budget along with strategic plans and 
then the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) conducts quarterly reviews of 
the agencies’ progress on all Priority Goals to find opportunities for improvement 
and make sure agencies are addressing them (OMB, 2011). 
    Canadian performance managing was initiated by the ‘Program Review 
(1994) which examined all government programmes to bring about the most 
effective and cost efficient way of delivering services. In order to reduce the 
deficit, Budget 2011 launched the comprehensive, one-year Strategic and 
Operating Review across all of the government in the fiscal year 2011–12, with 
an aim to support the return to a balanced federal budget by 2014–15. The 
objective of the Strategic and Operating Review was to examine direct 
programme spending and identify proposals for reductions in operating grants 
and contribution, and capital expenditures, while maintaining the integrity of 
essential services (TBS, 2012). Canada has been seen as an exemplary case of 
success in managing fiscal retrenchment (Wilks, 2010: 99). 
    The Korean public sector reform faced a watershed moment with the 1997 
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economic crisis which resulted in the creation of the infrastructure for 
performance-based management in the public sector. The government became 
interested in the economic, effective and efficient use of limited resources. In this 
context the Basic Act for Evaluation of Government Activities (Evaluation Act) 
was legislated in 2001 and improved by the Government Activities Assessment 
Act (Assessment Act) in 2006 in order to examine and assess the programmes 
and services of central and local governments. The traditional financial system 
was fundamentally changed to the programme budget and accrual basis 
accounting in 2008 to establish the ground for performance management. Since 
then, in Korea the performance assessment has enjoyed continuity and has not 
experienced conspicuous change in response to the recent financial 
conservatism as seen in the countries’ cases mentioned above.   
 
2.2. The reasons for introducing performance management  
According to the purpose of measuring performance, performance improvement 
can be differently interpreted. The studies draw attention to the multiple purposes 
of performance measures and how the measures chosen must be appropriate for 
particular purposes (Behn, 2003: 587; Hatry, 1999: 158). If the purpose is to 
control, then measures of input are needed as these can specifically be regulated 
in terms of whether policy requirements have been adhered to and often lie within 
the responsibility of managers to commission or provide (Clarkson et al., 2009). 
On the other hand, if organizational learning and developments are the true 
intentions behind measuring performance then a wider set of measures are 
needed to provide detailed information about various aspects of various 
operations (Behn, 2003: 596). However, the purposes behind measuring 
performance are rarely stated explicitly and multiple purposes are often hidden 
behind a single set of measures (Clarkson et al., 2009).  
Rashid enumerates in detail the usefulness of performance management as 
follows. It provides ‘clarity about who is responsible and accountable for ensuring 
objectives are achieved and with whom, by when and what the expected 
outcomes are; focuses the organization on priorities, harnessing the 
organization’s energy to those ends; provides a balanced approach to monitoring 
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and evaluating performance, learning and feeding back issues to bridge 
performance gaps; clarifies what is expected of individuals, teams and other 
organizations who are contributing to delivering shared priorities; allows feedback 
to individuals and teams and to citizens and stakeholders; creates more 
openness and honesty about what can and cannot be achieved; demonstrates to 
interested parties that best value is being achieved; supports the levering in of 
resources to maximize the Council’s overall performance; enables effective use 
of limited resources; identifies performance gaps that need to be remedied; 
encourages learning from the causes of mistakes and success; improves 
communication inside and outside the organization’ (Rashid, 1999: 25). 
    These various points on the usefulness and objectives of performance 
management above can be summarized into three categories. Performance 
management in the public sector contributes to ensuring effective resources 
allocation, enhancing performance in respect to public service provision, and 
improving accountability in generic terms (Bouckaert and Hallligan, 2006: 455).  
    First, performance management ultimately aims at efficient allocation of 
resource. The common purpose of OECD countries applying performance 
information in their budget process and decision making is for allocating 
resources (Curristine 2005: 95; Bouckaert and Hallligan, 2008: 148).  
    Second, performance management is basically enforced to help 
organizations achieve their objectives and improve performance in terms of 
measurement or reporting (Atkinson et al., 1997). Performance measurement is 
needed for setting goals and objectives, planning programmes, monitoring and 
evaluating the results to determine if they are making progress in achieving the 
established goals and objectives, and modifying programme plans to enhance 
performance.  
    Third, public accountability provides a framework for legitimising the exercise 
of public power. John Stewart (1994: 75) notes that ‘public accountability rests 
both on giving an account and on being held to account’. Performance measures 
can provide useful information to various stakeholders, managers, politicians and 
the public and thus results in increasing the accountability of public organizations. 
The accountability of government had been discussed with legality or 
purposefulness in the past, but recently has been developed toward emphasizing 
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effects or results. The accountability for effects or results, catching sight of the 
intended impact of programmes, considers result-based management which can 
enhance the efficiency of management and surely improves political control of 
administration focusing on the performance of government activities.  
     These three purposes might not be seen as separate but, rather, connected 
to each other. In other words, the more pressure placed on efficient resources 
allocation, the more likely the performance will be enhanced. The improved 
performance can be considered to have as much accountability as is required. As 
performance is ‘not a unitary concept’ in the public sector where there are a 
range of dimensions and contexts, its usefulness and purpose may be differently 
defined and measured according to each organization’s defined goals. 
 
2.3. Some critical qualifications  
The performance measurement systems may fail to help public organizations 
investigate or improve performance because their activities or services are 
sometimes ambiguous and intangible, and therefore it is difficult to measure their 
immediate outputs. In some jobs what is meaningful is not measurable and what 
is measurable is not meaningful. The greater the emphasis placed on 
measurement and quantification, the more likely the subtle, non-measurable 
elements of the task will be sacrificed (Levinson, 2003).  
    The wide range of stakeholders and their diverse interests can be an 
impediment in measuring performance in the public sector. Their different 
interests and aims may demand different organizational devotion and finally 
different performance. For example, the Ministry of Finance tends to focus on 
financial performance; whereas Parliament may be more interested in the 
effectiveness of policy; while consumers are anxious about the quality of service 
delivery (Carter, 1991: 90). This is also prone to make it difficult to answer 
questions about all the different dimensions of performance and to design the 
performance measures.  
    Another problematic issue is the asymmetrical cost and benefit of 
performance management (Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008: 27). While costs of 
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performance measurement systems are unconditional and immediate, their 
benefits are conditional and scheduled for the future. Benefits depend on the use 
of performance information for the purpose of improved results, and are 
transferred into their outcomes through interaction with different service users. 
Costs include all costs and time for developing systems, collecting and 
processing data, completing reports and analysing information. In addition, there 
might be invisible costs such as transaction costs for staff training; employee’s 
compliance cost; and perverse effects resulting from performance measurement 
(Talbot, 2005). Thus it is likely that reformers fail to give new systems enough 
time to deliver results.    
    Despite performance measurement systems being applied to the public 
sector, it is frequently alleged that performance information seems not to be 
commonly used in policy debates and has little impact on resource allocation. 
Curristine (2005: 12) similarly notes that politicians do not generally make use of 
performance information provided by performance measurement systems in their 
decision making. There is also a tendency for politicians to avoid the publication 
of performance assessment, especially when it includes negative information 
(Hailstones, 1994: 195). A UK Parliamentary committee (Public Administration 
Select Committee, 2003) indicates that both Government and the Legislature did 
not sufficiently use performance information in debates about policies (Talbot, 
2005:512). The core reason for this problem may be the low validity or complexity 
of such performance indicators.    
    The increasing competition among public organizations also can have a 
counterproductive effect on performance management in respect of transparency 
because competitive pressure can lead to information isolation of organizations 
due to the partial interests of the competitors. (Hepworth, 1994: 141) On the 
other hand there are increasing concerns about the danger of information 
overload, even though the increase in the quantity provides decision makers with 
more information. (Curristine, 2005: 102). It makes it difficult to distinguish what is 
meaningful and important.  
    In summary, it is necessary to acknowledge the limitations of measuring 
performance because public sector organization does not correspond to the 
majority of the criteria employed for private sector decision making, and there are 
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difficulties in reaching an agreement on the criteria used to assess performance. 
The important factors revealed by the OECD survey in developing high quality 
performance measures are the strong leadership support of managers in charge 
of government programmes; the types of goods and services; and political 
pressure to improve performance (Curristine, 2005: 97).  
 
2.4. What values are measured? 
A wide range of values, such as the common good, exists in the public sector 
where there are different stakeholders, and where there are a variety of 
managing dimensions. In practice, more instrumental or extrinsic values which 
are possible to measure have been the focus for improving the managerial 
competency of government. Many governments have a common interest in 
making savings in public expenditure, improving the quality of public services, 
making the operations of government more efficient, and increasing the chances 
that the policies which are chosen and implemented will be effective (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2004: 7). The ascendancy of the ‘three Es’: economy, efficiency, and 
effectiveness has been intended to increase central control over service delivery 
as well as cutting costs (Carter, 1991). 
First, economy primarily has something to do with input and is thus defined 
as acquiring resource in appropriate quantity or at least cost (e.g. cost per case, 
cost per service type, number of staff involved). Input refers to resources needed 
to produce output. Such measures based on derivatives of economy are given 
importance by the dominance of the government budget process: for example, as 
expressed in terms of cost, staffing totals and quantities comparisons are made 
across similar types of organization (Boland and Fowler, 2000: 149; Flynn, 2007: 
122). Accounting for how money has been spent can give information about 
financial performance from the perspective of economy. 
Second, efficiency concerns not only input but also output. Output refers to 
the amount measured in quantifiable terms (e.g., patients treated, crimes solved, 
the miles of road repaired). For most services it is possible to devise a measure 
of volume: local government can measure the distance of repairing a road, the 
number of customers the social worker provides a service for, and the weight of 
 103 
refuse disposal. All that remains to produce a measure of efficiency is to find out 
how much each one costs to produce, and then make comparisons, either with 
other local governments, or over time (Flynn, 2007: 123). Efficiency is thus 
defined as maximizing output for a given set of input, or minimizing input for a 
required output (e.g. cost per patient, repair cost per mile, staff-student ratios). 
Finally effectiveness involves the degree to which outputs meet 
organizational needs and requirements: ‘outcomes’. Outcomes refer to the final 
impact of service that is outside the activity or programme (e.g. healthier 
individual, a safer society). Output means what a programme produces, such as 
immediate products or services, while outcomes are the ultimate effects it 
delivers. Therefore, for customers and the public, outcome is a measure of policy 
success and will be considered more seriously.  
Economy and efficiency are compatible with the concept of financial 
accountability and so comparatively convenient to collect because they are 
usually measured by quantitative terms and data such as costs, volume of 
service and productivity (Palmer, 1993). Accounting systems have been long 
employed for performance measurement because they conceive of reliable and 
consistent features (Atkinson et al., 1997). Contrary to economy and efficiency, 
effectiveness is much more difficult to measure due to such problems as the 
inability to measure outcomes accurately; the difficulty in separating the effect of 
services from other factors; and conflicting interpretations of results (Hansenfeld, 
1983). Therefore, effectiveness may be partly measured in terms of ‘quality of 
service’, ‘customer satisfaction’ and ‘achievement of goal’. According to studies, 
effectiveness indicators may appear less often than efficiency indicators (Palmer, 
1993; Carter, 1991: 90).  
Performance management is based on the logic that assessment through 
measurement can lead to enhancing the performance and the responsibility of 
public organizations. There is a lack of agreement on how to measure 
performance and how to manage performance. In the private sector, there is a 
consensus that performance ultimately can be measured by profits. Then, the 
public sector analogy for the profits of the private sector should be ‘the outcome 
for society of the public sector intervention’ (Smith 1996: viii). In the management 
of public resources, performance could refer to outcome, the impact on society of 
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a particular public sector activity. 
The purpose of measuring outcomes is to assess the valuation placed on 
public sector activity (Smith 1996). Recent studies like the OECD (2005) survey 
and Bouckaert and Halligan(2008: 11) with regard to performance measurement 
have in mind not just output but ‘outcomes’ of government policy. Curristine (2005: 
89) agrees with this, indicating that concentrating only on output can ‘give rise to 
goal displacement as agencies risk losing sight of the intended impact of their 
programs’. However, outcome or effectiveness indicators were extremely rare 
and mostly not very informative earlier. Putnam et al.(1994: 66) opposed 
including outcomes in the measures because outcomes were influenced by 
various factors besides government activities. They demonstrated that 
government must not be given credit or blame for matters beyond their control. 
The majority of the countries that have developed performance measures 
produce a combination of outputs and outcomes according to the OECD survey 
by Curristine (2005: 89) because of the difficulty in following an approach 
converging solely on either outputs or outcomes. In Korea in the composition of 
indicators, the checking and comparison of efficiency and effectiveness started to 
be important, each organization preferring to use outputs data with quantitative 
indicators (Park, N.W. et al, 2008). According to the analysis of self-assessment 
of the Korean central government in 2011, the ratio of the performance indicators 
of outputs versus outcomes were found to be 3 to 1 (KIPA, 2011). In the UK, the 
USA, Canada and Australia, which have developed performance management, 
performance information mixed with outputs and outcomes are collected and 
utilized in the work process, to a higher degree than average practice (Bouckaert 
and Halligan, 2008: 149). 
To sum up, in order to improve managerial competency, governments have 
intended to measure economy, efficiency and effectiveness across their public 
services and government operations. Despite some controversy, the majority of 
the countries that developed performance measures have produced combined 
performance information of outputs and outcomes.  
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3. Performance management in Korea 
3.1. Development of policy evaluation  
Performance management in Korea has grown out of processes of policy 
evaluation initiatives. When policy evaluation was introduced in the early 1960s, 
Korea was one of the poorest countries at that time, however, Korea has grown 
into the 15th largest country based on Gross Domestic Product in 2012 (World 
Bank, 2013). Behind this economic development there has been policy 
evaluation. If we can say that the engine of the Korean economic growth was the 
Five-Year Plan for development, the supportive institution behind the successful 
implementation of this plan was policy evaluation (MPF, 2013). Policy evaluation 
has therefore become a cherished principle in Korean public life, an institutional 
norm which commands wide support. In improving the effectiveness of policy 
evaluation central government has experienced three phases of paradigm 
change which affected the development of policy evaluation in local government.  
The first stage, ‘Review and Evaluation of Government Policies’ was 
introduced in 1961 to assess the Five-Year Plan. It was influenced by 
contemporary policy science (Lee, D.O., 2009: 199). Obviously, however, the 
important impetus for its introduction was the need to check the progress of 
economic development policies which President Park Jung-hee prioritised and 
thus was a national ideology. The purpose of this evaluation was to conduct a 
continuing appraisal of progress and effectiveness of the Five-Year Plan, and of 
gaps between production and investment targets on the one hand, and 
accomplishments on the other. Following Wolf (1961)’s suggestion that for a 
more objective evaluation it should be implemented by a different organization 
other than the executive, the Office of the Prime Minister took charge of the 
Review and Evaluation. However, it was criticized as only a waste of resources 
since the function of the review and evaluation of government policies was 
separated from budget offices and the results did not properly feedback to 
planning organization (Moon, Y.S., 1996). In this stage, the policy evaluation at 
the local level was in line with Review and Evaluation exercised by central 
government because local autonomy was not implemented until the 1990s. 
In the second stage, in order to improve feedback and connect with 
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planning and budget organization, ‘Examination and Evaluation of Government 
Policies’ was conducted by the Economic Planning Board which evaluated or 
monitored several of the main policies and programmes. From the Roh Tae-woo 
government (1987-1993) it was conducted for nearly 20 years before the Roh 
Mu-hyun government introduced the Government Activities Assessments (GAA) 
in 2006. Since the external organization evaluated the salient policies of central 
government departments, it was called a corporate assessment (MPF, 2013). 
However there was criticism that it hardly assessed the performance of 
government precisely and comprehensively but just monitored the 
implementation of certain policies (Lee, D.O., 2009: 199). The examination and 
evaluation of local government policies was conducted in some local 
governments from 1995, according to local ordinances (Park, H.J., 2005). The 
effort to introduce NPM-type reformative methods was made in the Korean public 
sector around then. A series of initiatives aimed at increasing economic efficiency 
and effectiveness of government was accelerated by the external catalyst of the 
1997 economic crises. Various performance measurement tools such as 
Measurement of Objectives, Performance Contract, Performance-related 
Payment, Performance audit, and Evaluation of Agencies, were experimented 
with and introduced in the second stage.  
These endeavours sought to introduce a more comprehensive assessment 
of government activities. ‘Government Performance Evaluation (GPE)’ was 
introduced in central government in 1998 and tried to assess government 
performance systemically rather than simply monitor it. Central government 
departments for the first time had to compete with each other in the new scheme 
because the results of GPE had been published to the public by the office of the 
prime minister in the form of league tables (Lee, D.O., 2009). In accordance with 
the introduction of GPE, Joint Performance Assessment (JPA) for local 
government was introduced as a pilot assessment of regional governments in 
1999 in order to assess the performance of local government comprehensively. 
But some local governments expressed refusal to be assessed with the reason 
that there was no legal base to assess local government. In this context, the 
Basic Act for Evaluation of Government Activities (the Evaluation Act) was 
enacted to evaluate performance of government in 2001 when JPA was formally 
launched under this law. The purpose of performance management extrapolated 
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in the Evaluation Act is to enhance achievement of government activities by 
measuring outputs and outcomes of government interventions in respect to the 
economic feasibility, the effectiveness and the efficiency. However, many 
problems were noticed because the law became effective without arranging a 
range of evaluations to be separately implemented by the various ministries at 
that time (Lee Y. S. et al, 2005): in practice there was extensive paperwork, 
overlapping and a top-down approach; in theory there needed to be a change in 
the direction of evaluation toward performance management. Following these 
criticisms, there was a change of paradigm to get rid of overlapping evaluations, 
to enforce the performance evaluations, and to give discretionary evaluation.  
    In the third stage, the new Basic Act for Government Activities Assessment 
(the Assessment Act) was enacted in 2006. The Roh Mu-hyun government 
conceived of the importance of performance management, and took and 
emphasized performance assessment as an instrument of government 
innovation. Early in 2005 at the cabinet meeting for operational planning checks, 
President Roh affirmed that “performance management is the essential task 
every ministry should enforce” (Shin, H. C., 2008). President Roh’s government 
reformed the institutional base to connect assessment with performance 
management, and incorporated a variety of individual assessments into the GAA 
to reduce the burden on local government. During this period policy evaluation 
incorporated a self-assessment framework into the GAA. Both central and local 
governments should conduct a self-assessment. The assessment results and 
performance information are utilized for making decisions for policies and reward 
or penalty of organizations and individuals. In particular, the scope of complex 
and redundant assessments implemented by central department assessments 
over local government activities was adjusted and all the individual assessment 
was integrated into the JPA. Thus, self-assessment and JPA are the current 
performance assessment systems from the perspective of the Korean local 
government.  
 
3.2. GAA as performance management 
With the Assessment Act, performance management and evaluation came to be 
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strengthened. The aim of assessment of government activities is not ‘evaluation’ 
itself but performance management. Performance management plays a 
comprehensive role helping in the decision making of organizations, and here, 
the instrument of assessment is utilized for promoting performance management 
(Kaplan & Norton, 1992). The core of the Assessment Act is to enforce 
assessment grounded on performance management in public organizations; and 
at the same time, to adopt self-assessment as a basic tool for performance 
measurement; to integrate and connect all kinds of evaluation systems which 
were separate and complicated; and to avoid overlapping evaluations across the 
government (Lee, D.O., 2009). In addition, an exclusive budget allocation for 
enforcing performance evaluation was provided to ensure the quality of results of 
the evaluation, differing from the past, and the results of performance evaluation 
were encouraged to be reflected in the budget, the management of the 
organization and personnel policy.  
GAA are divided into the two parts of self-assessment and corporate 
evaluation according to who is the assessor, as shown in Figure 4-5. As for the 
former, by default, central and local government should evaluate their own 
policies and activities of their organization. The latter is that the external 
organization evaluates the salient policies of each central and local government 
and public enterprises.  
 
Figure 4-5. The structure of Government Activity Assessment (GAA) 
The Committee for Government Activity Assessment (CGA) 
   
Central government  Local government  Public Enterprise 
GPE  JPA  Pubic Enterprise  
Management assessment  
Assessor: the CGA  Assessor: MOGAHA  Assessor: MPF 
Self-Assessment  Self-Assessment   
      
 
 GPE is used by for the prime minister to evaluate the prioritized policies needed 
to integrate the national management targets for the central government. Public 
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enterprises management assessment7 is managed by MPF. The Committee for 
Government Activities Assessment chaired by the prime minister is the formal 
evaluator which supervises self-assessment and evaluates GPE. This committee 
allows MOGAHA to do JPA and MPF to do public enterprise assessment and 
then reports these results from MOGAHA and MPF 
JPA evaluates the devolved policies and activities of local government. 
Before the implementation of JPA in 1999, local governments suffered a heavy 
burden of evaluation because there were a variety of individual evaluations by 
central governments which focused on input or process rather than outputs or 
outcomes. In the process of introducing JPA, there was policy conflict between 
ministries regarding who would have responsibility for it (Lee, D.O., 2009). The 
office of the prime minister wanted to retain the power to conduct JPA in the 
name of incorporating GPE and JPA, while MOGAHA and other central 
government departments sought to retain their power to regulate local 
government. As a result, a compromise led to a ‘joint’ assessment of previously-
existed individual evaluations rather than a completely new comprehensive 
assessment (Lee, D.O., 2009). Individual local government assessments 
consisting of JPA were united with the evaluating process centring on MOPAS in 
2008, in order not to continuously interfere in local autonomy. The measurement 
experts began to participate in the process of JPA which were intended to 
evaluate performance or outcomes of local governments in a rounded picture in 
order to improve the achievement of national priorities and to increase their 
accountability. 
    Self-assessment means that members of the organization assess their 
performance for themselves and thus it is the process of learning by evaluation 
because they come to know their merits and weak points through evaluating their 
activities. The performance indicators are recommended by CGA to ensure the 
objectiveness of evaluation. Each central government department employed and 
fine-tuned these self-assessment indicators according to specific characteristics 
of organization. The self-assessment targets the three areas of fiscal 
                                               
7
 The process, standard and methods used to evaluate public agencies are legislated in The Law 
of Public Enterprise Management (MPF, 2012). MPF takes charge of evaluating state-owned 
enterprises, public agencies and funds management, and reports the results of the evaluation to 
the Committee of Government Activities Assessment. 
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performance, organizational capacity and policy management. 
    Fiscal performance has been emphasized, given the idea that, without 
analysis of the costs and benefits of government activities, the expected effect of 
performance management cannot be achieved. To establish the foundation for 
fiscal performance management, a series of institutional systems were 
introduced: for example, they include the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework, 
Top-down budget, and Programme budget with Accrual basis accounting (MPF, 
2013). The Medium-Term Expenditure Framework provides government 
organizations with the broad picture concerning future budget allocation and the 
conditions under which programmes operate, and is able to manage performance 
of multi-year periods. It is essential that the Medium-Term Expenditure 
Framework should be consistent and continuous year by year. A top-down budget 
allows managers of programmes to have more autonomy in planning and 
spending the budget and thus can build the foundation for result-based 
performance management. Lastly Programme budget and Accrual basis 
accounting contribute to improving the quality of performance information as part 
of the infrastructure of performance management (Park, N.W. et al, 2008; 29). 
    In conclusion, the Korean government has developed performance 
management systems suitable for the Korean public sector. Currently the scheme 
of GAA is located in the centre of performance management. This system aims to 
integrate performance management systems and incorporate the results of 
performance information in organizational design, personnel management and 
budgeting. If we compare the extent to which Korean performance management 
has been developed in line with broadly accepted theory, it helps to understand 
the system of managing performance in Korea. It also helps give a certain level 
of trust to the performance data from the Korean government analysed in chapter 
7. For this reason, the next part delves into the institutional features to find out to 
which stage performance management has been developed in the Korean 
government, based on the discussion of Bouckaert and Halligan (2008).         
3.3. The Korean model of Performance Management  
The approach of Bouckaert and Halligan (2008) is useful in discussing the 
development of performance management. They constructed four ideal types 
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based on the logical sequence of performance management: measurement, 
incorporation and use of performance (see Table 4-6). First, the ‘measuring’ 
stage is collecting performance data from the policy implementation process and 
converting it into policy information. The next stage is incorporating performance 
information into documents, procedures and stakeholder discourses. Then, 
performance information is widely accepted and utilized in a strategy of improving 
decision making, results and accountability. The way in which measured 
performance data is employed can be analysed through four ideal types: 
‘performance administration’, ‘management of performance’, ‘performance 
management’, and ‘performance governance’ (see Bouckaert and Halligan 2008 
and Table 4-6).  
 
Table 4-6. Four ideal types of managing performance 
 Performance 
Administration 
Management of 
Performance 
Performance  
Management 
Performance  
Governance 
Measuring  
  Span 
Input & Process Specialised / 
Organizationally 
determined 3E 
Hierarchical / 
Organization and 
Policy based 3E 
Ddd  Consolidated/ 
 F    Full span 
Incorporating Some   Within  
Different function 
 
Systemically  
Internal integration 
Systemically  
Internal &external            
I     Integration 
Using Internal  
Reporting  
Disconnected Coherent                  
Comprehensive   
S    Societal use 
Limitations Ad hoc Incoherence Complex,  
not sustainable as  
a stable system 
Uncontrollable 
Source: Bouckaert and Halligan (2008) 
 
     
The Korean model approximates the features of Performance Management, 
the third ideal type of Bouckaert and Halligan (2008). In comparison to the 
previous ideal type, managements of performance, there is a functional and 
hierarchical integration of measurement, incorporation and use of performance 
(ibid: 100). Korea has sustained an intensive commitment to a performance 
approach and achieved the institutional development over the last decade. The 
characteristics of performance management of the Korean government are as 
follows. 
    The ‘span of performance’ covered by the GAA includes organizational and 
policy based economy, efficiency, and effectiveness. At the highest level, the 
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performance of prioritized policies sometimes crossed many central governments 
departmental lines. According to a study researching the measures of self-
assessment across the central government in 2011, the performance indicators 
of effectiveness were found to be 24% of self-assessment indicators and that of 
output to be 75% (KIPA, 2011). Looking at effectiveness and outcomes broadens 
the scope beyond the organizational border line of performance. There is an 
interactive measurement process which provides a good understanding of the 
operation of performance measurement. For example, central government 
departments participate in setting the performance indicators of GPE; JPA also 
has an interactive participation process from internal stakeholders such as local 
public officials and external stakeholder such as public service customers. As a 
result, performance measurements become dynamic and develop interactively in 
GAA, ‘taking trade-offs and paradoxes into account’. As for the ‘depth of 
performance’ stressed by Bouckaert and Halligan (2008: 21), the system of GAA 
is organized at the individual level but also at the level of policy field. For example, 
GPE evaluates cross cutting policies in which multi-ministerial departments 
cooperate to achieve the same goal such as administrative information disclosure, 
government innovation and job creation.  
    In order to control the quality of performance, the Board of Audit and 
Inspection of Korea came up with the guidelines for performance audit in 2005 
and extensively carried out performance auditing while helping maintain 
legitimacy of the measures between public administration and political 
accountability (BAI, 2005)8. Creating ownership by administrative stakeholders is 
another way to establish the legitimacy of performance information. Self-
assessments of the Korean central and local governments employ evaluation of 
customer satisfaction in order to communicate with stakeholder and society. The 
result of assessment can be acceptable to a range of stakeholders including civil 
society and politicians.  
    A more developed quality model was applied across different ministries and 
levels of government. The Balanced Scorecard (BSC) was introduced in order to 
systematically conduct the self-assessment in the central ministries after the 
                                               
8 Performance auditing is defined as examination, analysis, and performance assessment of 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness of policy, activity and corporate management in the manual 
of the Korean performance auditing (BAI, 2005). 
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CEO of KOTRA (Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency), which achieved 
successful innovation by the BSC, was inaugurated as the minister of MOGAHA 
in 2005. The balanced performance management means it is not solely a 
financial evaluation but includes a non-financial evaluation; not solely short term 
performance but also long term performance. The BSC was also spread to the 
local governments after being completely disseminated to all the ministries and 
agencies of the central governments in 2006.  
Performance information about nationally prioritized projects is incorporated 
in the policy cycle. The result of self-assessment, where every activity related 
with those projects in all departments is assessed, is the base for allocating 
performance-related payment for the individual, and is reflected on the personnel 
and organizational management (KIPA, 2011).   
    In particular, the integrated financial system seeks to incorporate 
performance information across functions. The Management of Performance 
Objectives (MPO) and the Programme Self-Assessment Tool connect 
performance management with allocating financial resources. The Programme 
Self-Assessment Tool involves the reviewing of budget programmes on the basis 
of a checklist and is being used as information in the decision-making and budget 
preparation process. MPF suggests items and the guidelines for the self-
assessment in advance, and then each ministry assesses their programme 
according to the guideline. This self-assessment result is submitted to review with 
evidence and confirmed by the responsible reviewer of MPF in budget 
preparation and improvement of the institution. MPO sets the objectives which 
are connected to the goals of the organization and are measurable indicators; 
evaluates the indicators as to whether the organization achieves the objectives; 
and utilizes the result of the evaluation to manage government finance (Park, 
N.W. et al, 2008). The Act of National Finance stipulates that the planning of 
performance and the report of performance should be attached to the budget. 
Recently the utilization of cost accounting is gradually developing in both central 
and local government to improve the value-for-money of the policy. The cost 
accounting system produces a net cost of the activity or business which the 
organization operates. The cost accounting aims to calculate the operating costs 
of the organization and their activities in order to use them in performance 
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management  
    In conclusion, the incorporated framework of GAA which is an institutional 
foundation for performance assessment can give important evidence that the 
performance model of Korea has entered the relatively advanced stage of 
performance management. According to survey research studying GAA, current 
performance assessments were revealed to contribute to integrating performance 
management tools within the organization and improving efficiency and 
effectiveness of programmes or activities (OPM, 2012). The process of objective 
and authoritative performance management happens across the levels of 
government. The Korean government’s integrated financial system where 
budgets turn into performance budgets, accounting systems shift to cost 
accounting, and audits transform to performance audits in a coherent and 
systematic way, contributes to a sustainable and functional incorporation. The 
whole performance management framework has been accepted by politicians, 
administrators and citizens who are using performance information in a 
transparent way as partners in a policy cycle. The results of performance 
assessment are widely published and they are regarded as an indicator of 
success or failure of each organization.  
 
4. A profile of local government performance 
management in Korea 
4.1. The integration of performance instruments  
There has been a range of instruments for performance management which have 
assisted Korean local government to operate with good performance and 
accountability after the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s. Review and 
Evaluation of Government Policies before 2002 was disconnected with the policy 
and management cycle: evaluation departments simply collected performance 
reports from each implementing department and the results were not reflected in 
the allocation of finance. Influenced by the NPM-type reform in the early 2000s, 
the multiple performance management models such as Performance-related Pay 
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Systems, MPO and a Public Service Charter were introduced in local government. 
The performance annual salary system applies for upper managers through a 
performance evaluation by management of objectives, and a performance bonus 
for the subordinate workers through an efficiency rating system (MOPAS, 2011b). 
The performance-related pay system seems to be embedded in each 
organization in that the scale of the budget for performance-related pay has 
expanded to nearly 1trillion KRW in 2012 from 290 billion KRW in 2005, and the 
gap of pay between grades continues to broaden (Park and Jang, 2012). Since 
the Government Activity Assessment Act was enacted in 2006, managing 
performance of local governments has consisted of the two components of the 
Joint Performance Assessment (JPA) and the Self-assessment.  
    In accordance with the introduction of BSC, the previous management tools 
were incorporated in self-assessment and used in the policy cycle. For example 
in Seoul Metropolitan City, MPO of individual staff and corporate evaluation are 
unified in the performance plan and assessed by the performance indicators of 
BSC and then the results are reflected in the Performance related Payment and 
incentives or penalty for the organization (Seoul, 2013). In this way, BSC has 
been popularly used for the self-assessment tool in the local government. But the 
motive for the introduction of BSC seemed not to come from the willingness or 
need of local government but from the initiative of the central government 
according to the government report (MOGAHA, 2007a). The central government 
set up a taskforce team to support building the foundation of the balanced 
scorecard system in the local governments in 2005, and in order to promote the 
geographical spread of performance management, several public hearings and 
briefing sessions were held on the balanced scorecard introduction for local 
governments. As a consequence in 2006, twelve local governments introduced 
the balanced scorecard as a pilot system. However, there were some criticisms 
regarding the spread of BSC. The application of the balanced scorecard in the 
public sector was prone to produce a limited effect, different from that in the 
private sector, because even the head of local government does not have the 
overall authority to establish the strategy of the organization and cannot always 
fundamentally restructure the organization (Park, H.Y., 2010). Despite concerns, 
BSC survives as a tool for the self-assessment system in many local 
governments up to now: 82 local governments out of 244 operate BSC to do self-
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assessment (OPM, 2012).  
    There have been efforts to shift the financial system of local government to 
cost accounting and performance budgets which are in the experimental stage in 
2015. In practice accrual base accounting, programme budget (performance 
budget 9 ) and medium-term expenditure are operated to integrate financial 
performance. The accrual accounting system was experimentally introduced from 
1999 in two local governments and then five years later, programme budgets 
started to be piloted in nine local governments and their territory was gradually 
broadened to all local governments in 2007 (see chapter 5). Currently the 
financial information of local government is so systemized that managers or 
external stakeholders could review its performance on each programme from 
budget to actual accounting outcomes at a glance.  
    Lastly, the financial analysis of local government started to be implemented 
in 1998, right after the financial crisis, to meet the demand for the local 
government’s fiscal health and effectiveness. The financial analysis of local 
government focused on the ten stock indicators but in 2005 these expanded to 
30 indicators in order to ensure the accountability and the autonomy of local 
government. It developed the indicators to measure performance oriented 
concepts like residents’ satisfaction (MOPAS, 2009c) 
    In conclusion, over a comparatively short term, Korean local government 
experienced many institutional management changes centred on performance 
and competition. Performance management of local government can be seen to 
be passively induced by the policy of central governments, rather than 
spontaneously and voluntary by local government, in that most performance 
management tools were introduced by guidelines of central government. For this 
reason, in the early stage of innovation it took much time and effort for 
practitioners in local government to adapt to the new performance management 
institutions. They sometimes had the feeling of ‘reform fatigue’ and many people 
wondered if the new management systems would be helpful in enhancing the 
performance of local government. During the stage of development of 
performance management, local governments struggled to adapt the self-
                                               
9
 In 2015, the Korean local governments produce the performance budget in the pilot version. 
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assessment system for their organization and positively participate in the national 
performance management scheme of JPA. The next part will investigate further 
the main axes of managing performance, which would justify why this thesis uses 
JPA for the later statistical analysis. 
 
4.2. Joint Performance Assessment  
The first and most influential tool of local government performance management 
is JPA. It is important to analyse the evolution of JPA because the data it has 
generated is used in the statistical analysis in chapters 7 and 8.  
MOGAHA10 was endowed with the power to develop and conduct JPA.  In 
consultation with other ministries and cooperation with the office of the prime 
minister, MOGAHA assesses how efficiently local governments are implementing 
policies and programmes delegated or funded by central government, and how 
well they are providing public services (Article 21 of the Assessment Act). The 
CGA under the control of the office of the prime minister deliberates and decides the 
master plan of JPA as noted above. The office of prime minister reviews and passes 
the preferential policies for evaluation proposed by each central government 
department on to MOGAHA through the deliberation of CGA. Then MOGAHA 
establishes the specific plans of evaluation; devises performance indicators with 
public officials from central and local government and external specialists in the 
policies or programmes to be evaluated; and organizes the task force team in order 
to carry out JPA directly. An online evaluation system called VPS (Virtual Policy 
Studio) has been established since 2008 to ensure the fairness and objectivity of the 
evaluation. JPA has been told to systematically construct the overall processes 
from the planning, through the practical assessment, to the final feedback, the 
commission of assessment, the working groups and the supervising organization 
(AIR, 2006; 546-548) 
JPA is an unprecedented evaluating system in that it can be seen as a 
product of the changed central-local government relationships which resulted 
from the local elections in the 1990s (see chapter 2). Since local governments 
                                               
10
 The government reshuffle changed MOPAS to MOGAHA in December 2014 
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were no longer regarded as the executive branches of central government, but 
rather as autonomous political bodies, the control system by the centre had to be 
changed. In this context a more effective tool to ensure the achievement of 
national priorities without excessive intervention in local government was needed. 
JPA is an indirect vehicle to control local government and to ensure the 
accountability of local government (Lee D.O., 2009). This thesis is primarily 
concerned with, how central controls of local government have impacted the 
performance of local government over the last decade of changing the central-
local governmental relationship, the use of JPA therefore fits neatly into the 
structure of this thesis. JPA produced objective and consistent performance 
information at the level of local government for the first time. The performance 
information measured by JPA meets the stability and the coverage of the variable 
criteria for the statistical analysis (see chapter 7). The performance information 
encompasses all the important functions of local government because JPA is a 
comprehensive performance assessment. Enough longitudinal data can be traced 
because JPA started in 1999 despite being initially a pilot-test. It is not too much to 
say that JPA has developed in parallel with Korean local autonomy.  
Since the 2004 JPA there have been nine assessment sections which generally 
cover most functions or services of local government though it had a few structural 
changes (see chapter 7). In the 2008 JPA, for example, as shown in Table 4-7, the 
nine sections were: the assessment of local administration, service innovation, 
social welfare, health and sanitation, environment management, local economy, 
regional development, culture and tourism and security for life and property. 
 
Table 4-7. The sectors of assessment in the 2008 JPA 
Sector Theme (74 themes) Competent 
Departments
11
 
Local  
Administration 
Real-name policy 
Customer service 
Information disclosure 
Non-profit organization support 
Volunteer work   
e-government 
  
 
 
 
MOPAS 
                                               
11
MPVA is the Ministry of the Patriots and Veterans Affairs; MHW is the Ministry of Health and 
Welfare; MOL is the Ministry of Labour; MW is the Ministry of Women; MAF is the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Foods; KFDA is the Korean Food and Drug Administration; CFT is the Committee 
of Fair Trade; MOE is the Ministry of Environment; KIPO is the Korean Intellectual Property Office; 
MLTM is the Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs; NEMA is the National Emergency 
Management Agency  
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Personnel reshuffle 
Policy on female public officials 
Official records management 
Social  
Welfare 
Benefits for patriots and veterans 
Welfare policy 
Multi-culture family support 
Measures for low birth & aging society 
Employment rate of  disabled public workers 
Preventing prostitution 
Women resource development 
Preventing violence in family  
Gender impact analysis 
 MPVA 
MHW 
MHW 
MHW 
MOL 
MW 
MW 
MW 
MW 
Health & 
Sanitation 
Communicable disease control 
Public health management 
Preventing infectious disease 
Food safety management 
Herbal medicine distribution management 
 MAF 
MHW 
MHW 
KFDA 
KFDA 
Environment 
management 
Environment management 
Water quality control 
Nature conservation programme 
Air pollution management 
Waste disposal 
Forest administration 
  
 
MOE 
Local  
Economy 
Vitalization of local economy 
Pro-market local tax policy 
Emergency spending 
Preservation of the local consumer 
National asset management 
Fair trade administration 
Employment promotion 
Cooperation between labour, business and 
government 
Procurement from small and medium industry 
  
MOPAS 
 
CFT 
MPF 
KIPO 
MOL 
 
SMBA 
Regional  
development 
Rural development policy 
Construction administration 
Public rental house construction 
House improvement in rural areas 
Rationalization of individual land price 
 MOPAS 
MLTM 
Culture  & 
Tourism 
Improvement of living space 
Promoting local culture and art 
Local library policy 
Promoting tourist destinations 
Signboard regulation 
 MOPAS 
MCT 
 
 
MOPAS 
Security Civil defence 
Fire security 
Safety education 
Disaster management 
Local disaster response system 
Risk management 
 NEMA 
 
 
 
 
MOPAS 
Service  
Innovation 
Internal organizational-management 
Regulation reform 
Establishing law and order  
Energy saving 
Price control 
Budget management 
 MOPAS 
 
MOL 
MOPAS 
Source: adapted from the disclosure of JPA results (MOPAS, 2009b) 
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Each of these assessments comprised five to six themes that were closely related to 
central government policies and programmes and totalled 74 themes in the 2008 
JPA. The most important theme was ‘emergency spending’ under the sector of 
‘Local Economy’, which was required to promptly respond to the 2008 global 
financial crisis.  
 
Table 4-8. Results of the 2008 JPA 
 
 Metropolitan Cities      Province 
 GA 
(Best) 
NA 
(Fair) 
DA 
(Worst) 
GA 
(Best) 
NA 
(Fair) 
DA 
(Worst) 
Local  
administration 
Busan 
Kwangju 
Daegu 
Daejon 
Ulsan 
Seoul 
Incheon 
Chungbuk 
Gyengnam 
Jeju 
Chungnam 
Jeonbuk 
Jeonnam 
Gyeonggi 
Gangwon 
Gyengbuk 
Social  
Welfare 
Daegu 
Daejon 
Busan 
Kwangju 
Ulsan 
Seoul 
Incheon 
Chungbuk 
Gyengnam 
Jeju 
Gangwon 
Jeonbuk 
Jeonnam 
Gyeonggi 
Chungnam 
Gyengbuk 
Health & 
Sanitation 
Daegu 
Incheon 
Busan 
Kwangju 
Daejon 
Seoul 
Ulsan 
Chungbuk 
Jeonbuk 
Gyengnam 
Gangwon 
Chungnam 
Jeonnam 
Gyeonggi 
Gyengbuk 
Jeju 
Environment 
management 
Kwangju 
Daejon 
Seoul 
Incheon 
Ulsan 
Busan 
Daegu 
Gangwon 
Chungnam 
Gyengnam 
Chungbuk 
Jeonnam 
Gyengbuk 
Gyeonggi 
Jeonbuk 
Jeju 
Local  
Economy 
Busan 
Daejon 
Daegu 
Incheon 
Ulsan 
Seoul 
Kwangju 
Chungbuk 
Jeonnam 
Gyengnam 
Gangwon 
Gyengbuk 
Jeju 
Gyeonggi 
Chungnam 
Jeonbuk 
Regional  
development 
Seoul 
Ulsan 
Daegu 
Incheon 
Kwangju 
Busan 
Daejon 
Gangwon 
Jeonbuk 
Jeonnam 
Gyengbuk 
Gyengnam 
Jeju 
Gyeonggi 
Chungbuk 
Chungnam 
Culture  & 
Tourism 
Kwangju 
Daejon 
Busan 
Daegu 
Incheon 
Seoul 
Ulsan 
Gyeonggi 
Gangwon 
Jeju 
Jeonbuk 
Jeonnam 
Gyengnam 
Chungbuk 
Chungnam 
Gyengbuk 
Security Busan 
Kwangju 
Seoul 
Daejon 
Ulsan 
Daegu 
Incheon 
Chungbuk 
Jeonbuk 
Gyengnam 
Gangwon 
Jeonnam 
Jeju 
Gyeonggi 
Chungnam 
Gyengbuk 
Service  
Innovation 
Busan 
Ulsan 
Incheon 
Kwangju 
Daejon 
Seoul 
Daegu 
Gangwon 
Jeonbuk 
Gyengbuk 
Chungnam 
Gyengnam 
Jeju 
Gyeonggi 
Chungbuk 
Jeonnam 
 
Source: adapted from the disclosure of JPA results (MOPAS, 2009b) The reports of JPA can be 
accessed through the Local Administration Integrated Information System (www.laiis.go.kr) 
 
In order to help understand the nine sections to be assessed and the grade 
assessed by JPA, the result of the year of 2008 is shown in Table 4.8. Drawing the 
line between Metropolitan cities and Provinces, JPA evaluates their activities and 
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achievements based on performance indicators; gives them one of three categorical 
results, GA (best), NA (fair), and DA (weak). The result of JPA in respect of sectors 
(not themes) is published in the form of a press report by MOGAHA and can be 
accessed through the Local Administration Integrated Information System 
(www.laiis.go.kr). In 2008 among the metropolitan cities, Busan, Gwangju and 
Daejeon, and among the provinces, Gyengnam and Chungbuk had done well. 
Seoul and Gyenoggi, by contrast, were revealed to have achieved badly.  
The rankings in Table 4-8 affect levels of funding or control the central 
government. The well performing local government of each sector (‘GA’ group) 
obtains the special local shared tax. This financial incentive has been known to 
motivate local government to comply with the comprehensive assessment. Local 
governments with the worst results (‘DA’ group) can experience central governments’ 
greater intervention through the policy consultation. MOGAHA is able to intervene in 
local policies in order to identify the problem and improve policy conditions (see 
KIPA, 2012). If a local government is the best performer, by contrast, there is no 
notable reduction in direct central controls and instead it is named by sharing its best 
practices across levels of governments. For the feedback the JPA report is 
distributed to local and central government departments, but the communication of 
JPA results to people to share and ponder upon the results has been neglected 
(KIPA, 2011). 
Performance information which is published provides citizens with the potential 
to better judge the incumbent’s performance and influences their voting (James and 
John, 2007). However, the JPA publication does not appear to feed into elections for 
the head of local government, although we cannot say the exact causation effect of 
the JPA on the electoral support due to the lack of studies12. For example, Table 4-9 
demonstrates the number of JPA grades that each regional government achieved in 
FY 2012 and the result of 2014 election13.  Both the worst performers (S, CN, JN) 
and the best performers (B, CB) succeeded in re-election. Regardless of JPA 
performance, the electoral support tends to be based on regionalism (see chapter2). 
                                               
12  There is one article explaining the influence of the heads of local government on fiscal 
performance around their political cooperation, entrepreneurial careers and incumbency (see Yu 
and Jo, 2015) but the impact of performance on electoral support has not been researched yet in 
Korea. 
 
13 The 2013 performance of local government was published in September 2014 and the local 
election was held in June 2014 
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In particular, the poor performance of CN was openly attacked by the opposing 
candidate in the process of the electoral competition and frequently reported by the 
press (Yonhap News, 19 May 2014), but it did not change the electoral support for 
the incumbent.   
 
Table 4-9 JPA performance FY2012 and results of 2014 election 
Regional 
 government 
S B DG I G DJ U GG GW CB CN JB JN GB GN J 
 
J 
P 
A 
Best 
(Ga) 
1 4 2 4 2 4 1 3 3 6 1 4 1 4 1 4 
Fair 
(Na) 
1 5 4 2 6 4 5 4 5 3 2 3 - 4 2 4 
Worst 
(Da) 
7 - 3 3 1 1 3 2 1 - 6 2 8 1 6 1 
re-election ◎ ◎ ○ x ○ ○ ○ ○ ◎ ○ ◎ ○ ○ ◎ ◎ x 
◎ : support the incumbent party & personality,   ○ : the incumbent party,    X : changed party  
 
The operation of JPA over a decade has generated some criticisms as well. 
First, the purpose of JPA is not clear. If JPA is considered just as an evaluation to 
achieve central government’s policy demands, it can be used as a control or 
supervision system. In this case, central intervention may conflict with local 
autonomy. Nevertheless a study revealed that local governments have responded 
promptly to the results of JPA and been involved positively to obtain the better 
results (KIPA, 2012). Second, there is a gap between the intention of central 
government and local government’s perception. Sometimes top-down devised 
performance indicators were not connected with the front-line tasks and thus the 
technical terms of JPA are ambiguous to local public officials. Third, there are 
limitations in enhancing the professionalism of evaluation due to frequent job rotation 
of either central or local government staff. Although the task of performance 
evaluation requires professional and experienced public workers, the personnel 
system hampers the accumulation of experience and knowledge. Lastly, the 
performance indicator system focuses on relatively tangible services (e.g. refuse 
collection) being measured first but needs to proceed to more individual and less 
concrete services. Performance assessment fails if it does not meet the demand 
of performance information and loses the functional and legitimate aspect of 
measuring performance. In order to create a living performance management 
system of local government, measuring performance should be opened in a 
policy cycle from the rank and file of the organization to the citizen and politicians.  
 123 
Evidence shows that acceptance of JPA from internal stakeholders such as 
central and local government seems to gradually have grown. The objectivity and 
the consistency of JPA have grown by expanding experts’ involvement and 
enforcing the verification of performance in the entire process. The number of 
objections from local government about the results of JPA in 2011 had reduced 
by half compared to that of the year of 2008 (OPM, 2012). Considering the long-
standing implementation of JPA, there have been little material benefits from 
good results of JPA (Ryoo, Y.A., 2010: 244). The system of reducing the level of 
control for ‘good’ JPA seems not to apply to local government. Nevertheless the 
relations between central and local governments have improved more compared 
to before the implementation of JPA. Local governments do not have to struggle 
with ‘the fatigue of assessment’ with over 75 individual assessments anymore 
and instead the performance assessment occurs just once for a certain time 
period per year. Budget, time and effort could be saved across the levels of 
government and the dispute over the performance assessment of local 
government by central government was considerably reduced after JPA. Further 
improvements are possible in order to enhance the performance of national 
policies through JPA. For instance, performance objects should be clearly linked 
with performance indicators; the process of JPA should be more integrated with 
the other performance tools such as the function of personnel or organization of 
local government; and the result of JPA should feed into subsequent 
development of policy. 
    
4.3. The self-assessment system of local government 
The second tool of managing performance in the local government is the self-
assessment system. As Wildavsky argues (1972: 509) it is desirable for 
organizations to evaluate their activities for themselves but after considering the 
requirements for evaluation. This process can be connected with learning-by-doing 
because they can identify their weak and strong points. At the micro level self-
assessment is concentrated on the validity or efficiency of the programmes or 
policy but on the macro level, it provides the performance measurement of 
policies or programmes, and feeds back useful information to the tax payers, 
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interest groups and the general public.  
According to the Assessment Act Article 18, the head of local government 
should enforce self-assessment including the policy and programme of 
subordinate organizations within its jurisdiction. The head of local government 
should establish the planning of self-assessment yearly in order to enhance the 
performance of policies and programmes of the jurisdiction. Each local 
government implements the various models for self-assessment suitable for their 
features. For example, according to the study of Gyeonggi Research Institute (GRI, 
2008), the self-assessment system has been operated in a mixed form with a 
variety of evaluation systems such as BSC (Balanced Score Card) or MBO 
(Management by Objectives) across the local governments within the jurisdiction 
of Gyeonggi Province. Nationally, the majority of local government uses 
performance indicators and BSC and the remaining local governments 
qualitatively assess their work without performance (OPM, 2012) as Table 4-5 
shows. As for the assessor, local governments establish a committee for self-
assessment, or use out-sourcing or an external advisory organ. 
Most local governments set a plan for self-assessment early in the year but 
some in the middle of the year have a relatively short period of evaluation. The 
law legislates that all local governments should enforce the self-assessment 
more than once per year. Many local governments regularly investigate customer 
satisfaction about public services provision internally or through out-sourcing.  
 
Table 4-10. Type of self-assessment 
 
Total number of 
local governments 
Methods  
Assessor Qualitative 
assessment       
Performance 
Indicators 
BSC 
244 31 
(13%) 
131 
(53%) 
82 
(34%) 
Self  
(internal department) 
: 232 
Outsourcing: 12 
Source: OPM, 2012 
  
 
With respect to the scope of self-assessment, most local governments 
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evaluate their own business and centrally preferred policies, and some local 
governments delegated the work as well. Most local governments employ all-
around performance indicators of input, output, and outcome measures but some 
local governments emphasize a special indicator of input or output.   
The result of self-assessment is usually publicised internally or externally but 
some do not reveal them (GRI, 2008). However, only the upper category of 
results is made public and the evaluation indicators and process are still closed. 
The result can reflect on personal performance payment, employee performance 
reviews and allocation of programme budgeting.  
The self-assessment of Korean local government faces some problems. 
According to the Act, all local government should implement self-assessment 
every year but sometimes the purpose and usefulness of this evaluation can be 
forgotten because the result of the evaluation is difficult to reflect in subsequent 
policy or activities. Since the focus of the evaluation is mainly on organization, it 
is unclear who is responsible for the results of self-assessment. The results are 
sometimes full of ambiguous and abstract judgements so it might not be useful 
for changing or improving performance of the organization. In addition, there is 
not sufficient consideration of the environment of evaluation to design the model 
of evaluation or interpret its result.  
In line with the evidence of Boyne et al (2004) in which the number of 
organizational elements attempting evaluation is negatively related to the extent 
which local government engage in evaluation, the number of activities to be 
assessed needs to be incrementally considered. The current self-assessment is 
apt to require constant revolution in all functions of the organization. Therefore 
self-assessment is likely to be considered merely as red-tape if local government 
simultaneously reviews a high number of activities.  
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5. Conclusion: Korea’s effective performance 
management regime 
The emphasis of performance in the public sector is to ensure the accountability 
of devolved government.  In this sense, performance management can be 
another controlling mechanism for central government to manipulate local 
government. In many countries, various institutions and techniques of 
performance management adapted for the public sector have been developed 
over the decades. Despite some critical views of performance management in 
the government, the performance of local government includes diverse meanings 
such as efficiency, accountability and local democracy. The argument of this 
thesis is that an increase in local democracy may improve local government 
performance because the democratically elected politicians tend to produce the 
public services in a more efficient way, in order to remain in power (Adam, A. et al, 
2011). So the performance of local government can be used to judge how well 
local autonomy has worked through reducing the effect of central controls on 
local government.  
In this sense, JPA has bedded in a new mechanism of ensuring the 
accountability of local government and has grown more sophisticated toward 
increasing objectivity and consistency over time. It meets the broad 
characteristics of the Bouckaert and Halligan’s ideal-type of relatively advanced 
‘performance management’ as discussed earlier in this chapter. At the same time, 
JPA contributes to forming more democratic relationships between local and 
central government by reducing the burden of assessments and increasing 
intergovernmental communications. JPA integrates nicely into the structure and the 
argument of this thesis by showing how central controls have impacted the 
performance of local government over the last decade during which Korean 
central-local government relations confronted change. The institutional stability, 
the consistency of the performance assessment and the feature of the new 
intergovernmental relations of JPA support using the results of JPA as the source 
of local government performance in the statistical analysis in later chapters. 
Chapter 7 will delve into the structure of JPA to better understand the 
performance indicators of JPA and chapter 8 will more specifically discuss the 
structure of the fiscal performance data of JPA. However, to begin with, in order 
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to analyse the fiscal relations between central and local governments in detail, 
chapter 5 will investigate the characteristics of fiscal controls exercised by central 
government. This elucidates the context of institutional change, the tension 
between local autonomy and central controls and the evolving nature of central 
controls over the last decade. Based on researched evidence and theories, 
chapter 6 will establish the concrete hypotheses regarding how the controls 
exercised by central government impacted local government performance. 
Therefore the discussion of the performance of local government in this chapter 
is a cardinal element not only to obtain practical performance data of local 
government but also to understand the context of the overall performance 
management system in the Korean public sector.   
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Chapter 5. Fiscal Institutions of local government  
1. Drivers of fiscal reform  
1.1. The lesson from the financial crisis  
As chapter 3 noted, the experience of fiscal crises may become a catalyst to 
unleash a series of reforms. The occasion of the 1997-8 economic crisis made 
the vulnerabilities of every single system of Korea come to the fore. By power 
change the newly inaugurated President Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) made use of 
the national fiscal crisis in order to re-define institutions. The increasing attention 
of scholars and civil groups and the IMF’s encouragement raised the voice to 
change the fundamental system of finance. The Korean government put 
considerable care into taking the best practices of forerunner countries to suit the 
idiosyncrasies of new and changing environments.  
The challenges of government reform against an uncertain environment 
became motives for the fiscal reform in the Korea public sector and included the 
following. First, long-term strategic planning and monitoring systems needed to 
take fiscal uncertainties into consideration (Poister, 2003). Strategic planning 
approaches are emphasized to identify the most fundamental issues facing an 
organization in the long run, and to develop strategies and gain needed 
information to resolve those issues effectively, as Bryson (2011) noted. This is 
the reason why the planning minister was in charge of the fiscal reform of Korea 
after the Asian economic crises rather than the finance minister. Second, 
government makes an effort to demonstrate accountability for results. A major 
impetus for the implementation of performance systems in public organizations is 
the need to improve accountability. It is necessary to remember that 
accountability of top managers or elected mayors is just the same as the role of 
the bottom line in the private sector. Further, public service needs to be provided 
in a more customer-oriented way in order to enhance government efficacy. 
Customer-oriented strategies create accountability to key stakeholders by 
inducing competition for customers and emphasizing service quality (Bryson, 
2011: 256). Even financial reports such as budget and accounting need to be 
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easily explained for external users such as councillors, academics and citizens. 
Government needs to be carefully responsive to citizens’ favourable and 
unfavourable attitudes. To do this, performance measures and taking feeding 
back from the public can be useful ways to communicate with citizens and 
understand their needs. Fourth, efficient processes based on electronic 
governments need to be prepositioned to enhance quality of work and 
performance. Government function analysis reduces unnecessary work and 
streamlines the work process. The exact recognition of the changed situation 
through an external shock gave a chance for the Korean government to execute 
structural reform in the public sector. At the same time, the impact of the 
isomorphism from NPM reform in many other countries encouraged the extensive 
reform in Korea.   
 
1.2. The NPM paradigm 
Another external factor shaping reform is the change of paradigm of the public 
sector, which contributed to an isomorphic institutional reform process. The 
private sector emphasized ‘performance management’ rather early and 
experienced substantial developments in management theory and practice during 
the 1990s (Talbot, 1999). Meanwhile, the public sector endured scepticism about 
the legitimacy of the Welfare State and the competence of the administrative 
state (Lane and Ersson, 1994:7-8). Therefore a variety of changes were 
undertaken to compensate for bulky and inefficient government. In particular 
government reforms based on NPM have been carried out in order to reduce the 
inefficiency and enhance the quality of service provision in many OECD countries 
since the 1980s. Although NPM has been variously described by different 
commentators, there is a good deal of overlap among the different accounts of 
what NPM at this time entailed: a shift in emphasis from policy making to 
management skills; from a stress on process to a stress on output; from orderly 
hierarchies to a competitive and performance base (Hood, 1995: 95). Sanderson 
(1996) clearly points out the logic of NPM: one thing is cutting the size of the 
public sector and another is increasing the efficiency of what is left. As a result, 
the direction of reform across OECD countries involved developing performance 
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management, introducing more competition to the public sector and offering 
quality and choice to citizen (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 9) 
    A strand of literature sees managing performance as the central element of 
NPM (Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008: 13; Pollitt: 2006). The best practices 
distilled from forerunner countries have been applied to other countries including 
Korea. The United States began a full-fledged reform by way of ‘Reinventing 
Government ‘in the 1990s and the enactment of GPRA. In the UK since the 
1980s there has been an increasing pressure for government reform with a 
leading example of the NPM project seen in the Next Steps programme. Central 
to NPM in modes of public management was a shift toward more explicit and 
measurable standards of performance for public sector organizations (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2011: 10). Emphasis on performance in the UK was made explicit in 
the Comprehensive Spending Review and the Public Service Agreements, 
though they are not available any more (see section 2.1 chapter 4). 
Influenced by such considerations, the incoming Roh Administration in 2003 
initiated a series of public sector reforms and proposed the direction of 
government reform involving the establishment of a Korean performance 
management system; constant and systematic function analysis; rearrangement 
of government organizations; and redesign of work procedure. In particular, 
budget and accounting reforms were considered as integral parts of the public 
sector reform. President Roh emphasized in the 2005 beginning-of-the-year 
business briefing that “performance management is the essential task to be 
executed by all departments of the government” (Shin, H.C., 2008: 20). To 
oversee the reform, the Presidential Committee on Government Innovation and 
Decentralization (PCGID) was set up as a government-civic advisory body 
reporting directly to the president. As can be deduced from the title of PCGID, 
there were two specific major projects of government innovation and local 
autonomy. With regard to the former, the central government recognized the 
importance of performance management for the implementation of government 
innovation. It commenced performance evaluation by taking BSC to the public as 
the cardinal mechanism for government innovation (see chapter 4), and also by 
the revolution of government financial systems through ushering in programme 
budgets and accrual basis accounting based on highlighting performance and 
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accountability. 
1.3. Political democracy 
On the other hand, endogenous factors also motivated Korea to put in place a 
more democratic society. The extension of local autonomy in the mid-1990s 
gradually led to institutional transformation to increase local autonomy. As 
Mahoney and Thelen emphasized (2010), processes endogenous to institutions 
generated incremental change and agents disadvantaged by centralism sought 
to revise and supplement the rules of centralism in Korea. Kim Dae-jung led the 
democratization campaign in the Democratic (oriented) Party (see Figure 2-1) in 
opposition for a long time. Since the Kim Dae-jung government embarked on this 
power change, local democracy and decentralization has been stressed as a 
direction for reform. The Roh Mu-hyun government, from the same party, 
emphasized decentralization as a preferential national policy agenda (MOGAHA, 
2004). In order to enforce local autonomy and strengthen the fiscal capacity of 
local government, a variety of policies were carried out. For example, local 
shared tax was reinforced a few times by increasing the tax rate thus MOFE 
needed to transfer a great portion of national tax income to local government via 
MOPAS (MOPAS, 2011a). Local government participated and reflected their 
concern in designing Programme budget and Accrual accounting with central 
government. Further, the official budget compilation guideline was abolished in 
2003 because it may constrain the fiscal autonomy of local government. One of 
the visible achievements for financial independence of local government was 
enacting the Law on Contract of Local Government, which separated local 
government’s transactions from the national law, in 2006. This legal development 
expresses the independence of the local government’s legitimacy from the 
perspective of the centralists of MPB.   
The following Lee Myung-bak administration which originated from the 
Conservative Party put more value on pragmatism, as recognized in the 
‘pragmatic government’ a name deriving from Lee’s campaign slogan, although 
broadly it implemented decentralization policy as well. The Lee government 
carried out notorious improvised policies to fit with the changing environment 
rather than those consistent under long-term planning and strategies (Kim, J.G., 
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2008; Shin, J.S., 2010; Min, K.G., 2009). First, local tax cuts weakened local 
financial capacity which weakened the decentralization policy. Local 
governments’ lack of legal control over their tax affairs allowed MPB to 
manipulate local tax to suit national policy. Another example is the earlier budget 
spending so called ‘emergency spending’ which provide an explicit instance of 
central government’s control over local government expenditure. Emergency 
spending was a kind of Keynesian deficit spending prescription and was 
unavoidably employed to overcome national economic depression. It is difficult to 
deny that emergency spending negatively influenced local fiscal autonomy. In 
contrast, however, a major achievement of the Lee administration was the 
introduction for the first time of a local consumption tax and local income tax. 
These taxes, introduced in 2010, had undeniable worth as a means to increase 
local autonomy. This is the first case when part of the national tax was 
transformed to the local tax in Korea.  
    The next part will discuss local government’s fiscal institutions which were 
newly introduced or transformed according to the exogenous or endogenous 
factors of reforms. This thesis contends that the fiscal institutional transformation 
towards greater local autonomy has been in progress but central controls also 
have survived. Therefore the focus is on how local autonomy expands, but also 
on how central controls are sustained through the institutional changes.   
2. NPM inspired fiscal reforms 
The Roh government’s preferred policy emphasis was government innovation. 
President Roh Mu-hyun decided to establish a financial information system for 
the public sector in March 2004 (BARO, 2006). To do this he undertook 
comprehensive fiscal institutional reform from budget to accounting for the first 
time since the creation of the Republic. MPB took the responsibility for organizing 
a taskforce team, recruiting experts, researching and decision making for accrual 
based accounting and programme budget. As a result the Budget and Accounting 
Reinvention Office (BARO) was established in May 2004, which consisted of 
professional civil servants from MPB, MOGAHA, MOFE and BAI, accountants 
and academic scholars. This government office successively opened a 
comprehensive financial system called the ‘D-brain system’ in January 2007. D-
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brain means a ‘digital brain’ which conducted all the fiscal processes. It was a 
comprehensively integrated financial system processing and producing financial 
information from programme budget to accrual accounting, from central 
government to local government. The following section will outline the institutional 
change, context and central controlling mechanism regarding this reform.   
2.1. Accrual based accounting 
After the election of local government mayors, the introduction of accrual 
accounting was propounded by academia, civil society and some local 
governments. Since the IMF bailout, there have been demands to improve the 
transparency and reliability of Korean financial statistics. Thus the Kim Dae-jung 
government adopted the enforcement of accrual accounting. The budget and 
accounting reforms were considered as integral parts of this public sector reform. 
MOGAHA planned a basic roadmap and undertook the enforcement of 
accounting reform of local government in 1999. In the Roh Mu-hyun government 
accrual accounting became a main agenda of PCGID and in January 2004 was 
adopted as the national reform task by President Roh with the power of 
enforcement (MOGAHA, 2004). 
    Conventionally budgeting and planning were paramount rather than effective 
accounting. However the outcome-oriented paradigm and the increasing need to 
consider fiscal uncertainty have made government put corresponding value on 
accounting.  In the public sector, the multiple objectives of accounting are to 
inform the stakeholders about the financial situation of the government; to 
provide possible investors with information about creditworthiness; to aid 
management decision making; to identify assets and liabilities; and to facilitate 
democratic transparency (Hepworth, 2003).  
According to an OECD publication, accrual accounting has several 
implications for dealing with long-term budget horizons (Matheson, 2002: 44). 
First, revenues are recognized only when services are rendered not when cash is 
received. Expenses are recognized when economic resources are used, rather 
than when they are paid in cash. After a government has received services, the 
related obligations are also reported as expenses for the current period and as 
liabilities on the balance sheet. Second, all economic resources are considered 
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as assets in the balance sheet. For example, Korean local governments 
recognize their local roads and other infrastructure as assets, and record their 
depreciation as an expense as well. Third, all government obligations for services 
received or commitments made are reported as liabilities in the balance sheet, 
even if they have not been funded in the budgetary process. Therefore the 
accrual based accounting system is essential to ensure the financial soundness 
of local government. It helps to determine the financial capacity of local 
government in the long term; operate performance management by providing 
cost and revenue information when resources are used or services occur; 
comprehensive information about assets, liabilities, revenue and expense are 
recognized and connected with budget information. Ultimately it aims to establish 
a cost management mind-set in public officials and to improve the efficiency and 
the effectiveness of public service. The local financial report written in an accrual 
basis in Korea is published after not only the review of professional accountants 
who have completed the required educational courses over public finance but 
also after the audit of the local council.  
The cash based accounting system had been used for more than half a 
century since the Republic began in 1945. It does book-keeping based on 
changes of cash over budget implementation; when the cash inflow income is 
recognized and when the cash outflow expenditure is recognized. This 
accounting method is a record of those transactions and the classification is 
simple and has the advantage of being an easy way to control the budget, but 
there are limits to recording and recognizing accurately the changes in the flow of 
economic resources. For instance, even if local governments engage in multi-
year transactions approved of the council it is not recognized as debt. Also the 
depreciation costs of the resources are usually ignored so the general cost of 
local government tends to be under recorded. 
Unlike the way programme budget system replaced line item budgeting, the 
accrual based system complements the cash based accounting because cash-
based programme budgeting still needs cash-based accounting information. 
Therefore two ways of accounting coexist in Korean local government. All local 
governments have formally submitted financial reports by accrual accounts as 
well as cash based written reports on their final accounts to local councils since 
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2007.  
However, the accrual based accounting system faced huge criticisms, as 
Hepworth (2002: 135-7) noted. First, in fact top managers of local government 
have no real understanding of the meaning of accrual accounting. They are 
unwilling to accept the management implication of the information produced, or 
they otherwise ignore the financial report without any chance to read it. Second, 
there is pressure from politicians to state results in a manner that suits them. For 
example they would stick to accrued expenses which are recognized unlike cash 
accounts at the micro level to attack the executive without comprehensive 
understanding of the financial report. Third, officials from budgeting, cash 
accounting and other departments are unwilling to accept accrual accounting and 
its implications because there is no link between accrual accounts and the cash 
based budget they are accustomed to (KRILA, 2002: 3). Institutionally, the 
contents of accrual accounting are very difficult for general public officials to 
understand. Fourth, the nature of public administration is different from that of the 
private sector. There are performance objectives or results other than things 
measurable by price such as equity or fairness. In practice accrual based 
accounting is just complementary to the current cash based accounting and it 
appears that local public officials do not feel the necessity of accrual accounting 
because cash based accounting is easier and more appropriate for operating the 
current cash based local finance system. Therefore enforcement of accruals was 
controversial. Much of the controversy arose from the government administration 
itself. A significant amount of time needed to be invested in educating and 
consulting with government managers and other interested groups like local 
councils (Matheson, 2002: 44).  
 
2.2. Introducing programme budgeting  
Osborn and Gaebler note in their influential Reinventing government that ‘the 
traditional line-item budget system incorporates rules that encourage managers 
to waste money. We need a government that measures the results of what an 
agency does, and ties incentives to achieving those results’ (Osborne and 
Gaebler, 1992: 353). The most traditional use of performance measures in 
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government is the monitoring and reporting of programme activities and agency 
operations (Poister, 2003).  
Managing a unit of policy or programme other than controlling cost items is 
considered a better way for improving performance in the era of NPM. The 
Korean government made a performance based financial reform in both central 
and local government areas, which would seek to improve the accessibility and 
user-friendliness of the budget in order to easily monitor government finance. The 
Presidential Secretariat and MOGAHA discussed the introduction of ‘the 
performance based budgeting system’ in the long term. To do this, at first the 
conversion to programme budgeting system gained momentum as one of the 
major government projects in 2004. Local governments piloted programme 
budgeting, which broadly speaking is a performance based form of budgeting, 
from 2004 and formally began to submit a programme budget bill to the local 
council in 2008. 
    On the cusp of performance ushering in a full-fledged programme budgeting 
system in Korea, it appeared that the very concept of programme budgeting was 
understood differently even among those who had participated extensively in the 
new system’s inception (Kim, John M., 2005: 17) and there was a struggle to 
even define the concept. Budget officials viewed programme budgeting primarily 
as a framework that streamlines resource allocation decisions, while other 
officials and scholars, oriented toward public administration or accounting, 
seemed to regard it mainly as a vehicle for making performance management 
operational in the public sector (Kim, John M., 2005: 17). The manual for 
programme budgeting of local government defines it as a budgeting method 
constituting the process and structure of budget planning, budget allocation and 
budget spending for a programme and activity, and the connected evaluation of 
the programme. This emphasis on policy programmes provides the most 
productive approach and is the main aim of the budgeting reforms (MOGAHA, 
2006). 
    The traditional line item based budgeting system has been employed for 
more than a half century. The line item budget focuses predominantly on input 
and spending at the micro level. While the value of monitoring and ensuring 
spending compliance should not be underestimated, this arrangement limits the 
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ability of government to analyse spending vis-a-vis their objectives (Kim, D.Y., 
2005). It contains only financial information to meet requirements for monitoring 
inputs. As a result, it is insufficient for resource allocation decision-making and 
performance oriented management, and the identification of both autonomy and 
accountability of managers.  
In contrast, programme budgeting alleviates the disadvantages of line 
budgeting by creating a systematic planning, allocation, spending, and evaluation 
of budgets. It is centred on programmes such as policies, projects and activities 
in order to systematically reflect the policies of government in budgets and 
maximize the financial performance. Programmes are the units by which 
performance is to be defined and measured. Programme budgeting is the 
building block for linking resources and results. In short, as the unit of a 
programme budget is the project or activity, it is possible to operate output and 
performance oriented budgeting (Kim D.Y., 2005). The annual budget contains 
financial data and gives adequate consideration to results or progress in 
achieving policy objectives. A programme budget provides the efficient control of 
those policies chosen and conducted by local government. This point is also 
emphasized in the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy in the 
UK (cited by Johns and Pendlebury, 1996: 71) 
 
Programme budgeting is primarily a system associated with corporate management which 
identifies alternative policies, presents the implications of their adoption and provides for the 
efficient control of those policies chosen. It embraces several established concepts and 
analytical techniques within the framework of a systematic approach to decision making, 
planning, management and control. 
 
Consequently programme budgeting can improve the financial performance 
of government and the quality of public services (MOGAHA,  2006) and the way 
in which it has been developed and implemented within local government shows 
a key aspect of fiscal reform. These new techniques had potential to empower 
local council members and elected mayors to exactly monitor the local finance 
and to healthily manage local government.    
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2.3. Normative controls and cooperative relations  
MOGAHA intended to instil the key ideas of NPM in local government through 
fiscal reform. Normative understandings seemed to amount to a strengthening 
local government through shared experience of responding to the NPM reform. 
By contrast, in practice the normative controls also comprised a strengthening of 
central control by disguised means. So we can say that the normative controls 
were implemented with a centralist’s bias. The reforming initiative and the legal 
basis of central government allowed the central government to install the 
controlling tools in operating the programme budget and accounting process of 
local government. Article 5 in the Law of Local Government Finance (LLGF) 
stipulates that ‘MOGAHA can notify about matters needed for performance 
centred financial management to the top officials of local government’. MOGAHA 
informs local governments of the established budgeting and accounting manuals 
which guide how to compile a programme budget, how to record government 
accounting and practical standards of government expenditure (MOGAHA, 
2007b). This provides the formal requirements and methods by which local 
performance budgets are created and, in terms of enforcement, on the grounds 
of this manual the audit office makes a decision when investigating the cases of 
budget operation and expenditure, and when deciding whether or not the cases 
are legal and proper. Central government insists that this fiscal reform contributes 
to giving more fiscal autonomy to local government by permitting strategic 
management. However, as long as the budget and accounting standards of local 
government are specified by MOGAHA, MOGAHA takes de facto control of local 
government finance.  
In addition, the fiscal transparency which is achieved by the NPM fiscal 
reform is a convenient vehicle for central controls. Programme budgeting and 
accrual accounting made it possible for the multiple stakeholders to easily access 
local finance data. These systems thus improve fiscal democracy and 
transparency. They systematically show the cost information about each 
programme in accordance with department or function and thus it is not difficult to 
catch up with the financial issues compared to the case of reading each line-item 
cost without programmes. This allows central government to accurately monitor 
the expenditure of local government in real-time due to the digitalized information 
 139 
technology. Therefore MPB and other central government departments are able 
to check the progress of a subsidy programme implemented by local government 
regularly or in real-time.  
The system connection is an important factor for central government to 
indirectly control local governments. MOGAHA did not allow an individual local 
government based finance system but developed a commonly available local 
finance operating system and spread it to all local governments. From this 
common electronic system, all local government financial information is collected 
to e-hojo which is an integrated financial information system for the budgeting 
and accounting of local governments.  
Before this financial information system, MOGAHA pushed for a proper IT 
based accrual accounting system. The greatest challenge to introducing accruals 
was its professional nature; in the private sector accountants were exclusively 
able to do accrual accounting. MOGAHA confronted the complexity and 
unfamiliarity of accrual accounting standards which were beyond the 
understanding of local officials in charge of general public services. A well-
designed automatic journalizing system, however, was believed to relieve the 
burden of technical expertise for the local officials. Therefore MOPAS 
concentrated on the invention of an automatic journalizing system: Local 
government Accounting by Double-entry book-keeping Information system (LADI). 
LADI enables officials to automatically journalize a transaction into debit and 
credit entries if they simply input some information about an economic activity. 
That pilot test of the accrual accounting system was gradually extended to two 
local governments in 1999, nine in 2003, 63 in 2004, and 246 (all local 
governments) in 2005 (MOGAHA, 2007b).The initial investigation into the state of 
assets and liabilities of each local government was promoted in 2006 and at last 
all local governments legally began to write financial reports by accrual based 
accounting in 2007.  
In a pattern different from the usual reform trajectory, the policy community 
played an important role in spreading and sharing the idea of NPM fiscal reform. 
Accrual basis accounting was unfamiliar even in central government thus both 
central and local government needed to learn together and make their own 
accounting well-tailored to the public sector. While the policy community of 
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programme budget consisted of central and local government officials, that of 
accrual accounting consisted of scholars originating from accounting, 
management and public administration; professional accountants of private 
sectors; local government accounting professionals; technicians who transformed 
the results discussed in the policy community into LADI. This is consistent with 
the concept on epistemic community drawing from ‘a network of professionals 
with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an 
authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge (Haas, 1992: 3)’, resting on 
shared knowledge of professional accountants and public finance. It can be said 
that the accrual based accounting system was designed, not by public 
professionals, but by this epistemic community or policy community which was 
tightly integrated because of either consensus, or because there was a powerful 
dominant interest (Rhodes, 1999:144). They seemed to share the sense of duty 
and they wrote the history of local government finance management. The policy 
community was formed when the pilot test of the accrual accounting system 
started in two basic local governments in 1999 by a collaboration of the mayors’ 
intention and central government’s persuasion for the fiscal institutional change. 
Then the sphere of the policy community got to extend as the number of pilot 
local governments increased as mention above.  
In summary, programme budgeting and accrual accounting systems are the 
cornerstones of NPM styled reform which have changed the dynamics of the 
institution of central-local relations and central control. The rules have changed 
as have the norms and the cognitive framework which now encompasses 
financial expectations and a new vocabulary of accounting concepts. This gives a 
certain fiscal discretion and responsibility to local government; however, it also 
conceives new ways of controlling local government. It leads to normatively share 
the common idea of performance in the public sector and enables the 
government finance to be monitored by more stakeholders. Control over 
knowledge and information based on IT system is an important dimension of 
central and local government relations at the point that new ideas and information 
can lead to new patterns of behaviour and prove to be an important determinant 
of performance of local government. The normative aspect of budget and 
accounting reform will be revisited in chapter 6 to classify modes of central 
government’s control of local government. Under the increasing local autonomy 
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trend, central government could not help resorting to cooperative and normative 
modes for the fiscal reform of local government.   
3. Emergency Spending  
3.1. Escaping global economic crisis 
In response to the global financial crisis in 2008, Korean economic policymakers 
embarked on a full scale Keynesian counter-recessionary spending programme 
using the public sector as the spearhead of fiscal policy (Kim and Hur, 2013: 74). 
In practice, mostly it was the front line of local government that undertook the 
fiscal implementation of government spending. President Lee Myung-bak 
stressed in December of 2008 “It is such an impending moment to the extent that 
each ministry should spend their budget from the next day after the budget 
approval by the National Assembly” (Cabinet meeting 2/12/08) and continuously 
the president ordered departments not to wait until next year to embark on 
enterprises and to immediately execute possible business (Expanded economy 
ministers meeting 4/12/08) (MOPAS, 2008). 
According to the broad consensus of the literature, decentralization of 
expenditure responsibility can entail substantial gains in terms of efficiency and 
welfare, by promoting a closer correspondence of expenditure priorities with the 
preferences of affected citizens (Ter-Minassian, 1997). A converse example has 
been witnessed in Korea. In principle, each local government in Korea has 
expenditure responsibility according to the Local Finance Act but in practice 
considerable control by the centre exists, as noted in chapter 2. Particularly 
under emergency situations such as an economic crisis, central government 
wants to oversee the whole spending of both the centre and locality. Faced with 
global economic crisis in 2008, central government pushed all public sector 
organizations to increase their spending goals and asked them regularly to report 
how much they were spending, in order to inter-temporally relocate government 
expenditure and to adjust the cyclical downturn caused by the global crisis . Local 
government had to achieve the objective of spending 60% of their budget by the 
second quarter of the year. It was a harsh objective compared to the fact that 
 142 
local government usually could spend, at best, less than 30% of their budget over 
this period. Their financial dependence on central government was a main 
obstacle to physically achieve this goal. In other words, local governments’ real 
budgets can be outlined after March or April when departments of central 
government start to decide or allocate the amount of subsidies to each local 
government. According to the internal report of MOPAS (2008), local 
governments ‘have to spend the budget in accordance with a wartime 
behavioural prescription’. Therefore the term of ‘emergency spending’ expresses 
the spending pressure exerted on local governments by central government in 
2008. 
For the emergency spending of the local governments, central governments 
carried out a combination of exceptional deregulator policies like the following: to 
solve the lack of funds, MPB and MOGAHA allowed local governments to issue 
far more bonds than in an ordinary year, and encouraged them at the same time 
to increase their capital spending to offset weak private spending; MOGAHA 
greatly simplified local government contracts and accounting procedures in order 
to speed up spending: for instance, MOGAHA mandated local government to 
reduce public bid notification period from 60 days to 10 days and to expand the 
size of pre-payment, using exceptional legal articles of the law (MOPAS, 2008). 
Consequently, to prepare for and support the emergency spending of local 
government, three laws and statutory instruments were revised and more than 
twenty activity units such as bid notification, bills for price and payments of bills 
were improved with the view to simplifying financial procedures. The emergency 
spending goal was successfully achieved through the endeavour of almost all 
local governments. However there were some damaging side effects of this 
speedy spending: disordering of accounting standards, lack of equity over the 
expenditure and deterioration of public services. Nevertheless, the OECD 
evaluated Korea as one of the few OECD member countries which recovered 
rapidly from the recent global financial crisis due to sustaining spending and 
demand: that is to say, ‘by prompt and effective policy responses’ such as 
‘implementing the largest stimulus package among OECD countries, amounting 
to 6.1% of GDP’ (OECD, 2010: 3).  This episode illustrates the ability of central 
government to appeal to national political priorities to strengthen control over the 
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localities. 
 
3.2. Coercive controls and threat of sanction 
The forceful initiative by the president worked as the most important motive 
encouraging emergency spending in the public sector. President Lee Myung-bak 
ordered ministers and governors or mayors in the annual business briefing on 
22nd December 2008 to “Immediately execute the measures for early execution of 
budget in order to respond economic fluctuations (MOPAS, 2008)”. On listening 
to the president’s address, but within a framework of undue centralisation, the 
government began to plan and execute the early budget spending which the 
government called ‘emergency spending’ through all possible policy tools.  
Central control over local government’s policy formulation and 
implementation should be exercised within laws, regulations and guide lines that 
give rise to predictability for local government concerning the continuity of control. 
In this context, central mandates for emergency spending involved unexpected 
coercive controls. If not compliant, local government could anticipate the loss of 
benefit from or cooperation with the centre. The pattern of control was not totally 
predictable and made use of a variety of improvised policy instruments. It 
conceived multiple factors to ensure local government’s compliance such as 
application of threat and naming and shaming. The central government’s 
persuasion stimulated awareness of local government’s role as an important 
consuming body in the public sector. The spending performance of each local 
government was supervised and announced by central government. This played 
a significant role in a programme of compulsion leading to the compliance of local 
government. The government promoted the performance of spending progress in 
the media such as through newspapers and websites and gave special rewards 
(Jeonbuk Residents Times, 13 Jan 2009; Gangwon Times, 06 December 2008). 
MOPAS exerts considerable influence on local government expenditure 
through a combination of mandates and administrative instruction as well as legal 
instruments. The daily spending progress by all local governments was 
monitored by the centre: whether they made use of the recommended simple 
spending instruments; which phase of work local government delayed spending 
in. Moreover, central government civil servants were regularly dispatched to local 
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governments in order to investigate their expenditure documents and spending 
fields in detail. To do this, MOPAS made use of all personnel in the department 
which is in charge of local government within the ministry.  
In conclusion, the policy of emergency spending constituted a step back 
for local democracy. In particular, the controlling mechanisms exercised by 
central government rested on coercive controls to induce immediate policy effect 
during the financially critical moment. The central government mobilized as many 
policy instruments for controlling local government emergency spending as 
possible. As a result it achieved the spending goal and contributed to stimulating 
the internal economy in the late 2000s (OECD 2010). The coercive feature of 
emergency spending will be revisited in chapter 6 to classify modes of central 
government’s control of local government.  
4. The reform of local tax  
The nature of local autonomy provides for citizens and their representatives to 
exercise discretion and responsibility to maximize the efficiency of resource 
distribution that allows residents to decide public service provision according to 
their preferences, whilst at the same time, it lets them take responsibility for their 
choices. Decentralized service provision allows local government to provide 
levels of public services and goods that are responsive to the preferences, costs 
and other circumstances peculiar to the local area. At this point, the link is 
obscure between the benefit of public expenditure and their price if revenue-
raising responsibility is assigned to central government (Ter-Minassian, 1997). In 
Korea, the tax base and tax rates cannot be determined by the independent 
initiative of local government but are proposed by the central government and 
passed in Parliament. The central government has 80% of the total tax revenue 
sources. The arrangement that assigns taxation power to the central government 
enables it to use the tax policy in managing the national economy and handling 
the market. Over the last decade local taxes have been monopolized by policy 
instruments employed by the central government for macroeconomic 
management and redistribution. However the recent introduction of local income 
tax and local consumption tax provides no shortage of examples to demonstrate 
the growing local autonomy. This section focuses on a few predominant 
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examples of local tax policies which are regulated by central government.   
 
4.1. The acquisition tax cut  
Acquisition tax is levied on the behaviour of acquiring land, houses, buildings, 
tangible business asset, machinery, vehicles and membership. The acquisition 
tax is the predominant means for raising revenue at the local government level in 
Korea; it generates a significant proportion, around 10%, of local government 
revenue. However, since taxes on the transfer of property discourage the 
development and formulation of the land market (Bird and Slack, 2002: 33), a 
higher property tax and lower transfer tax on property is considered desirable by 
central government. The Korean central government intended to cut the 
acquisition tax for the purpose of anchoring the real estate transaction reporting 
system which was a new system in the sense that tax cutting usually encourages 
estate transactions during the period of economic prosperity. Originally the rate 
was 4% of the acquisition price but the central government changed the rates to 
1.5% in January 2006 and to 1% in September in the same year (KILF, 2012). 
Consequently, local government lost revenue of about 3trillion KRW (£1.7 billion, 
2% of the total local government budget) roughly the same as the amount which 
was cut in 2006 through the transfer tax. This is not only controlling the behaviour 
of people in the market but also indirectly controlling local government by means 
of deprivation of material resource (Vedung, 2003: 30). The central government’s 
tax rate manipulations explicitly showed the financial dependence of local 
government. Central government did not have any procedural obligation to seek 
the consent of local governments, though local government was the most 
vulnerable victim of the tax reductions. In response to the abrupt statement of 
central government, local governments had no policy instruments by which to 
influence the forming of tax policy: at best they declared they were against the 
tax reduction but many local governments offered little substantial resistance and 
eventually all bodies had to accept the policy. Although the acquisition tax rates 
are regulated by the law, the central government frequently changed these rates 
within a considerably short period which harmed the stability of public 
administration and central-local government relations. It is hardly surprising 
therefore that such centralised direction is enough to cause the disobedience of 
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local governments. According to the press in Korea (Naeil News, 19 July 2006) 
2006), nearly 30% of the 16 regional governments presented a statement which 
opposed the acquisition tax cut in 2006.  
It can be concluded that the unilateral reduction of the acquisition tax rate 
can be said to have damaged the fiscal autonomy of local governments (KILF, 
2012: 165). Tax authority is held by the central government but the revenue cut of 
the acquisition tax, ordered by the centre, shifted the loss to the local government 
revenue. Therefore, the decision to make the tax cut without preliminary consent 
breaches a basic principle of cooperative government which is due consultation.   
 
4.2. The increase of local shared tax 
Local shared tax is of great importance in local governments’ revenue: it 
accounts for half of dependent revenues and looks like a prerequisite essential 
for the local government management. Regardless of its financial strength, each 
local government is required to provide statutory public services at a constant 
level. Local shared tax allows it to achieve horizontal equity and a national 
minimum for public services. The local shared tax is considered fundamentally as 
a local tax, essentially local governments’ own revenue (Ter-Minassian, 1997). 
But the central government retains a large discretionary authority with regard to 
the regulation of the local shared tax. MPF transfers the allocated tax to MOPAS 
after collecting the national tax to alleviate vertical imbalance as regulated by the 
law. Then MOPAS plays an important role in distributing the tax to the each local 
government based on the specific calculation scheme. In terms of central 
government’s policy instruments, it plays a role of ensuring compliance of local 
government with national policy. 
The local shared tax fund is used for the distribution of general purpose 
transfers to the local governments. Thus, when the rate of local allocation 
increased, there was rhetoric that it would enhance local financial autonomy, as it 
expanded the fiscal capacity of local government. In 2000 the Kim Dae-jung 
government increased the shared tax rate from 13.27% to 15% and again to 
19.13% in 2005 under the Roh Mu-hyun government. In the national political 
debate, the increased rate meant the improved power of local government and 
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corresponded to the national policy direction of decentralization. Currently the 
total amount of the fund corresponds to 29 trillion KRW, 19.24% of total internal 
tax revenues (earmarked taxes, such as the transportation tax, energy tax, 
environment tax, and education tax, are not included in these revenues), and 
accounts for 24% of general account revenue of local governments. It has 
occupied the issue of the fiscal debate between central and local government to 
strengthen local finance.  
Instead, in part it might deter developing independent local revenue and 
enhancing fiscal accountability of local government. In practice whether the 
increase of local shared tax contributed to more fiscal autonomy for local 
government is controversial. Behind the formula14 to decide distribution is the 
central government’s intention to control the spending of local government. Most 
of all, the formula has an ‘incentive scheme’ to reflect central government’s policy 
preference and to control local government’s spending above the socioeconomic 
indicators which are used to measure the basic fiscal need and the basic 
financial revenue. Changes in the composition of expenditure can affect the 
aggregate amount of local shared tax that local government can obtain. This may 
be the case if the composition of local governments’ expenditure shifts in favour 
of an item or direction that the central government included in the formula as an 
incentive scheme. Since incentive schemes can be changed according to the 
policy direction or economic conditions, local government tends to be aware of 
them and reflect them in their financial decisions. For example in the year 2010, 
the central government considered how local government tried to reduce 
operating costs by judging the number of officials and the size of local 
government office buildings or how local government made efforts to collect local 
tax (MOPAS, 2011a). If they proved to waste resources or were lazy in increasing 
local revenue, the amount of local shared tax was reduced. By rule of thumb, 
local governments have no choice but to follow the central intention in order to 
                                               
14
 The general component comprising 10/11 of the total transfer is distributed according to a 
complex formula which takes into account the basic financial needs and the revenue capacity of 
each jurisdiction. When MOPAS distributes the local shared tax to fiscally deficient local 
governments based on the difference between the basic financial needs and the basic financial 
revenue, the difference is not subsidized entirely, but pro-rated within the range of the total local 
shared tax (KLIRA, 2011). The index of fiscal capacity and the amount of the equalization 
payment depends on the ratio of ‘basic financial needs’ to ‘basic financial revenue’ 
 148 
get as much revenue as possible. Consequently, the increase in local shared tax 
is supposed to improve fiscal autonomy of local government; however conversely, 
central controls are sustained through the ‘incentive scheme’ in the calculation 
formula for local shared tax.  
In the policy debate, the local shared tax has been a panacea to solve 
vertical financial gaps and to fund increasing local service demands. As a result, 
local governments lost motivation to voluntarily and positively enhance their fiscal 
soundness and fiscal responsibility. In reality, policy experiments such as local 
income tax and local consumption tax did not become effective until 2010; 
instead local shared tax was expanded to meet the demand for local fiscal 
autonomy. In this way, the local shared tax system has controlled ex post 
spending of the local resource and deterred developing independent local 
revenue with dominating the national tax debate. It is a prerequisite essential for 
the local income but its nature is controlling local government. The control of local 
government revenue through local shared tax will be revisited in chapter 6 where 
we classify modes of central government controls. 
 
4.3. Introduction of local income tax and local consumption tax 
MOPAS presented a plan for the funding of local finance in the Presidential 
Committee of Local Development in September 2009, in which the government 
would introduce local income tax and local consumption tax from 2010 (MOPAS, 
2009a). MPF intended to cut the rate of local shared tax, which could have 
resulted in no overall increase of the local resource, but it failed. Finally local 
consumption tax was established by switching 5% of value-added tax to local 
consumption tax and this has been increased to 11% of value-added tax since 
2014 (KIPF, 2015). This is the first case where part of national tax has been 
changed to a local tax (MOPAS, 2009a). Local income tax started by temporally 
switching the income percentage of resident tax to local income tax for the first 
three years. Then local income tax was finally created as an independent 
taxation system which has different tax rates in accordance with different income 
bands (KIPF, 2015).  
The introduction of local consumption tax was the long-cherished task that 
local government had continuously requested after local autonomy. Both local 
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income tax and local consumption tax reflect a huge development in 
decentralization policy in Korea. Local governments are equipped to get away 
from the conventional practice of clinging onto intergovernmental transfers. This 
change assigns a degree of revenue-raising responsibility to local government 
and thus local government will make an effort to raise local taxes. This will 
reduce the unbalanced responsibilities between expenditure and income of local 
government. The development and the expansion of local income tax and local 
consumption tax are expected to enhance the accountability of local government 
(see section 3.3 of chapter 9).  
 
5. Conclusion: greater fiscal autonomy? 
An essential requirement of good public sector management is that the manager 
has a comprehensive responsibility in the development and use of financial 
information (Hepworth, 2002: 117). The central ministry and the national 
politicians continue to control finance because they want to oversee all activities 
of government and manipulate policies in a monolithic way for the national goals 
whilst establishing some flexibility in response to popular approval for greater 
democratisation. Nevertheless, there has been evidence that the top-down 
central-local government relationship began to change and establish a new 
partnership model reflected in the fiscal institution and policy. 
The fiscal reforms pursued over the 2000s were intended to heal the fiscal 
weakness, encourage fiscal accountability and finally establish fiscal autonomy. 
The main initiative of these fiscal reforms has been economic, with the expansion 
of government area by more public services and investment being difficult to 
finance, especially in the fiscal distress conditions after the 1998 economic crisis. 
The NPM-styled budget and accounting system can be depicted as a dramatic 
reconfiguration arising from a large-scale shift of exogenous conditions. There 
were new normative understandings which seemed to strengthen the autonomy 
and responsibility of local government through shared experience of responding 
to the NPM reform. By contrast, the normative controls comprise a strengthening 
of central control by new means so we can say that the normative controls were 
implemented with a centralist’s bias. On the other hand, at the same time, the 
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institutional transformations to introduce independent local taxes may be 
incrementally generated by processes endogenous to the institution towards local 
autonomy. Political pressures with the election of mayors by popular vote have 
incurred incremental shifts in local fiscal policies to increase local autonomy. The 
general inclination to move in the direction of NPM and decentralization seems to 
have a substantial impact on improving local accountability and local democracy 
but evaluation is complex. These substantial reforms have established new 
dynamics in central-local relations which are still in flux and this study identifies 
tensions which require careful analysis. 
Despite statements of democratic decentralization, we can witness central 
controls surviving in the process of fiscal institutional transformation in the 2000s. 
These reforms are briefly explained in this chapter with a focus on how central 
government’s control over local government has been affected in the creation 
and transition of financial institutions. The changing nature of the fiscal relations 
between central and local governments is giving more authority to local 
government while preserving subtle institutional controls of local government. 
Therefore different views exist about the institutional changes. Some observers 
(Park, J.M., 2008: 146) comment on the partly positive characteristics because 
the fiscal autonomy has been enhanced through reduced central intervention 
over budget compilation or local expenditure. Others (Shin, B.G., 2011; Kim,M.H., 
2011: 396) criticize the return to centralism because central government remains 
empowered to monitor local government through the integrated financial system, 
which presents a gloomy prospects for local autonomy.  
In conclusion, the fiscal institutional changes examined in this chapter 
explain the change in central controls to increase local autonomy, but, at the 
same time central controls survive indirectly in different modes in local fiscal 
institutions. Thus the potential relationship between central controls and local 
government is likely to vary across the local policies and the contrasting effect of 
control and autonomy may be cancelled out at the aggregate level. Therefore we 
need to test our argument by the robustly established statistical method. The 
great interest in whether these fiscal institutions have contributed to increasing 
local autonomy will be revisited through the links between central controls and 
local performance in chapter 6. The next chapters are dedicated to proving the 
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arguments presented in chapter one about the effect of change in central controls 
on local government.   
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Chapter 6. Links between controls, crises and performance 
1. Introduction: assessing the performance of local 
government 
As argued in chapter two, one of the distinctive features of Korean central-local 
government relations is a traditional centralism. This trend started to change after 
local autonomy resumed in the mid-1990s. The experience of financial crises 
accelerated NPM-style institutional reform which emphasizes monitoring and 
assessment of government organizations (see chapter 3). Since then measuring 
performance of local government has been an institutional priority of new public 
management focusing on ‘autonomy and responsibility’, which is, at the same 
time, exercised as another version of central controls. Chapter 5 argued how 
central government intended to control local government through the examination 
of the fiscal institution of local government despite the demand for institutional 
transformation toward the increase in local democracy. The argument this thesis 
will contend is that central controls of local government impact the performance 
of local government. Chapter 4 outlined the profile of performance management 
of local government and thus recognized the local performance from JPA which 
will be used in the statistical analysis. In this chapter, we investigate how to 
define and analyse the performance of Korean local government and explore its 
relationships to the concepts of control and crises. The objective is to outline a 
series of hypotheses about those relationships and to define those hypotheses 
with sufficient precision to undertake statistical analysis of causation in the light of 
available data. This chapter therefore sets the scene for the more quantitative 
analysis provided in chapter 7. 
 
1.1. The values and performance of local government 
Recent fiscal austerity policies originating from the global economic crisis have 
required every level of government in almost all countries to achieve more 
efficient public administration. In the government sector ensuring efficiency is of 
paramount importance not only because government is usually under budget 
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constraints but also because bureaucrats tend to pursue objectives that are not in 
the interest of the citizen-voter as claimed by Niskanen (1975). Nonetheless 
admittedly it is difficult to measure government’s performance or efficiency.  
Local government has faced increasing expenditure and exponential 
demand for service provision with the change of social and economic conditions. 
Severe financial dependence on central government brings all local governments 
into disrepute by attaching the tag of squandering national resources. An English 
scholar indicates that the problems that local government confronts are directly 
derived from its ambiguous role ‘as an elected, tax-raising government but which 
it has great difficulty in moderating or resolving because the power to do so [rests] 
solely with the central government’ (Sharpe, 1981:5). Dwindling fiscal resource, 
inefficiency of executives, and immature party politics may undermine the 
effectiveness of local government (see chapter 2).  
 In spite of this disrepute, local governments have unique values (see 
chapter 2). It is argued that local accountability contributes to a better match 
between public services and the needs or preferences of a diverse citizenry and 
achieves a greater potential effectiveness of the public sector. Sharpe (1970: 168) 
also emphasized that local government can exercise ‘authoritative horizontal 
coordination’- it can achieve effective ‘joining up’ at the local level so local 
government has practical advantage in providing public services. Local 
government is likely to have a skilled local workforce and know specifically the 
distinctive features of each locality and, hence, can adjust service provision 
accordingly. Another important value of local government is liberty. Hayek stated 
that local government generally offers ‘the next best solution where private 
initiative cannot be relied upon to provide certain services and where some sort 
of collective action is therefore needed; many of the advantages of private 
enterprise and few of the dangers of coercive action of government (Hayek, 1960: 
263; cited in Sharpe, 1970 :157-8)’. In addition, local government civilizes the 
public through the medium of self-government as a training ground for democracy. 
Sometimes local government is a laboratory of policies and thus makes an 
attempt to experiment with various policies before central government considers 
them. When combined, the core value of local government is that the 
democratically organized political unit effectively provides public services in 
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accordance with proper procedures, the preference and the demands of citizens. 
Thus, the era of fiscal austerity is not just a matter of less government but should 
also be evaluated in relation to issues of better and more responsive governance.  
This evaluation should start with measuring performance. A good 
performance management system is a strategic tool to achieve desired results. 
Performance measurement can be seen as ‘a tangible operationalization of 
results’ because it approximately estimates results (Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008: 
14).  This operationalization has four dimensions from the perspective of 
different stakeholders: (1) public resources have been acquired as agreed and in 
accordance with rules and procedures, which involves stakeholders such as the 
finance department, and line managers within the organization; (2) that resources 
have been used efficiently, which mainly gains attention from outsider 
stakeholders such as supervisory institutions including central government or the 
audit office, taxpayers and politicians; (3) that resources have been used to 
achieve the intended results, which top managers or politicians have an interest 
in; (4) results respond to the legitimate demands of citizens within its jurisdiction.  
Thus performance can be defined according to these dimensions. Firstly, as 
local governments should be accountable for acquiring resources, performance 
can be defined as acquiring resources in appropriate quantity or with least cost 
within budget rules. This looks at how much money was used up by the local 
government over a period (Flynn, 2007: 122). This definition concerns the 
resources required to produce output, such as providing physical equipment, 
human resources and finance, and thus at its simplest measures economy (see 
chapter 4). There are established proper legal procedures such as reporting and 
monitoring systems and thus public officials are expected to observe those rules 
and procedures, and to be regularly inspected in order to ensure or monitor the 
performance of local government. Second, local government performance can be 
defined as using resources efficiently. How efficiently government consumes its 
resources is related to a measure of that government’s overall efficiency. 
Efficiency is important in transferring resource from central government 
departments to local government. Central government usually supervises 
whether local government efficiently spends grants, and transfers appropriate 
quantity of resource grounded on the efficient spending of taxes. Third, local 
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government performance can be defined as assessing whether public spending 
achieves what it was supposed to. This definition is interpreted to measure 
effectiveness by which outputs meet, and to what extent, the organizational 
needs and requirement (see chapter 4). Outcomes are usually beyond the local 
sphere and even are affected by the changing policy environment. Fourth, 
performance of local government can be defined as responding to the proper and 
legitimate demands made by citizens. Responsiveness is more than meeting the 
needs of immediate service users and extends to the related people of those who 
receive public services (Walkers et al., 2015). This performance can be shown 
through satisfaction assessment of a certain policy or service, or aggregately 
through political support in elections (see Boyne et al., 2009).  
In fact, local government performance becomes a product of a dynamic 
process, involving identifying the demands of citizens, blending and directing of 
available human and physical resources, and assessing the results or outputs in 
order to achieve public objectives. This concept of performance suggests a 
melding of the management objectives of efficiency and effectiveness as well as 
the degree of citizen satisfaction.  
The customer-focused performance definition, namely responsiveness, can 
be obtained through survey or interview regarding the outputs or results of 
services. However, survey-based performance measures are susceptible to 
verification bias (Andrews et al., 2012: 36). The linear relationships between 
quantity and quality of outputs and customer satisfaction are not always 
guaranteed because citizens as customers perceive these outputs within levels 
of expectation. The confrontation of outputs with individual perception levels 
results in a level of satisfaction (Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008: 20). Survey 
measures on satisfaction often suffer from methodological biases, of which 
common-method bias is believed to be most serious (Wall et al., 2004). In 
addition, reliance upon recall, together with uncertainty about informants’ 
knowledge of actual performance, may problematize the use of survey based 
performance data (Golden, 1992). Research demonstrates that there is not 
always a good correlation between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ types of outcome 
or between the producer-defined increase in quality of a service and satisfaction 
change (Brown and Coulter, 1983; cited in Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008: 20) 
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The best measures of public sector performance are often thought to be 
drawn directly from government sources (Andrews et al., 2012). Data and 
information from those sources are often taken to be an apposite standard 
because it is believed to reflect the real world more accurately and to collect the 
data more objectively minimizing the discretion of researchers (Meier and 
Brudney, 2002: 19). Performance data should be impartial, independent and 
objective. Data from government sources meet these criteria because they are 
based on the precise assessment of a dimension of performance and an external 
process to verify its accuracy.  Therefore, considering not only the feasibility of 
data collection but also the validity of data, the current research employs 
performance definitions focusing on efficient resource usage from government 
source. This performance definition is exactly consistent with the concept of fiscal 
performance from JPA. We will further explore the fiscal performance of JPA as 
dependent variables in chapter 7. 
Local government is expected to provide better quality and greater quantity 
of public service. However, in practice, this is not always the case and public 
choice theory is far more sceptical. Thus, Milton Friedman’s contention that the 
behaviour of government servants is assumed to respond to self-interest not to 
public interest (Friedman, 1986) has an obvious affinity to Niskanen’s argument. 
This perspective, then, provides a corrective and directs critical attention to the 
full range of factors that appear to act in favour of good performance.  
 
1.2. The determinants of performance 
Potential influence on performance of local government can be categorized into 
the external environment and internal organizational characteristics. Local 
government is accountable to a range of stakeholders and depends on a higher 
level of government for political and financial resources (Andrews et al., 2012: 7). 
The external environment constitutes the institution and socioeconomic 
conditions. The first component, the institutional environment, is set by external 
stakeholders such as parliament and central government in which local 
government exists and operates. The institution includes not only the legal and 
constitutional context but also operating procedures, the conventions and culture. 
According to Scott (2014) institutions consists of cognitive, normative and 
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regulative aspects that provide stability and meaning to social behaviour. The 
cognitive aspect concentrates on the capacity of institutions to process 
information and to reach the appropriate conclusions from the information; the 
normative approach considers the capacity of an institution to inculcate its values 
into members; the regulative approach concerns controlling the behaviour of 
participants by rules or incentives.  
The different interaction between these three elements of an institution will 
influence the outcomes of institutional change. For example, Roland discussed 
that political institutions can change quickly but normative and cognitive aspects 
of institutions move slowly and thus the different interaction of fast-moving and 
slow-moving institutions influence the economic growth (Roland, 2004). This 
differential pace of change may mean that the legal changes may lack the 
cultural basis needed to support them and make them successful (Peters, 2012: 
183). In this sense, the institutional transplantation of ‘best practice’ often failed to 
produce expected performance in other countries.  
Different type of institution may influence performance differently. Lijphart 
(1999) argues that the pattern of democracy influences the performance of 
government. The pattern of democracy in his study is two-dimensional on the 
basis of the contrasts between the ‘Westminster model’ and the ‘Consensus 
model’ which simplifies the enormous variety of formal and informal rules and 
institutions. Whereas the Westminster model tends to concentrate power in the 
hands of the majority, the Consensus model in Switzerland and Belgium tries to 
share, disperse, and restrain power in a variety of ways but  the overall 
performance record of consensus democracies is clearly superior to that of 
Westminster democracy (Lijphart, 1999).  
 The second component of the external environment that influences local 
government performance is the variety of socioeconomic conditions of the local 
community that local governments take charge of through their service provisions. 
Andrews and his colleagues labelled this as the ‘technical’ environment which 
includes the level of services needed, scarcity or abundance of financial 
resources for operational activities, and the proportion of socially vulnerable in 
the population (Andrews et al., 2012). Drawing on their study, three dimensions 
can be identified of the organizational environment that influences the 
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performance of local government: munificence which means the resource 
capacity of an organization; complexity or dispersion of service targets; and 
dynamism which means environmental stability-instability or turbulence. For 
example, measures such as the standard population-weighted measures of 
deprivation, age diversity, ethnic diversity and social class diversity found in the 
UK national census have been employed in performance studies (Andrews et al., 
2012: 39).  
The internal environmental attributes that have been included in studies of 
performance in the public sector include strategy, structures, culture and 
leadership of organizations (Boyne, 2004, Walker and Andrews, 2015). In 
management approaches the variety of policies must, at bottom, be relevant to 
the purpose of the local government and the community in which local 
government exists. Based on this basic determination, the performance of local 
government depends largely on organizational cultures that affect how public 
officials influence each other in solving problems and making decisions; how they 
handle disagreements; and how they seek out facts, share information and 
communicate with one another. Moreover the dynamic management style with 
which the appropriateness of an approach must be criticized at each stage of the 
problem-solving and decision-making process contributes to enhancing the 
efficiency and performance of local government.  
From these theoretical and empirical studies we can say that not only the 
external environment, including institutional and socio-economical technical 
aspects, but also internal organizational factors, have an influence on 
performance of local government. The central question of this thesis concerns 
the survival of central controls and the effect of central controls on local 
government performance in Korea, therefore the institutional environment 
identified by central controls as well as the technical environment will be included 
to explain performance variation of local government. In summary, central 
government controls is identified as one of the important determinants influencing 
a local government’s performance as a major component of the external 
environment. Then we need an appropriate model to investigate the relations 
between central controls and local government performance. 
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1.3. The Models for analysing performance 
There has been a variety of performance models developed since governments 
began to attempt to apply cost-effectiveness and systems analysis to their 
programmes and services in the late 1960s. There are ‘academic’ models of 
performance which link determinants to outcomes. Hatry presented the 
continuum of relevant factors in a performance measurement system using the 
term ‘logic model’ - one that links inputs, activities, outputs and outcomes - and 
describes the relationships among these different types of performance 
information (Hatry, 1999: 34). He presented some instances concerning 
performance measurement and getting results concerning local governments of 
the US. Notwithstanding, his performance measurements are narrowly defined 
(Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008: 35), and his simple model does not control 
contextual or environmental factors. 
In contrast to the standard approach, Bouckaert and Halligan (2008) specify 
procedural components of managing performance and establish the ideal types 
according to their relationship. As we noted in chapter 4, the usual process of 
managing performance is first, measuring performance by observing and 
registering performance related issues and processing performance data into 
information; second, incorporating it into documents, procedures and stakeholder 
discourses by the anchoring instrument to institutionalise the performance 
information; and third, using it in a strategy of improving decision making, results 
and accountability (Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008: 28). Their four ideal types are 
Performance Administration, Management of Performance, Performance 
Management and Performance Governance (see chapter 4). This model sheds 
light on the systematic and comprehensive comparisons across the cases of 
different countries managing the performance in their governments. In particular, 
this contributed to understanding the stage of performance management of the 
Korean local government in chapter 4. Nevertheless, it has methodological 
limitations in investigating the causal relations between central controls and local 
performance which this study supposes.  
Mead’s performance studies, however, involve statistical modelling to 
associate programme features with performance outcomes. He stresses that 
performance analyses are a strategy that aims ‘to relate the practices of program 
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to measures of performance’ (Mead, 2003: 108). Whether the programmes have 
the ties to outcomes depends on the connection with which both the programmes 
and performance are jointly the product of a policy environment. A regression 
model can be built in which all the main influences on performance are 
accounted for and which explains the variation across the unit of observations. 
Then environmental variables such as demographics, economic conditions and 
other contextual factors are controlled in order to be surer of independent 
influence (Mead, 2003: 115). This approach takes a step further in organizing the 
framework for performance analysis advanced by former commentators 
(Heinreich, 2012: 43). In particular, it includes a series of environmental variables 
as well as the explainers which the research mainly wants to elaborate. For 
example, a local government tends to have lower performance if it has heavy 
caseloads and higher performance if it had high population density. This 
regression model sheds light on the methodology most appropriate for this thesis 
in the sense that it can include multiple factors, such as central control which 
possibly explain variation in the performance indicators across the unit of 
observation. Chapter 7 will develop the research model of this thesis by using 
aspects of this statistical method. 
In order to establish correlations and construct hypotheses we need a 
measure of performance of local government. This study is interested in 
performance assessment models which are devised and implemented by 
government. The government models are a gold standard for performance 
studies because they are regarded to be objectively focused on the performance 
of an organization. In Korea, operating within a national system of public services 
reflecting both its unitary structure of government and the ambition of central 
government, elaborate performance assessment systems have been developed 
for steering public management, and controlling priorities and the performance of 
regional and local government (see chapter 4). For example, based on the 
shared priorities between national policy objectives and local priorities agreed by 
CGA and MOGAHA on behalf of central and local government respectively, JPA 
included a range of aspects or concepts of ‘performance’ in local government. 
JPA measures how well local governments are implementing policies and 
programmes and thus delivering better services for local people and communities. 
JPA has some similar features with the previous CPA of the UK: for instance, it is 
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carried out by the central government over the local government; there are 
published league tables of comparative performance information and central 
government interventions for bad performers. JPA is relatively sophisticated, 
consistent and publicly available. If used with discrimination it can be used to test 
the hypotheses developed at the end of this chapter.  
In order to interpret the data and identify external factors, ‘explanatory 
information’ is needed along with their performance data – from qualitative 
assessments to in-depth programme evaluations that produce satisfactory 
reliable information (Hatry, 1999:138). In this aspect, JPA has limitation. JPA 
employs a variety of performance indicators which measure its different aspects 
from input and output to outcome, and are generally assessed in terms of 
statistical data; however, it has no qualitative measures (Choi, C.S., 2003; Lee, 
D.O., 2009: 270). Therefore quality and outcomes of local government services 
are unlikely to be sufficiently assessed in the JPA framework although a bit of 
explanatory information can be obtained in the process of field research by JPA 
assessors. 
As for this study, testing hypotheses about the relations between central 
control, which is represented by the fiscal institution, and performance of local 
government requires a statistical model in which the main influences on 
performance are accounted for. The following section analyses the modes of 
control and examines the potential relationship with performance in order to 
establish the hypotheses to test those relations through statistical modelling.  
2. Central government control  
2.1. Does control matter?  
This study focuses on the external impact of central government’s control over 
local government performance, unlike the literature on local government 
management and performance most of which is theoretically based on economic 
theories of service production, contingency theories of organizational design and 
resource based argument about distinctive production capabilities (see Walker 
and Andrews, 2015). Controls dealt with in this study mean central government’s 
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regulating policies, steering local government in central- local government 
relations as mentioned in chapter 2. Local government is subjected to central 
controls which circumscribe its activities in line with nationally set goals. The way 
in which such controls are established tends to embody some doctrines which 
underline them. It has been known that the particular NPM-inspired controls over 
bureaucracy are often associated with a politically clearer performance control as 
well as a greater managerial autonomy with regards to responsibility (Boin et al., 
2006), while traditional central controls over local finance focused on legitimate 
spending or decreasing fiscal discretion. 
Controls are needed not only to supervise the wishes of the central 
government but also to facilitate administrative coordination (Ball and Peters, 
2005: 241). There is a plethora of different regulators pursuing different values or 
goals. The political category of controls includes supervision by a political organ 
like parliament and the Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea in addition to 
citizens’ power to elect the top of public servants and councillors. Legal controls 
are procedures for dealing with corruption and misuse of administrative authority 
through the ordinary legal channels (Ball and Peters, 2005: 241). The 
administrative controls are internal regulation within governmental relations. 
Administrative controls constitute central government departments’ personnel, 
financial and organizational regulation of local government. For example, 
MOGAHA in Korea is able to set tax rates, to control local government access to 
borrowing for capital purpose, to set limits to current expenditure level and plays 
a role through inspectorates looking at the fitness and the legality of the 
operations of local governments. This thesis focuses on the intergovernmental 
control mechanisms by which central government regulates local governments’ 
legislation, oversight, guidance and especially finance but not to the exclusion of 
political control because after all, local government is defined by its political 
independence and democratic credentials and central government should 
recognize legitimate local discretion. This focus can give a more definite picture 
of the role of central controls and local government’s discretion in central-local 
relations.  
These controls have conventionally been associated with accountability 
requirements in the public sector (Andrews et al., 2012). Actually, local 
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governments as part of the public sector are being pressured to become more 
results-oriented and more concerned with performance rather than to resort to 
traditional forms of accountability about their activities (Bouckaert and Pollitt, 
1996). Change in the nature of government is linked to the trends of central 
controls of local government. The conventional features of government are 
bureaucracy, legislation, financial control, regulation and enforcement (Richards 
and Smith, 2002: 279; Heywood, 2000:19). The deployment of so-called 
‘command-and–control’ regulatory policy instruments is the quintessence of 
government (Pierre, 2000: 242). The central state’s power over local government 
provides effective instruments to reform the financial system and enhance the 
efficiency of government. However, the concept of ‘governance’ gradually 
occupies the discussion about government. It captures such developments as 
contracting out, public-private partnership and multi-level links between different 
levels of governments (Rhodes, 1999: 54). Even a host of new public 
management reforms lead to a critical view that government has been ‘hollowed 
out’.   
Nevertheless, central controls through the instrument of audit and inspection 
have expanded and shifted in a new direction of promoting service improvement 
especially in local government. The deployment of command and control seems 
to survive under the changed intergovernmental relations. Despite increasing 
local autonomy in Korea, central controls flourishes in many areas of local 
government. In particular, the issue of central controls are important because 
Korea is in the transitional period during which the central-local relations are 
expected to be more democratic through institutional changes (see chapter 1). 
According to the British experience, ‘hands-off’ control, representing a steering by 
use of incentives and sanctions and the setting of meta-level rules, can be 
effective and probably much more powerful than ‘hands-on’ regulation and 
direction (Hoggett, 1996: 25). Understanding the nature of central controls in the 
paradoxical phenomenon will contribute to diagnosing and establishing more 
successful central-local government relations in Korea. 
 
 164 
2.2. Taxonomy of control  
The control exercised by central government is expressed in the form of an 
institution which seeks to implement certain policies and operates a variety of 
methods of control. Modes of control can be classified in a variety of different 
ways. It is necessary to select an appropriate set of concepts in order to 
differentiate types of control and to distinguish the positive and negative aspects 
of each type. These modes of control influence the resource allocation for and 
management of local government; consequently it is also possible for these to 
affect performance of local government. In this sense we need to draw a line 
between categories of government control. 
Hoggett (1996: 12) argued that three distinctive but inter-locking strategies of 
control existed in the 1990s within the UK public sector’s restructuring, 
contradicting the idea of a single movement toward some presumed post-
bureaucratic regime. First, he identified ‘the introduction of managed competition 
as a means of coordinating the activities of a decentralized unit; second, the 
attempt to decentralize operations whilst centralizing strategic command; third, 
the extended development of performance management techniques’. He 
observed that in some parts of public services, such as education, all three 
control strategies have been implemented simultaneously; in other areas such as 
the civil service the diffusion of competition has been confined to producers 
rather than the consumer market (ibid: 24).  
From a wider perspective, Hood et al. (2004) analysed control in modern 
government by comparing the situation across various countries using a three-
dimensional case of prisons, higher education and higher civil servants. They 
designated four types of controlling government: oversight; competition, mutuality 
and randomness (ibid, 2004: 18-9); the first two of these are the currently popular 
ways and the latter two are past ways to control governments, but in practice 
governments prefer to mix the current and past types rather than to discard old 
ways or to insist on only new controlling styles (ibid, 2004: 18). 
An important threefold typology of control was noted by Amitai Etzioni in his 
influential work A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations. He mainly 
uses the concept of ‘power’ but also maintains that ‘power’ is synonymous with 
‘control’. Control falls into three kinds of power, referred to as coercive, 
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remunerative and normative according to the means employed to make the 
subjects comply: 
 
Coercive power rests on the application, or the threat of application, of physical sanctions 
such as infliction of pain, deformity, or death; generation of frustration through restriction of 
movement; or controlling through force the satisfaction of needs such as those for food, 
sex, comfort, and the like. 
Remunerative power is based on control over material resources and rewards through 
allocation of salaries and wage, commissions and contributions, “fringe benefit”, services 
and commodities. 
Normative power rests on the allocation and manipulation of symbolic rewards and 
deprivations through employment of leaders, manipulation of mass media, allocation of 
esteem and prestige symbols, administration of ritual, and influence over the distribution of 
“acceptance” and “positive response”. [Etzioni, 1975: 13] 
 
Etzioni’s arrangement is chosen as a point of departure for this thesis and 
directs attention to an attempt to probe policy instruments by Evert Vedung. He 
labels three classifications of ‘regulations’, ‘economic means’, and ‘information’ 
(Vedung, 2003) but this research rechristens them as ‘coercive controls’, 
‘remunerative control’, and ‘normative controls’ to highlight the types of central 
controls over local government. While the two cases of Etzioni and Vedung are 
aimed at the relationships between government and people, they provide a 
theoretical basis for the properties of power in intergovernmental relations.  
First, coercive controls are measures undertaken by central government to 
influence local government by means of formulated rules and directives which 
mandate the local government to act in accordance with what is ordered (Vedung, 
2003: 31) and are supported by ‘the threat of sanctions (Stone, 1982:10)’. This 
definition deviates to an extent from the conceptualization of ‘regulation’ which 
conceives an authoritative relationship. In general ‘regulation’ means 
governmental intervention, covering all forms of political control like Meier’s 
definition that ‘regulation is any attempt by the government to control the 
behaviour of citizens, corporations or sub-governments’ (Meier, 1985:1). However, 
unlike a comprehensive regulation, coercive control is regarded as just one of the 
means that governments have at their disposal to exert control over local 
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government.  
Second, remunerative control involves either the giving out or the taking 
away of resources, be they non-monetary such as approval of local government 
access to borrowing for capital purposes, or monetary such as grants. Resource 
controls have been considered as effective policy instruments to achieve 
centrally set goals. The policy impact of them, however, is sometimes difficult to 
anticipate when they are mediated by the market; for example, a tax levied on an 
item of personal preference like tobacco makes the indulgence of people more 
expensive and thus the final response of customers impacts the policy effect of 
the expansion of local income. It ought to be stressed that remunerative controls 
are not always mandatorily applied across the regions, a fact that makes 
remunerative controls different from coercive controls (Vedung, 2003: 32). Local 
governments may not to make use of grants because the strings attached to 
them are not worthwhile in their own interest. On the other hand, since there is no 
reason to deny intergovernmental transfers without stings such as shared tax, 
local governments tend to be competitive to get more of the common pool 
resource.    
Third, normative controls, referred to as moral persuasion or exhortation, 
covers attempts at influencing local government through the transfer of 
knowledge, the communication of reasoned argument, and the dispensing of 
advice (Vedung, 2003: 32). It would embrace appeals to political loyalty and 
party-political goals shared across national and local government. The transfer of 
information is offered to influence local government to do what the central 
government regards as desirable. It covers not only objective and correct 
knowledge, but also judgments about which phenomena and measures are good 
or bad, and recommends about how citizens should act and behave. In Korea 
there is a historic norm that the locality should defer to the centre. However the 
local autonomy revival after the mid-1990s unleashed some questions over this 
normative power that had ruled the central-local relationship for a long time.  
This three-fold scheme can provide clear delineations of the properties of 
central government control over local government. In evaluating the effectiveness 
of control, fiscal policy is one of the most important issues in the classical 
approach and remains central in recent studies (Perotti, 2004). However, 
 167 
research mainly focuses on the policy process and not on the effects and thus it 
is worthwhile to investigate empirically the effect of central government’s 
controlling of local government over a specified time period. 
 
2.3. Control and performance 
In earlier days, some commentator suggested that performance management in 
the context of the new public management was primarily top-down with a 
dominant concern for enhancing control let alone informing organizational 
change and service improvement (Sanderson, 2001: 297; McKevitt and Lawton, 
1996). The control of local government is indispensable for the centre to 
supervise local government but there is not much empirical research about how 
different control types influence performance of local government. Moreover, the 
central government tends to control and command even under the changed 
environment characterised by looser, often market, relationships operating 
through policy networks and governance (Sanderson, 2001; Hoggett, 1996). 
The central question posed by this thesis is how each type of controls 
influences the promoting of local government performance. Therefore the 
discussion seeks to extend previous work on the relationship between controls 
and performance and then establishes some hypotheses about three different 
control types.  
First of all, as for the relation of normative controls with improving 
performance far less research has examined this point. To identify published 
studies which analyse the impact of the normative controls requires the 
adaptation of research terms. As the previous section reviewed, normative 
controls means moral persuasion, or exhortation, and attempts at influencing 
people through the transfer of knowledge, the communication of reasoned 
argument and advice, and thus the case of sharing of norms such as innovation, 
goals and strategy were used together. The empirical study on strategy and 
organizational performance undertaken by Andrews et al (2006) in English local 
governments reveals the positive association between a prospective strategy and 
performance. This evidence indicates that there is reward to be found for local 
governments which pursue a strategy that includes identifying new priorities, 
searching out new opportunities for, and where there is willingness to, change 
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public service quality. Walker and Brewer (2009) demonstrate that a strategy of 
prospector can offset the detrimental impact of red tape and increase 
performance. This finding suggests that local government can pursue the 
normative controls that are associated with innovation – that is developing new 
service delivery mechanisms - and thereby achieve higher performance 
(Andrews et al., 2012: 65). Due to co-operation and creative exploration of novel 
options, normative controls may produce better performance of an organization. 
This argument leads to the following hypothesis.  
 
H1: Normative controls exercised by central government are positively related to 
improved local government performance 
 
Second, remunerative control might be expected to have complex relations 
with local government performance according to its types and strings of 
resources. Where there is a presence of positive remunerative control which 
means central government enables local government to expand its resource 
availability through taxes or monetary incentives, local government has more 
discretion and capacity to spend and thus improve its performance. However a 
negative remunerative control to reduce financial availability for or discretion of 
local government may have a negative relation to the performance of local 
government. This is supported by some authors. Balaguer-Coll et al (2007: 448) 
revealed that self-generated revenue, grants, deficit financing and a high 
governing party share of the votes15 have a negative impact on performance on 
a local scale. More precisely the empirical evidence was quite persuasive in the 
case of overall cost efficiency for unconditional grants received from the higher 
layers of government, which coincides with the studies that suggest that grants 
may not only encourage local service provision but also stimulate inefficiency 
(Moesen and Cauwenberge, 2000). By contrast, funding by earmarked subsidies 
allows central governments to specify its intentions about the spending of local 
government and make local government take responsibility for central 
government goals. This strict overseeing of spending subsidies will enhance 
                                               
15
 Municipalities managed by governments with a higher percentage of votes, which are more 
unlikely to face monitoring by other parties, have fewer incentives to efficiently manage and 
improve performance. (Balaguer-Coll et al., 2007: 443). 
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efficiency of local government (Geys and Moesen, 2009). The difference of 
results may come from the way performance is defined or measured, and 
controlling environmental variables. In order to clearly discuss the relation 
between remunerative control and performance this research assumes the 
positive direction of remunerative control to enhance the availability of resource 
and then, given the evidence which has been presented thus far, the following 
relationship is anticipated  
 
H2: Remunerative controls exercised by central government are positively related 
to improved local government performance. 
 
Third, there is a potentially more complex relationship in respect of how 
coercive controls might affect local government performance. The previous 
studies on the effect of coercive controls or regulation on performance have been 
varied in the results. A range of research from the education sector, especially on 
the relationship between the inspection system and English secondary school 
pupils’ examination results measured by GCSE (General Certificates in 
Secondary Education), discovers a negative relationship over a relatively long 
time period (Rosenthal, 2004). The intervention from the upper organization will 
constrain the management so that performance can be expected to be lower. 
Thus it can be assumed there is a negative relationship between coercive control 
and local government performance. However, considering the English local 
government performance measure system reinforced by the Local Public Service 
Agreement and CPA, central controls are supposed to raise the local government 
performance where the local authorities failed to manage financial soundness or 
deliver good quality (Andrews et al., 2005; Lowndes 2003: 140). Those identified 
as poor were subject to an increased level of central government intervention in 
order to increase their performance. Thus a case could be made for an exception 
where prior performance of the local government is very bad. Since generally 
control exercised by central government has a damaging effect on the 
independence and initiative of local government (Rhodes, 1980:271), coercive 
controls are likely to negatively influence the performance of local government. 
However, some exceptional cases can reveal coercive controls are effective in 
improving performance of a local government with previously bad outcomes. The 
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third hypotheses on the impact of coercive controls are then: 
 
H3-1: Coercive controls exercised by central government are negatively related 
to improved local government performance 
 
H3-2: Coercive controls exercised by central government may raise performance 
of the local government where prior performance is very bad  
 
This research assumes that different control types are associated with 
different effects on enhancing the performance of local government, drawing on 
previous research and common knowledge. As explored in earlier chapters, this 
thesis is also concerned with the relationship between control and performance in 
the environmental context of fiscal crisis. This focus is driven by the experience 
of economic and fiscal crises over recent years in Korea, and we can adapt the 
hypotheses outlined above to apply in relation to crises, which allow them to be 
tested against data which emerge from Korean fiscal crises over the past twenty 
years.   
3. Fiscal Crises  
3.1. The window of opportunity for reform 
Fiscal crises cause an undesirable and unexpected problematic situation that 
makes the local government deviate from and disrupt the ordinary public service 
provision driven by economic imperatives (see chapter 3). Crises are episodic 
breakdowns of familiar symbolic frameworks that legitimated the pre-existing 
socio-political order ('t Hart, 1993; Boin et al., 2008: 3). The effects of crises on 
public policies and institutions are variously treated in the literature. In academic 
discourse, a crisis marks a phase of disorder in the seemingly normal 
development of a system: for instance an economic crisis refers to an interval of 
decline in a long period of steady growth and development (Boin et al., 2008: 2). 
Crises do not always negatively influence organizational existence but also may 
positively work in practice if they are objectively diagnosed and carefully treated. 
For example, as a result of the restructuring following the 1997 crisis, Korea 
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could rapidly recover from the economic crisis beginning in 2008 due to the 
reduced vulnerability of the financial and corporate sectors (Il SaKong and 
Youngsun Koh, 2010: 71). They provide ‘punctuations’ which allow necessary 
change in the institutional process of ‘punctuated equilibrium’.  
Crises, either as external or internal variables, tend to have considerable 
influence on local governments. If they are an internal variable such as in the 
case of local fiscal crises, local government pays back financial support from the 
upper level government and reforms the organization for efficiency management 
to deal with its impact (Boin et al., 2008: 4). Even if they are external global 
economic crises, from the perspective of local government, they influence the 
whole of local government operations and activities by changing transaction or 
production costs of services (North, 1990). Sometimes local government is 
required to make sacrifices in order to achieve national recovery and the central 
government takes advantage of the strengthening nationalism, caused by the 
crisis situation. 
Confronted with a crisis, politicians and public officials urgently have to deal 
with the immediate threat or damage inflicted, but more importantly they also 
have to come to terms with the vulnerabilities revealed and the public disaffection 
this may evoke (Boin et al., 2008: 4). By and large, most local governments or 
municipalities that have endured fiscal or financial crisis are accompanied by 
investigation and proclamation of reform aimed at improving their institutions and 
systems that have proven vulnerable under pressure. Therefore crises do have 
dynamic potential to prompt institutional change. By destabilizing the veracity and 
legitimacy of existing policies, goals and institutions, as well as threatening the 
security obtained by relevant actors and stakeholders, they provide “windows of 
opportunity” for reform (Birkland, 2006; Boin et al., 2008: 10) 
 
3.2. Taxonomy of crises 
There are a variety of problems that trigger crises from natural forces to 
deliberate acts by an enemy inside or outside that society (Boin et al., 2008: 3) 
but we concentrate especially on the fiscal or financial crises. Despite the 
concepts of crises established in economic theory, our study will use operational 
definitions of crises. We draw the line between local government fiscal crises and 
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national economic crises in analysing the relations between crises and local 
performance to reflect the Korean experience.  
Fiscal crisis involves the budget deficit being too large in the government 
sector. A major reason why the fiscal deficit of each country deteriorates is that a 
large scale fiscal expansion has been carried out in order to meet impending 
social demands. In the past, fiscal crisis was more frequently observed at the 
local government level than but over recent years the state has been no 
exception like the Greek crisis. Meanwhile economic crisis creates problems in 
financial markets and spreads them to all economic sectors. Economic crisis is 
observed in the regional and global area, a much wider space than local fiscal 
crisis, because financial markets are opened globally. During financial crises, the 
macro-economy goes into a downturn which means significantly reduced 
government tax income. Governments across the world have announced and 
carried out budget cutbacks in core public service provisions and have 
dramatically scaled back on ‘non-essential’ public subsidies (Mccann, 2013: 6). 
Financial crises can be diversely defined but this study intends to employ a 
simple operationalization based on the economic measure. Korea has had 
relatively high average economic growth rates of about 9% in the 1980s, 6% in 
the 1990s, and 5% in the 2000s (BOK, 2013). These growth rates, however, sank 
below the one percent, -6.9% in 1998 and 0.3% in 2009 when Korea experienced 
financial crises resulting from the 1997 Asian economic crises and the recent 
global economic crisis in 2008. Therefore financial crises can be operationally 
defined as when Korea experienced negative GDP growth rates during the year 
(see Il SaKong and Young sun Koh, 2010: 70-75). 
The term, ‘fiscal crisis’ has been used and sometimes abused to describe 
the state of local finance. What are the criteria used to determine whether a local 
government is fiscally distressed? In general local fiscal crisis is a condition in 
which a fiscal deficit has accumulated and thus local government cannot fulfil 
their fiscal obligations any more. In a technical sense, if local governments are 
able to meet their monthly salary and wage bills; they continue to provide basic 
public services, and almost all the less basic ones as well (Newton, 1981: 222-
223), there is no hint of fiscal crisis. A guideline, therefore, is needed to check the 
fiscal condition. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR, 
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1973: 7) in the USA recommended that states should establish by statute a set of 
guidelines to determine whether a city’s financial condition necessitates state 
intervention. In this sense, the Local Finance Act of Korea stipulated central 
government’s monitoring of and intervention in the fiscal condition of local 
government in 2011. This study uses one of the criteria provided by the law in 
order to operationally define a fiscal crisis of local government. To sum up, crises 
in this thesis are classified into local fiscal crises and national financial crises and 
in chapter 7 they are operationally defined and treated as independent variables 
which respectively influence the performance of local government. They are thus 
incorporated into the hypotheses defined below. 
 
3.3. Crises and performance 
There may be both direct and indirect impacts that fiscal or financial crises have 
on local government performance. The direct effect of crises is generated from 
uncertainty which interferes with the executive ability and decision making of 
local government. Episodically, the crisis situation sometimes strengthens 
nationalism and encourages people to fully exert their positive potential. The 
crisis situation creates opportunities for breakthroughs that in normal times are 
simply unthinkable or politically unfeasible (Boin et al., 2006: 122) and they make 
possible the revision of policies and the redesigning of institutions. Even 
unilateral top-down policies by central government are tolerated in order to 
effectively manage the critical situation at the national level (OECD 2010; MOFE 
1999). However, in the majority of cases, fiscal crises are expected to negatively 
impact local government. They create a resort to short term expedients and make 
it more difficult to pursue longer term value for money. The economic plight forces 
the local government to cut back, more or less extensively, which can affect 
quality and quantity of local public services and, furthermore, the performance of 
local government.   
    On the other hand, both fiscal and financial crises indirectly have an impact 
on local performance through central controls because a critical contingent 
situation influences the power and institutional capacity of government. Central 
ministries serve as ‘super-ordinate’ organs when central programmes are being 
implemented to overcome financial crises. The core executives are expected to 
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concentrate on the larger institutional, political and social ramifications of the 
crises and tend to respond to the problematic situation at the national level. 
Chapter 3 showed the historical experiences that the bureaucratic capabilities of 
states were expanded during economic turmoil (Ikenberry, 1994: 19; Tilly, 1975: 
610). Like in the US, Japan and Korea, when a local fiscal condition reaches a 
certain level of seriousness, central government is scheduled to intervene in the 
local fiscal policy by the law. In the central-local relationship, central government 
finds it easy to use command and control methods during crises. By means of 
only the centre’s control, without any discussion about the search for strategies 
for public service production and delivery through shared responsibilities, 
however, local government is unable to resolve all the tasks and demands placed 
upon it. When a local government did not achieve expected performance due to 
the fiscal crisis, central government may want to control that local government. In 
this way, the intervention from central government and its impact on local policy 
implementation will influence efficiency and the performance of local government.  
In addition, financial crises tend to reduce the size of subsidies and transfers 
to the local government (Pierre, 2000: 4), which may negatively affect the quality 
and quantity of public services delivered by local government and eventually can 
result in the lowered performance of local governments. Financial crises cause 
resource procurement costs, and thus local government needs to change the 
quantity and quality of service, and there will be a further transaction costs in 
changing these services or policies. Given the discussion presented thus far, 
both national financial and local fiscal crises are expected to directly or indirectly 
have a negative influence on the performance of local government.  
 
H4.1: National financial crises are negatively related to improved local 
government performance 
 
H4.2: Local fiscal crises are negatively related to improved local government 
performance 
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3.4. The combined effect of controls and crises on performance 
So far in this chapter, the relations of each of the controls and crises types to the 
performance of local government have been presented when these causative 
variables are considered separately from the other. Now this analysis advances a 
stage further by considering whether different control types interacting with crises 
make a difference to local government performance.  
During national financial crises, each control type is anticipated to influence 
differently the performance of local government. Positive controls can be 
expected to support local government by instilling strengthened nationalism to 
overcome financial crises. Negative controls can be expected to hamper the 
service provision of local government by reducing intergovernmental transfers 
and regulating local spending. Thus the potential relationship between central 
controls and local performance is complex and the positive and negative effects 
may be cancelled out at the aggregate level. Therefore a null hypothesis is that 
controls operated by central government during financial crises have no 
significant effect on the performance of local government.  
Although the impact of the broader control exercised by central government 
in itself is difficult to call, the effect of the specific mode of central controls may be 
more predictable in the combined effect of controls and crises on performance. 
The effect of the two causative variables (controls and crises) cannot be 
separated; that is the effect of central controls on local performance depends on 
the level of financial crisis and vice versa (Harrell, 2001:14). Stochastically, the 
interacting effect of normative controls with national financial crises depends on 
the reciprocal impact of two causative variables. Korea has been known to be 
resilient to crises. And local government tends to comply with central 
government’s authority. Therefore, central government’s normative controls 
during the financial crises are expected to strengthen nationalism and encourage 
local government to efficiently manage the organization. The hypothesis on the 
impact of normative controls interacting with economic crises is then: 
 
H5: Normative controls operated by central government during financial crises 
are positively related to improved performance of local government 
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During national fiscal crises, central government tends to reduce the size of 
subsidies and financial transfers toward the local government (Pierre, 2000: 4) 
taking into account reduced national income. In the same context 
intergovernmental transfers are reduced at financial crises, which may negatively 
affect the quality and quantity of public services delivered by local government. 
The Korean central government, however, enforced the expansion policy of local 
income in order to precipitate the domestic consumption by stimulating the local 
government expenditure (MOPAS, 2011a). This fiscal expansion may help the 
management of local government. In this sense, during financial crises, the 
remunerative controls expanding local income may contribute to providing the 
public services of local government. So this thesis expects that: 
 
             H6: Remunerative controls operated by central government during financial 
crises are positively related to improved performance of local government 
 
Third, coercive controls interacting with national financial crises are expected 
to have less complicated effects than we mentioned in hypotheses 3-1 and 3-2. 
The two causative variables, coercive controls and national economic crises, 
both negatively work on local performance in the separate model. The combined 
effect of coercive control with the financial crisis can be expected to be negatively 
related for the entire local government sampled. Interacting with the national 
financial crisis, local governments feel constrained to heed coercive controls 
which usually urge them to share the responsibility and burden of financial crises 
and ignore various impending local conditions, regardless of whether they are a 
normal local government or a badly performing local government. Therefore the 
interaction of coercive controls and financial crises may tend to reduce 
performance of local government. Thus far the discussion leads us to following 
hypotheses.  
 
    H7: Coercive controls operated by central government during national economic 
crises are negatively related to improved performance of local government 
 
Similarly, the combined effect of central controls with local fiscal crises on 
local performance depends on the different impacts of local fiscal crises. Most of 
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all, the individual effects of local fiscal crises are expected to negatively influence 
the performance of local governments as noted above. Individually normative and 
remunerative controls are expected to have some positive relation with the 
performance of local government. Thus the interactive effect of either normative 
control or remunerative control with local fiscal crises is anticipated to be 
negative, when the combined effect of two causative variables depends on the 
local fiscal crises effect. The analysis of coercive controls interacting with local 
fiscal crises is excluded because there is no observed case to meet both the 
constraints of local fiscal crises and coercive controls at the same time. Therefore, 
the following hypotheses are suggested. 
 
H8: Normative controls operated by central government during local fiscal crises 
are negatively related to improved performance of local government 
 
H9: Remunerative controls operated by central government during local fiscal 
crises are negatively related to improved performance of local government 
4. Conclusion 
Central controls have been reformed to facilitate more effective local democracy 
and we have seen significant changes in the central-local government 
relationship since the extension of local autonomy in the mid-1990s (see chapter 
1), even though Korea has a path-dependence of centralism (see chapter 2). The 
experience of financial crises and the impact of NPM style reform have 
unleashed a new range of regulation and inspection in the public sector, so local 
governments have been subject to more intensive controls from the central 
government. As we looked at the financial institution of local government in 
chapter 5, this thesis witnesses the paradoxical phenomenon that the central 
controls increase to ensure performance while local democracies are needed to 
increase. In order to evaluate the conflicting influence of central government on 
local government at the aggregate level, this study is moving from a general 
discussion of change in central-local government relations to empirical 
application of hypothesis as extended case studies. The emphasis on 
performance measures in the public sector enables this study to analyse the 
relation of central controls and performance of local government.  
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By linking concepts with performance, this chapter built a series of 
hypotheses with sufficient precision to undertake statistical analysis. Following 
previous literature, there is a distinction to be drawn between control types 
(normative, remunerative, and coercive), which is an appropriate typology to 
examine whether each control type influences differently the performance of local 
government. In addition, the factor of crises could not be ignored in examining 
the central controls and local performance because the effect of central controls 
may be modulated by crises effects. Crises are divided into national financial 
crises and local fiscal crises to investigate the interactive effect of three kinds of 
central control on local government performance. The hypotheses are used to 
examine whether central controls, in the transitional period of the Korean local 
democracy, have a positive or negative impact on local government and to find 
robust causational relations in the light of available data.  
The next chapters will focus on explaining the variables and method for more 
quantitative analysis and present the pattern of findings about how change in 
central controls has been empirically related to improved local government 
performance. More democratic and normative modes of central controls are 
expected to be important to ensure the increase in motivation and responsibility 
of local government and thus they are expected to have a positive relation with 
local performance. If we do not find a positive relationship then explanations for 
why democratic change in central-local relations has not been connected with 
improved performance of local government in Korea will be suggested in the 
concluding chapters.  
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Chapter 7. Central controls and local performance: a 
statistical case study 
1. Introduction 
Chapter 6 investigated how to define and analyse the performance of Korean 
local government and explored the theoretical relationship between local 
government performance and central control. It expanded the argument to 
consider another question in the environmental context of fiscal crises: how on-
going fiscal crises will affect the relations between central control and local 
performance. In this chapter, we establish the research model based on the 
conceptual links of chapter 6 and explore the appropriate methodology to test the 
model and justify them for our study in depth. Then, we define variables through 
extrapolating from established theories or exploring previous studies; and 
disclose the sources of data collection. This chapter seeks to undertake 
technically robust statistical analysis about a series of hypotheses with sufficient 
theoretical and practical possibilities for the statistical verification of our 
arguments. This section continues reviewing our argument and research 
questions which we have explored so far, before doing these tests. 
The question posed in this study is whether the central controls influence 
local government performance and how the different types of control influence 
local government performance; additionally when a financial crisis is given, how 
are the relationship between central control and local performance changed.  
Central government utilizes multiple controlling mechanisms such as setting 
of policy guidelines for public service delivery; a transfer of resources to the local 
government to equalize their capacity; and the ex post control of the use of the 
transfers and of the level and quality of services (Ter-Minassian, 1997). Central 
controls can influence the decentralized delivery of public goods and services 
and ensure accountability of local government. As discussed in chapter 4, many 
countries have emphasized performance management in the context of New 
Public Management. This trend brought up multiple isomorphic institutional 
changes which attempted to cure managerial inefficiency and improve 
government performance in the OECD countries (Curristine, 2005; Chan, J. et al., 
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2002). In the Korean institutional context, NPM inspired reforms were motivated 
by the harsh experiences of the Korean financial crises in the late 1990s 
(MOFE,1999: 210; MOGAHA, 2001: 228) as explored in chapter 3. The 
characteristics of those institutional reforms encompassed by NPM share 
elements for enhancing executive political control of local governments through 
reinvigorating executive oversight and the introduction of market based 
administration (Boin et al., 2006). In practice a more plausible way of portraying 
the controls operating over many Korea local bureaucracies is a mix of the NPM 
style control and the traditional way of control. In this sense, chapter 5 noted the 
archetypal examples of fiscal institutional changes. Chapter 6 collectively termed 
these NPM inspired or traditional interventions of central government as controls 
of local governments and classified them into normative, remunerative and 
coercive modes to analyse possible different effects of controls. The spread of 
NPM inspired ideas to introduce programme budgeting and accrual base 
accounting are treated as normative controls; traditional shared tax policy is 
incorporated as a way of remunerative control; and excessive intervention in local 
spending discretion facing economic crises is seen as a mode of coercive control. 
It has been known that there is the “crisis effect”, namely, a propensity to give 
fewer discretionary powers to local government in countries where there is a 
continuing threat (Bahl and Johannes, 1994). Importantly we examine the 
combined effect of central controls with crises to highlight unexpected and 
unintentional policy impact.  
Performance measurement comprises centralized targets, public reporting of 
data and the use of reward and penalties. Performance improvement is the 
substance of a performance measurement framework (Bouckaert and Halligan, 
2008: 14). The Korean central government has enforced performance 
management to hold organizations to account for their performance and regulate 
their behaviours. The official performance measure system is GAA, as discussed 
in chapter 4, which includes the assessment of local government, the Joint 
Performance Assessment (see Figure 4-5). JPA presents the level of local 
government performance regarding public services of nine sectors which are 
provided by local governments. The performance data is collected from this 
source for the statistical analysis in this thesis. It covers consistently fiscal 
performance for 13 years across the 16 regional governments (see Appendix 3 
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and 4).  
 Figure 7-6. Framework of the research 
 
  
 
 
Accordingly, the framework for this study accounts for how central controls 
and fiscal crises influence performance of local government, as Figure 7-6 
summarizes. The unit of analysis is the individual regional government. In 
chapter 6 we basically anticipated that Normative and Remunerative controls are 
expected to be positively related to local government performance. Coercive 
controls of poorly performing local government are expected to have positive 
relations with local government. On the other hand, the general case of Coercive 
controls, National Financial Crises (NFC) and Local Fiscal Crises (LFC) are 
negatively related to local government performance. During the crises, each type 
of central controls can be expected to impact negatively or positively local 
government performance in accordance with the magnitude of the crises effect. 
Therefore two models will be established in this chapter: one is to test both the 
individual effect of central controls and the individual effect of crises on the 
performance of local government; the other is to test the combined effects of 
central controls with crises on the performance of local government. These 
analyses look at the longitudinal and the cross sectional aspects. This study will 
contribute to the literature regarding performance in the public sector, especially 
considering there has been little empirical research about outcomes of the NPM 
reform and democratic change in central-local relations. This research uses the 
panel data fixed effect model so we can establish the causal relations between 
central controls and local performance, which is continued in the next section.  
Performance of  
Local government 
Central Controls 
   (Normative, Coercive 
    Remunerative modes) 
Economic crises, 
Local fiscal crises 
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2. Models and methodology  
2.1. The individual model for central controls        
The first model is at a non-crisis time to examine how each explanatory variable 
individually has an impact on local performance. Central government controls, 
and crises are separately connected to local performance because the latter is 
the joint product of a public administrative environment. Every programme 
implicitly has a set of hypotheses about what actions will produce which results 
(Hatry, 1999: 48). Each fiscal policy has goals intended by central government. 
Normative controls, sharing ideas of NPM in the process of introducing 
programme budget and accrual base accounting, intended to give more 
managerial autonomy and implant enhanced accountability in the sphere of local 
government. Remunerative control seen from the recent reform aimed to 
increase fiscal capacity of local government against the explosive demand of 
public service provision. These two modes of central controls give managerial 
autonomy and political performance controls to lower agencies (Boin et al., 2006). 
On the other hand, coercive control depends on hierarchical power and 
threatening thus constrains managerial autonomy and diversity of local 
government; however, such a coercive control has been identified as central to 
successful implementation through the centralized technique in areas such as 
action plans and monitoring in the group of local governments where prior 
performance is very bad (Andrews et al., 2005; Lowndes 2003: 140) or in 
organizations that emphasize improving current services (Andrews et al., 2011: 
647).  
This study supposes a continuous relationship between central controls and 
local government performance. The sets of central control variables discussed so 
far thus are entered linearly into the following models. One is to examine the 
short term effect of central controls and another is to test the long term effect of 
central controls on local government performance.  
 
 performance𝑖,𝑡+1 = β1f(controls)𝑖 𝑡 + other factors + random shocks 
 performance𝑖,𝑡+2 = β2f(controls)𝑖 𝑡 + other factors + random shocks 
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This equation consists of dependent variable (performance), explanatory 
variables (controls), controlling variable (other factors), and error terms (random 
shocks). The coefficients 𝛽 express the magnitude and the direction of the effect 
of central control on performance. The performance of local government is 
explained as a function of central government as well as other observed and 
unobserved factors and random shocks. The subscript i stands for the local 
government and the subscript t stands for the year, where t+1 indicates a one-
year lag and t+2 indicates a two-year lag. We assume that central controls might 
have an impact on local government performance with a time lag and the policy 
effect is sustained until t+2. For this reason, this model uses a one-year lag of 
performance variables to examine the short term effect of central controls and a 
two-year lag for the long term effect of central controls. The individual Model is to 
test the individual effect of each control mode on performance of local 
government. The mode of central control entering the equation inside a linear 
function f () is unspecified, which means that it is ‘normative control’, or ‘coercive 
controls’, or ‘remunerative control’. The core hypothesis of this thesis is that β is 
not zero. In other words, central control matters in some way for how local 
government performs its official duties.  
    This model tests H1 to H3: Normative control exercised by central 
government is positively related to local government performance (H1); 
Remunerative control of exercised by central government is positively related to 
local government performance (H2); Coercive control exercised by central 
government is negatively related to local government performance but may raise 
performance of the local government where prior performance is very bad (H3-
1/3-2). A considerable amount of literature proves that the increase of central 
controls in the performance management of the UK was eventually rewarded by 
improvements in actual performance (Boyne and Enticott 2004; Bouckart and 
Holligan, 2008: 368). Even though these comments did not specify different 
control modes, we can postulate that central controls may have an impact on 
performance of local government. Thus it is necessary to prove, in the Korean 
context, which types of central controls contributed to improvement of local 
performance.  
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2.2. The individual model for fiscal crises 
Before moving to combined models, where we estimate the interacting effect of 
central controls with crises, the individual effect of crises on local government 
performance is preliminarily measured in this equation.  
 
 performance𝑖,𝑡+1 = β3f(crises)𝑖𝑡 + other factors + random shocks 
 performance𝑖,𝑡+2 = β4f(crises)𝑖𝑡 + other factors + random shocks 
 
The impact of crises on local performance is examined in both short and long 
terms. The modes of crises unspecified in the equation are national financial crises 
(NFC) and local fiscal crises (LFC). Chapter 6 expected NFC are negatively 
related to local government performance (H4.1) and LFC are negatively related to 
local government performance (H4.2). Economic and financial crises in most cases 
are known to have an adverse effect on performance of public administration 
(Zafra-Gomez et al., 2013: 64). Policy makers and politicians advocate greater 
control of public deficits to prevent their economies from being penalized. Empirical 
research proves that during the economic crisis some NPM-style public service 
provision, such as externalization of service, does not achieve better performance 
in terms of the service cost due to high service monitoring costs and a lack of 
competition (Zafra-Gomez et al.2013: 64). However more generally, crises are 
marked by pervasive uncertainty and risk, and this implies that the impact of crises 
depends not only on their objective features but also on how they are perceived by 
policy-makers, politicians, and the public (Di Mascio et al., 2013 :18). Economic or 
financial crises can be opportunities for change or a threat to the existing 
institutional order but it involves a cost as well. Consequently the uncertain and 
risky characteristics a financial crisis creates will increase the cost of transactions; 
therefore, the effect of a financial or fiscal crisis on organizational performance 
may be negative. In this way, the Individual Model tests each effect of NFC and 
LFC on the performance of local government and it provides a foundation for later 
analysis of interaction effects. 
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2.3. The combined model  
The second model is to examine interacting effects between central controls and 
crises in the Individual Model. What impact did central control variables have on 
local performance while interacting with crises effect? Since the effect of financial 
crises on public administration has been mainly reflected via a stricter control of 
budgets and deficits (Di Mascio et al., 2013), we expect that local government 
performance may be influenced by the effect of both central controls and crises 
at the same time. Hence, the second models have the combined explanatory 
variables, controls and financial crises, and that the effect of the two explanatory 
variables (controls and crises) cannot be separated. In other words we assume 
that there is interaction between controls and crises. At the national level, the 
financial crises will cause a reduction in the size of financial transfers to local 
governments as well as stricter spending controls exercised by central 
government. In this situation, we did not expect that local governments achieve 
better performance in chapter 6. Local governments are exposed to the 
inefficiency in allotting resources and the reduced discretion in making decisions. 
By confronting the lack of information during crises to make decisions and 
stronger central controls, local governments need to pay much more cost in 
decision making and services provision.  
At a much narrower focus, the local government’s fiscal crises will directly 
reduce the available finance and even lead to reduce the coverage of current 
public service. The fiscal autonomy of local government may be further 
constrained by the intervention of upper governments for the fiscal normalization. 
The member of fiscally distressed local government will behave as a defender 
rather a prospector, which was revealed to have a negative relation with 
improved performance (Walker and Brewer, 2009). In consequence, that 
inefficient administrative process tends to produce higher costs or lower qualities 
of providing public services during local fiscal crises.  
At this point, it is necessary to take into account how the performance of 
local government varies with measures of crises in order to describe the full 
effect of central controls. Therefore in the second model during the crisis how 
central controls impacted performance of local government, crisis played the role 
of mediating variable. The assumed models in the short and long term are  
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performance𝑖,𝑡+1 = β5f(controls ∗ crises)𝑖,𝑡 + other factors + random shock 
  performance𝑖,𝑡+2 = β6f(controls ∗ crises)𝑖,𝑡 + other factors + random shock 
 
The Combined Model tests the interacting effect of each mode of controls 
with each type of crises on local government performance. Here the unspecified 
modes of controls are Normative, Remunerative and Coercive controls and the 
impacts of crises will be inspected by differentiation between NFC and LFC. Then 
the following hypotheses will be examined. During NFC, how each type of central 
controls is likely to influence performance of local government (H5, H6, and H7); 
during LFC, how each type of central controls is likely to influence performance of 
local government (H8, H9). Importantly in measuring the effect of different types 
of central controls on the performance of local government, the influence of 
crises as well as central controls, on performance can be differentiated in this 
interacting model.   
2.4. Fixed effect panel data method 
This case study employs the fixed effect panel data method in order to make 
valid inferences about the underlying relationships between central controls and 
local performance. A panel data set follows the same individuals over time, which 
is different from a set of pooled cross sections obtained by sampling randomly 
from a large population at different time points (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). 
Panel data can always see individual dimensions as well as the time dimension 
and thus is more systematic to trace individual information. Our panel data are 
observed in the period of 1998 to 2010 for sixteen individual regional 
governments of Korea (see Table 2-2 of chapter 2), so dependent variables and 
explanatory variables are indexed by both individual regional government and 
time.  
In panel data we can control a certain type of omitted variables called 
unobserved heterogeneity. Many variables that reflect an individual local 
government, such as per capita GRDP, demographic factors and financial 
condition, are directly observed and hence can be controlled for. In contrast, 
differences in compliance, motivation, capacity and so forth of local government, 
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which might influence local government performance, are either not observed or, 
at best, imperfectly observed. One approach for handling unobserved 
heterogeneity is to treat it as a fixed effect and to estimate it as a coefficient of 
individual specific 0/1 dummy variables (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005: 9). For 
example, in a cross-section regression, each unit regional government has a 
different intercept term and the same slope parameters. We differentiate the error 
between the persistent component(𝛼𝑖)  and the periodical component (𝑢𝑖𝑡) in 
the equation. Here  𝛼𝑖   means unobserved individual heterogeneity. 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =   𝛼𝑖 +   x 𝑖𝑡 𝛽 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 
where 𝑢 is uncorrelated with x and 𝛼 is correlated with x. We can recover 
the individual specific effects after estimation as: 
 ?̂?𝑖 =  𝑦𝑖 −  x 𝑖?̂? 
Here the individual specific effects are the leftover variation in the dependent 
variable ‘local performance’ that cannot be explained as the explanatory variable 
‘central controls’. The availability of multiple observations per individual unit in the 
form of panel data makes it possible to eliminate the fixed effect of unobserved 
individual heterogeneity by differencing, permitting consistent estimation of 𝛽 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005: 10). What fixed effect requires for consistency is 
that the explanatory variables of central controls be uncorrelated with deviation of 
 𝑢𝑖𝑡 from the average over the time period (Wooldridge, 2002: 278). So a central 
control variable can be systematically related to the persistent component ( 𝛼𝑖) in 
the error. It is for this reason that fixed effect is often superior to pooled OLS or 
random effects for applications where the explanatory variable ‘central control’ is 
determined by local government attributes that also affect 𝑦𝑖𝑡  (Wooldridge, 2002: 
279).   
Another alternative approach to modelling unobserved heterogeneity is 
through a random effects model. This model assumes unobserved heterogeneity 
effects are distributed independently of the explanatory variable. Its benefit is to 
enable the telling of more time-invariant independent variables. But the 
assumption of the random effect in which the explanatory variable and the error 
term, unobserved heterogeneity, has no correlation, is too strong considering our 
model. The unobserved differences are treated as random variables with a 
specified probability distribution which is unhelpful in non-experimental settings 
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(Allison, 2009: 2) and sometimes lead to inconsistent parameter estimates if in 
fact unobserved differences are correlated with the observed variables. For 
example, the explanatory variable ‘central control’ can be correlated with 
unobserved heterogeneity, motivation or compliance of local government. We 
measure ‘central control’ in dummy variables 0/1 whether each local government 
accepted central government’s control, thus ‘central control’ is likely to be 
affected by their unobserved heterogeneity, motivation, compliance, ability of 
local government. In this reason fixed effect is often superior for the current 
statistical model.  
The fixed effect estimator will always give consistent estimates but they may 
not be the most efficient, while the random effect estimation is sometimes 
inconsistent (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005: 699). The Hausman test is well known 
to check whether there is a significant difference between the fixed and random 
effects estimators (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005), although we cannot test this due 
to the need for instrument variables. Nevertheless, the fixed effect estimation 
may be the most appropriate method to correct unobserved heterogeneity which 
would induce bias if not removed. The current study is free from the drawbacks of 
the fixed effect estimator which means time-invariant variables are dropped from 
the model and their coefficients are not identified because of our interest on only 
the time-varying explanatory variable (Wooldridge, 2002: 266). The assumption 
of strict exogeneity between the explanatory variable and the error term in the 
random effect is too strong for the current model. Thus considering these benefits, 
all models are estimated using two-way fixed effects. By controlling for 
idiosyncratic shocks in each sampled year, as for instance the possible effect of 
the 2007 South Korea oil spill on Chungnam province, the two way effects model 
removes an unobserved source of bias (Boyne et al., 2009).    
3. Definition of variables and sources 
3.1. Dependent variables  
The dependent variable is the fiscal performance of local government. The 
availability of performance data of local government has a scholastic ramification 
because the previous literature mainly dealt with fiscal decentralization and 
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spending growth by using expenditure and other resource data which are not 
strictly measures of policy outcomes (Boyne et al., 2011: 643). This study uses 
two measures of fiscal performance of local governments. The first indicator is a 
one-year lagged fiscal performance score to examine the short-term effect of 
central controls. The second one is a two-year lagged fiscal performance score 
for the long-term effect of central controls. The scale of fiscal performance of 
local government (see Appendix 4) theoretically ranges from 0(worst) to 
100(best). The Durbin-Watson Statistics are used to test for the presence of 
serial correlation among the residuals16. The Arellano-Bond lagged dependent 
variable coefficient estimates are recommended for a control for unobserved 
heterogeneity while eliminating any bias that correction for unobserved 
heterogeneity might have caused on the lagged dependent variable (Arellano 
and Bond, 1991; cited in Boyne et al., 2011: 652). However, Arellano-Bond 
estimates are not necessary here because the current statistical model is not 
related with the dynamic panel data model which includes lagged dependent 
variables as explanatory variable.  
As noted in chapter 4, JPA was launched in 1999 when corporate 
assessment was expanded to cover regional government. The initial design of 
measures tends to affect how performance is judged (Clarkson et al., 2009: 404). 
JPA theoretically intends to improve the performance of local government in 
terms of helping local government implement policies and programmes more 
efficiently, and improve the delivery of quality services more effectively to local 
people and communities by checking and correcting problems and obstacles 
(Lee, D.O., 2009). We have seen that JPA was centrally designed and 
implemented as a strategic oversight tool, informed by common ideas of NPM. 
MOGAHA conducts JPA on the functions and powers delegated to local 
government; the implementation of policies and programmes funded by central 
government; and some important own local government tasks (Lee, D. O., 2009: 
215). JPA ensures integration of the government affairs by evaluating and 
feeding back those results to the local government and the public and thus it 
seeks to hold the local public administration accountable. The assessments are 
                                               
16 The value of the Durbin-Watson statistic ranges from 0 to 4. As a general rule of thumb, when 
residuals are uncorrelated the Durbin-Watson statistic is approximately 2. A value close to 0 
indicates strong positive correlation, while a value of 4 indicates strong negative correlation. 
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based on hundreds of performance indicators and the judgments of inspectors 
who examined the nine functions. Through the outcome of this massive 
measurement process the level of performance of each regional government is 
classified into one of three groups: ‘Ga’(best), ‘Na’(fair), ‘Da’(worst) in accordance 
to the nine service functions (see Table 4-8 of chapter 4). This assessment is 
concerned with the important services and programmes of the whole field of local 
government provision, national priorities can be stably achieved over the country 
and thus people can be served with improved qualities of services (Lee, D.O., 
2009: 206). 
The framework of JPA is annually decided in terms of a JPA primary plan 
which is made by the Committee for JPA and MOGAHA and approved by CGA. 
The evolution of JPA is presented in Table 7-11 which demonstrates the 
assessed sectors and the location of Finance of local government. Here the 
‘sector of assessment’ means the assessed service functions which were 
originally, in 1999, the three functions of innovation, regional economy, and 
information technology; but these were changed to nine functions from 2004, and 
‘Citizen Satisfaction’ is the assessment with which the professional agency 
surveys the satisfaction of residents with respect to major national policies 
provided by the local government. Despite the evolution of JPA framework, the 
fiscal performance was consistently included in JPA.  
In stage I, the fiscal performance of local government, denoted as ’Finance’ 
in Table 7-11, was assessed as part of Capacity from 1999 to 2001 (MOGAHA, 
2000b), among assessments of Activity & Achievement, and Capacity. In stage II, 
the fiscal performance assessment was included as one of the nine sectors of 
Activities and Achievement. The previous part of Capacity assessment was 
incorporated into the part of Activities & Achievement because it was hardly 
distinctive in evaluating methodology from assessment of Activities and 
Achievement and not clearly stipulated by the Evaluation Act (Park, H.Y., 2010). 
In addition, in order to reduce local government’s administrative burden, many 
individual evaluations of local authorities by central government disappeared or 
were merged into the JPA framework which consisted of nine assessments (Lee, 
D.O., 2009: 203).  
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Table 7-11. JPA development and sectoral focus by year  
 
Stage Year Sector of assessment 
(No. of  Sectors) 
CS*  Individual 
Assessment 
      
  Activity & Achievement  
 
Capacity   
I 1999 Innovation, Regional economy , 
Informational technology 
(3) 
 
Innovation, Regional economy , 
Informational technology,  
Health · welfare, Environment  
(5) 
Innovation, Regional economy , 
Informational technology,  
Health · welfare, Environment  
Security of residents (6) 
-Finance 
-Information 
-General  
 Public  
Services 
-  
- 
2000 
 
 
o 
- 
2001 o 
- 
     
II 2002 General Public Services,  
Finance, e-government,  
Security of residents,  
Welfare, Woman,  
Regional economy,  
Regional development,  
and Environment  
(9) 
o  
 
      - 
III 2003 General Public Service,  
Welfare, Women, Regional economy,  
and Environment (6) 
o Finance 
NA* 
2004 Internal Innovation, 
Service Innovation,  
Welfare, Women, Environment, 
Regional economy,  
Regional development,  
Culture and tourism,  
and Security 
(9) 
o Finance, NA  
e-government,  
ID*, Energy,  
Price , 
Agriculture, 
Tourism,  
Disaster Prevention 
2005 o 
2006 o 
2007 o 
2008 o 
IV 2009 General public service 
(including Finance), Welfare, 
Public health, Environment,  
Regional economy,  
Regional development , 
Culture and tourism,  
Security, National projects  
(9) 
o  
2010 o 
2011 o 
* CS: Citizen Satisfaction, NA: National Assets management, ID: Information Disclosure.  
  Source: MOGAHA 2000 to 2007; MOPAS, 2008 to2010; Park, H.Y.(2010) 
 
 
 
In stage III, ‘Finance’ assessment moved to the part of Individual 
Assessment of JPA. The number of Activity & Achievement sectors was reduced 
to soothe the resistance of the public officials union (Park, H.Y., 2010). The 
 192 
results of individual assessments that were separately undertaken until then by 
central government departments were integrated into JPA results in order to 
show their performance more comprehensively from the 2004 JPA. Consequently, 
fiscal performance was assessed in the form of Individual Assessments from 
2003 to 2008 JPA. In stage IV from the 2009 JPA, Local Finance Assessment 
has been included in the sector of Public Administration. 
Therefore, the consistency of fiscal performance data across these years 
depends on the extent that performance indicators change over the four 
changing phases of the JPA (Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008). In 1999, Local 
Finance was assessed through 22 performance indicators17 in terms of financial 
independence, stability, endeavour to secure income and debt management. 
These performance indicators in 2001 were reduced to thirteen indicators 
according to the criticism that previous indicators did not consider the 
disadvantages of local governments that have low fiscal capacity or a low self-
reliance ratio (Park, H.Y., 2010).   
In the 2002 JPA, the key performance indicators concerning Local Finance 
were sustained in terms of endeavour to secure income, saving costs, financial 
stability and debt management as the same as those18 of the 2001 JPA.  
From 2003 to 2008, the assessment of Finance of local government was 
included as one of the Individual assessments (see Table 7-11). The Finance 
assessment of local government made use of the result of Fiscal Diagnosis of 
Local Government in which MOGAHA and the Korea Research Institute for Local 
Administration (KRILA), an independent research institute, assessed and 
analysed local government finance in terms of securing income, reducing 
expenditure, debt management, long-term finance management, and 
                                               
17
 In detail they are: the fiscal capacity index; fiscal self-reliance ratio; balance of current 
account, income and expenditure ratio; programme budget ratio over the financial plan; self-
financed income ratio; curtailment ratio of current account; investment evaluation before budget 
compilation; implemented unqualified programmes; implemented qualified programme after 
investment evaluation; fulfilment of terms and conditions regarding bond floatation; debt-service 
ratio; tax collecting rate; collected overdue bills; gains on investments; and selling rate of public-
managed business. 
18
 They are: increased self-financed income rate, collected overdue tax rate, capital costs rate, 
curtailed operating cost rate, curtailed personnel cost rate, payment rate for matching fund 
projects, fund raising rate, evaluated investment rate before budget compilation, investment rate 
compiled to budget, debt service ratio, per capita obligated balance, current account balance, 
and available asset rate. 
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implementation of nationally prioritized policies (MOGHA, 2007). The indicators,19 
for the first time, included local government’ endeavour to measure sharing best 
practices and conformity to national policies other than fiscal conservation.  
Since 2009, Local Finance has been assessed in terms of savings budget, 
reinvestment, securing income, electronic payment rates of local tax and 
reduction of mistaken local taxation. During this period, performance indicators 
were intended to measure fiscal conservation, the extent of endeavours to 
increase local income, and implementation of national policies. From the 
evidence noted so far, we can witness that the consistency of fiscal performance 
indicators has been sustained to some extent over the sampled years.   
Although the law stipulates opening up the results of performance 
assessment for public scrutiny (Article 26 of the Assessment Act), in practice only 
the final grades for each of the nine service sectors are published (see Appendix 
2) with none of the detailed performance scores. In order to obtain the detailed 
score of performance this researcher directly contacted the departments 
MOGAHA and each regional government. The partial JPA data before 2007 came 
from KRILA which had been involved in designing and conducting JPA in its early 
stage. At last, the overall fiscal performance scores of local government from the 
fiscal year of 1999 to 2011 were tracked by the help of public servants and oral 
permission of the director of the Local Administrative Department of MOGAHA 
(see Appendix 3). Most notably, this disaggregate fiscal performance of local 
government from JPA is original unpublished. Since we used lagged performance 
data, for example using data from 1999 as a measure of 1998, this thesis has a 
complete data set covering 13 years from the fiscal year of 1998 to 2010 (see 
Appendix 4).  
In conclusion, the dependent variable employs the fiscal performance of 
                                               
19
 The detailed performance indicators are the stability of local income; collecting local tax; 
collecting overdue local tax; mistaken payment ratio of local tax; the stability of constant non-tax 
revenue; collecting overdue non-tax revenue; mistaken payment of non-tax revenue; saving 
operating cost; personnel cost; spending for events; transfers to the private sector; fulfilment of 
long term financial plans; capital costs reflected on the budget; debt management; the timeliness 
of financial information; the transparency of budget; the endeavour of setting up the programme 
budget and accrual accounting; and the citizen satisfaction about fiscal expenditure which 
investigates citizens’ preference over local festivals through surveys as they can feel the direct 
effect of the spent resources. 
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JPA. The fiscal performance indicators of the annual JPA have common 
characteristics to measure fiscal conservation and stability, capacity, and 
conformity with national policies, even though JPA experienced a few episodes of 
structural change during the given periods. Therefore the dependent variable is 
sufficiently robust to be used for the statistical analysis.   
 
3.2. Explanatory variables  
The first explanatory variable is central government’s controls on local fiscal 
institutions which are usually exerted through statutory regulations, policy 
guidelines, resources transfers, monitoring and audit. This study identified and 
measured central controls of local government, as analysed in chapter 6.  
More specifically chapter 6 differentiated types of control: normative, 
remunerative, and coercive control in order to distinguish the positive and 
negative aspects of each type of central control. This is based on a classification 
of policy instruments to make local government comply with central government, 
following Etzioni (1975) or Evert Vedung (2003). First, coercive controls are 
measures undertaken by central government to influence local government by 
means of formulated regulations. They are referred to as rule, orders, directives 
and statutory provisions of an obligatory nature, supported by threat of sanctions 
(Stone, 1982:10). Coercive controls in this study were gauged by central 
government’s directives to local governments to spend more and quicker, called 
Emergency Spending in Korea. The Korean central government devised and 
implemented extensive Emergency Spending to adjust the cyclical downturn 
caused by the global crisis and to stimulate the national economy from 2009 to 
2011. Emergency Spending as a policy instrument conceives authoritative 
relations, since all local governments have to use up their budget to the extent of 
more than 60% during the first half of the year. Despite its confliction with local 
spending policies, local government must follow the central government’s 
mandate in order not to be sanctioned in the central-local relations (see chapter 
5). Given the fact that at usual times the rate at which local government spends 
the budget reaches less than 30%, rather spending at a faster rate impeded due 
process of spending and reduced local fiscal autonomy. It also could hamper 
economic recovery in the second half of the year due to lack of available budget. 
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Therefore, the Emergency Spending policy has been criticized as a non-
expedient measure (NABO, 2012). The coercive control of Emergency Spending 
was dealt with using dummy variables. If the year is from 2009 to 2011 in which 
Emergency Spending was implemented, this research identifies there are 
Coercive controls in all regional governments. As chapter 6 noticed, coercive 
controls may have a complicated influence on local government thus we will 
examine the two cases of the sub-group where prior performance is in the lower 
quarter as well as the entire group of local government.   
Second, remunerative controls involve either the giving out or the taking 
away of resources. Remunerative control in this study focuses on expanding 
material resources through local shared tax (see chapter 5). In general, economic 
instruments such as subsidies make it cheaper or more expensive in terms of 
money, time, effort and other resources to pursue certain actions (Vedung, 2003: 
32). The increase of local shared tax makes local governments quantitatively 
expand or qualitatively improve public services at their discretion because it is 
distributed for the general purpose and does not have strings attached to 
spending. It thus can show a spending responsibility of local government and a 
definite effect of remunerative control on the performance of local government. 
During the periods this study deals with, from 1998 to 2010, there were three 
instances when the rate of local shared tax was formally raised, and no instances 
of reductions. Considering the times when there was an actual noteworthy 
increase in shared tax inflow into local government, after calculating internal 
revenues from the previous year in the lagged year, there were seven periods of 
increases in local shared tax rates in 2000-1, 2005, 2007-8, 2010 and 201220 
(MOPAS, 2011a). Therefore, the remunerative controls are considered to occur in 
these years in all regional governments. 
Third, normative control, referred to as moral persuasion or exhortation, 
covers attempts at influencing local government through the transfer of 
knowledge and the communication of reasoned argument and advice (Vedung, 
2003: 32). The transfer of information is offered to influence local government to 
do what the central government regards as desirable. It covers not only objective 
and correct knowledge; but also judgments about which phenomena and 
                                               
20 The fiscal year runs from 1
 
January to 31 December in the Korean government 
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measures are good or bad; and information implies recommendations about how 
local government should act and behave. In this sense, this study pays attention 
to the NPM inspired reform where central government exercised normative 
controls to share the norms of performance and accountability that NPM 
emphasize. Notably the process of introducing Programme Budgeting and 
Accrual Accounting to local governments entailed a revolutionary information 
transfer to the local level from various methods of information sessions, open 
hearings, workshops and educational training by the centre (MOGAHA, 2006). 
Local governments had a choice as to whether they took up the normative 
controls. Some were involved in the experiments of programme budgeting and 
accrual accounting early on, others later. Normative controls through them 
incurred a change of information and procedure rather than a change in financial 
allocations. It is difficult to differentiate the strength or frequency of central 
controls as they affect different local governments because usually central 
government exercises power equally over each local government in the unitary 
central-local relations. This analysis posits the normative controls when local 
government was involved in the experiment of the new financial framework from 
1999 till 2007 or the formal implementation of the new financial framework after 
2008, by examining reports by central government (MOGAHA 2006; MOGAHA 
2007a).  
The second set of explanatory variables arises from fiscal and economic 
crises, which are timely and useful to reflect contemporary situations. Importantly, 
the problematic fiscal condition such as the economic crisis beginning in 2008 
may also influence the effect of central controls on the performance of local 
governments. Chapter 6 defined the national financial crises as when Korea 
experienced negative GDP growth rates. However, this standard produces just 
one year of national financial crisis (-6.9% of 1998), even though the 2008 and 
2009 global crises threw the Korean economy into disarray (see Il SaKong and 
Youngsun Koh, 2010: 70-75). Therefore, in order to cover the recent financial 
crisis, the current research needs to add another standard: if there are minus 
economic growth rates in one of the quarters over the year, we consider that year 
as a national financial crisis. In detail, the Korean economy recorded minus 
growth from the fourth quarter of 2008 to the second quarter of 2009: -1.6% in 
the fourth quarter of 2008 and -1.9% and -1.1% in the first and second quarters 
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of 2009 (BOK 2013, Il SaKong and Youngsun Koh, 2010: 70). Therefore this 
study identifies a national financial crisis in 1998, 2008 and 2009. This definition 
does not sound very far-fetched because Korea has had positive economic 
growths except four periods of negative growth rates of GDP: -1.3% in 1956, -1.5% 
in 1980 due to the second oil crisis,-6.9% in 1998 due to the Asian Economic 
Crisis, and recently 0.3 % in 2008-9 due to the global economic crisis (see Il 
SaKong and Youngsun Koh, 2010: 70-75). 
As for the definition of local government’s fiscal crisis, Articles 55 to 56 of 
the Law of Local Government Finance and its enforcement ordinance stipulate 
fiscal diagnosis and designation of local government which has the possibility of 
or experiences of fiscal crisis. There are several standards to decide when a 
fiscal condition is a crisis or not, as specified in Article 65-2 of the enforcement 
ordinance of the same law. The standards include: first, when consolidated 
budget deficit ratio exceeds 30% of income; second, when the amount of debt 
burden exceeds more than 40% of the total amount of aggregate budget; and 
third, when quarterly cumulated local tax is a negative value. This study employs 
the second standard to decide fiscal crisis of local government considering the 
possibility of data collection. We found 24 cases out of 223 observations fitted the 
definition of local fiscal crises. In particular there has been no case of local fiscal 
crisis since 2008 (see Table 3-5) thus the coercive controls, which occurred in 
2008-9, interacting with local fiscal crises was excluded in the analysis.  
In short, this research observes that National economic crises are the years 
of 1998, 2008 and 2009 in which the Korean economy marked minus output 
growth during the year following the previous studies. Local fiscal crises are 
recognized when local government’s debt accounts for more than 40% of its total 
budget according to the law.  
 
3.3. Control variables 
Finally, this research includes a number of controls for factors likely to be an 
important influence on the fiscal performance of local government. Empirical 
research to explain public service performance variance in the local public sector 
pays considerable attention to the impact of political factors (Boyne et al., 2011; 
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193). Local public bureaucracies might be expected to be under more direct 
control by politicians, with citizens more justifiably holding politicians to account 
for their performance (James and John, 2007: 570). From different parties, 
politicians have distinctive views about the role of government and the value of 
public service performance (Boyne et al., 2011: 646). It could be argued that local 
governments should be more strongly affected by the policies of central 
governments that are controlled by the same political party. The Korean local 
government system is the strong mayor and weak council system, so in practice 
the mayor holds the main power rather than the local councillors. When the 
governor’s or mayor’s party is a ruling party at the national level, it can be 
expected that there is a greater positive capacity in local government to 
implement policies and provide services than when it is not, for example, through 
more efficient political negotiation and resource mobilization. A preliminary test 
also checked the cases when majorities of local councillors were held by the 
same party as the ruling party and when the party of the mayor was the same as 
the party of the majority of local councillors, and failed to find any interesting 
influence of the party from those cases. This preliminary test was conducted by 
the regression analysis where explanatory variables used dummy variables 
whether or not the party distribution of local government was included in the 
cases, and dependent variables used the fiscal performance scores. The 
insignificant results implicate that the effect of the council members’ party within 
and out of local government were not substantial enough to affect the policy 
implementation of the executive. This can be also explained by the constrained 
role of the council and the authoritatively centralized political culture in Korea. 
Therefore this study controls for only the case where the party of elected mayors 
and governors is a national ruling party by using a set of dummy variables. The 
detailed historic records about the parties at the national and local levels are 
examined through the resource centre of the National Election Commission 
(NEC).  
Recent research suggests that local government performance is influenced 
by external circumstances (Andrews et al., 2005), which are beyond local 
government’s control. Several studies about local government performance have 
incorporated per capita income for the local economic conditions (Boyne et al., 
2011: 652; De Borger and Kerstens, 1996). It is found that low resources 
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available to local government are associated with worse performance, on the 
other hand high resources are associated with better performance in a study of 
English local governments from 2000 to 2002 (Andrews, 2004; Andrews et al., 
2005) In this research, per capita GRDP (Gross Regional Domestic Product) is 
employed to control the economic effect on fiscal performance of local 
government.  The recent data of per capita GRDP came from the online sources 
of the Korean Statistical Information Service and the data before 2004 came from 
the published document of Statistics Korea (KNSO, 2005).  
As an internal environmental factor, tenure of governor or mayor is 
considered to affect the performance of local government. Tenure means the 
governor’s or mayor’s terms of office. The previous study showed that strategic 
management influenced performance of public service (Andrews et al., 2012). 
This variable is a proxy for the management of the chief executive of local 
government, which is difficult to specifically measure across the entire sample. 
This study assumes that the longer an executive chief of local government holds 
the office, the greater and better the knowledge and experience he/she could 
have to adopt a more appropriate managerial strategy. An English case study 
found out that re-election was affected not by positive performance but negative 
performance (see Boyne et al., 2009) and thus tenure in this study can give us 
roughly the relation between re-election and performance. Tenure was calculated 
monthly by using the data from NEC. 
In addition, this case study included both dummies of individual local 
government and time, and thus they control for a fixed effect between individual 
local government and random shocks such as a natural disaster in a certain year 
which might have forced local government to look more carefully into disaster 
response, potentially influencing performance across the regions (Boyne et al., 
2011).  
As theory suggests that organizations operate within the constraints of 
structure and over the longer haul create new constraints to sustain them 
(O’Toole 1999: 520), the past performance of an organization might act as a 
constraint and affect the possibility for performance in the future. This is simply 
stated as ‘organizations are an autoregressive system’ by a previous study 
(Boyne et al., 2011: 651). However, in order to rule out an autoregressive 
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specification, we will not control for past performance. When it includes a lagged 
dependent variable as control variable, the current model changes to the 
dynamic panel model in which both random effect and fixed effect estimators will 
be biased (Josef Bruderl, 2005), because the strict exogeneity assumption never 
holds in unobserved models with lagged dependent variables (Wooldridge, 2002: 
256). This potential problem can be checked with the Arellano-Bond estimates 
but the current method of this study cannot test this due to the methodological 
limitation. So alternatively past performance is excluded from the model.  
4. Conclusion 
The argument of this thesis, expressed as a research question, is whether or not 
local government performance has benefited from the change of central controls 
after the resurrection of local autonomy. There was a policy trend of increasing 
local democracy after implementing local autonomy after the mid-1990s, but this 
trend was not continued due to the financial crises. To statistically answer the 
research question, and prove the argument about the benefits of decentralisation, 
this chapter explored the fixed effect panel data model as an appropriate 
methodology. The fixed effect estimator will always give consistent estimates and 
the current statistical model is free from the drawbacks of the fixed effect model 
without any time-invariant explanatory variables. The assumptions of a random 
effect model are too strict for the current study because central controls may 
correlate with the unobserved heterogeneity such as capacity or compliance of 
local government. Therefore the fixed effect estimation can be seen as the most 
appropriate method, even though we cannot check Hausman tests which are well 
known to suggest whether there is a significant difference between the fixed and 
random effects estimators (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). 
Assessing the effect of central controls on local government using 
performance data is a major advance of this study. Here the dependent variable 
is local government performance. The performance data provided by JPA gives 
the results of the Korean central government assessments of local government 
performance from fiscal years 1998 to 2010. For independent variables, the 
modes of controls exercised by central government are normative, remunerative 
and coercive controls which were measured by the different financial institutions 
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of local government. This thesis is also concerned with the relationship between 
control and performance in the environmental context of crisis. In particular, 
financial fiscal crises at the national level and fiscal crises at the local level are 
considered as moderating variables. Finally, a number of controls have been 
created for factors which may affect performance of local government. They are 
political party, tenure of the chief executive of local government and per capita 
GRDP. Of elected mayors and governors, not local councils, the party and the 
tenure are researched, considering the external environment of the strong 
mayors and weak council system of local government. However the control for 
the past performance of local government is excluded in order to rule out the 
possibility of an autoregressive specification and to obtain more accurate results 
from fixed effect estimates without bias. So far this chapter has indicated the 
conceptual and statistical components in order to establish a robust quantitative 
research model. This study is moving forward the empirical application of the 
hypotheses of chapter 6 as extended case studies from a general discussion of 
change in central-local government relations in chapters 1 to 5. The next chapter 
will look into the empirical results of a series of hypotheses, obtain meaningful 
findings and explore the patterns of evidence regarding the relations between 
central controls, financial crises and local performance. Then in the concluding 
chapter we revisit the on-going arguments and synthesize the theoretical findings 
with empirical findings, in order to reach a meaningful conclusion about the 
evolving central-local relations in Korea.  
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Chapter 8. Empirical results and the pattern of 
findings 
1. Introduction 
Chapter 7 established the statistical research models, one is to test the individual 
effect of controls and crises and the other is for the interacting effect of each 
mode of controls with fiscal crises. In order to ensure statistical validity, chapter 7 
defined the variables and explained the data collection to undertake quantitative 
analyses of the relations of controls, crises and performance with sufficient 
theoretical and practical possibilities. After conducting the statistical simulation, 
this chapter enumerates empirical results of testing a series of hypotheses. The 
obtained results make us explore the individual effect of central controls and their 
interacting effects with fiscal crises. This leads to the final patterns of evidence 
regarding how change in central controls has been empirically related to 
improved local government performance. To do this, at first through descriptive 
analyses, we find the distinctive and specific features of the data to judge the 
appropriateness for the following regression analyses and understand the nature 
of the data. Next, as a preliminary analysis, correlation between variables will be 
investigated to review whether or not the explanatory variables are too collinear 
to do the regression analysis and establish the causation. Then, as the main 
component of this chapter, the regression analyses explore the statistical 
possibilities about the hypotheses of the individual and combined models, and 
according to the empirical results we will expand findings by considering previous 
studies and theories.  
1.1. Data description 
In Table 8-12, the overall descriptive statistics about the entire variables are 
displayed. The fiscal performance of local government of a lagged year, denoted 
as Short-term Performance, reveals a nearly normal distribution because its 
mean and median are very close, 81.42 and 81.68 respectively; there are no 
outliers in that the minimum 58.33 and maximum 96.46 lie within the 
three standard deviations of the mean in a normal distribution. In the same way, 
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Long-term Performance is a normal distribution and has no outliers.  
    The number of observations (N*T=16*15) is usually 240, as we investigate 
16 regional governments for 13 years from 1998 to 2010 ; however observations 
of the dependent variables are less than 240 due to one missing data set and the 
method of measuring dependent variables: Short-term Performance is measured 
with one-year lagged data and the measure of Daegue Metropolitan city of the 
year 1999 is missing and thus has 223 observations (N*(T-1)-1); on the other 
hand, Long-term Performance is 207 coming from the t+2 performance (N*(T-2)-
1). The Long-term Performance of 2010 is the score of the fiscal performance of 
2012, and the two years from 2011 to 2012 do not have their Long-term 
Performance measured and are excluded from the number of observations.  
    Explanatory variables are gauged by a dummy term if there is central 
government’s control through the NPM-style fiscal institutional changes or 
traditional intervention in fiscal autonomy, and if there is a national economic 
crisis or local fiscal crises of any local government in any of the given years (see 
chapter 7). 
    Among the control variables, the descriptive statistics of Ruling 
party_Governor show between 0 and 1 because it is measured by dummy 
variables when the governor’s (or mayor’s) party is a ruling party at the national 
level. Per capita GRDP and Tenure variables use natural logarithms to make the 
calculation less complicated.  
Tenure, meaning the governor’s or mayor’s terms of office measured from 
January 1998 to December 2012, shows a large variation by local governments. 
It is the highest in Gangwon Province because electorates consecutively chose 
the same governor from the second election in 1998 to the fourth election in 2006. 
On the other hand, the mayor tenure of Seoul Special Metropolitan City in 2010 is 
the lowest as mayor Oh Sehoon resigned only two months after inauguration due 
to the policy conflict about the free school meals with the local council, and a new 
mayor was elected through a by-election in 2011(NEC 2013). While the nature of 
explanatory variables is nominal, dependent variables and control variables use 
measurable variables. After data description, we need to know the association 
between the variables, particularly between explanatory variables to establish a 
robust regression model. 
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Table 8-12. Descriptive Analysis 
 
 
  
N Mean Median  St.Dev Min Max 
Dependent variables 
Short-term Perform 223 81.42 81.68 8.11 58.33 96.46 
Long-term Performance 207 81.85 82.3 8.29 58.33 96.46 
Explanatory variables 
      
Normative control 240 .52 1 .50 0 1 
Coercive control 240 .27 0 .44 0 1 
Remunerative control 240 .47 0 .50 0 1 
National Financial Crises(NFC) 240 .20 0 .40 0 1 
Local Fiscal Crises(LFC) 240 .10 0 .30 0 1 
Normative control X NFC 240 .13 0 .34 0 1 
Coercive control X NFC 240 .07 0 .25 0 1 
Remunerative control X NFC 240 .07 0 .25 0 1 
Normative control X LFC 240 .01 0 .11 0 1 
Remunerative control X LFC 240 .05 0 .23 0 1 
Control variables        
Ruling Party, Governor 240 .41 0 .49 0 1 
Percapita GRDP 240 16.62 16.59 0.44 15.59 17.96 
Tenure 240 40.14 30.00 27.57 2 138 
 
     
1.2. Correlation analysis 
Bivariate correlations are used for a large number of variables to preliminarily test 
the correlations among those variables of interest. The important purpose of 
correlation analysis is to check multicollinearity between independent variables. 
Appendix 5 reports Pearson correlations analysis. Multicollinearity is a potential 
problem for the regression analysis. Multicollinearity has been assumed in 
political science if the correlation coefficients exceeds 0.7(see Mainwaring and 
Zoco, 2007) between explanatory variables, though in other natural sciences it is 
assumed if the coefficient exceeds 0.4 (Kries et al., 2002).  As Appendix 5 
shows, there are some correlation coefficients that gain doubtful attention but 
most of them can be logically explained by interacting terms’ attributes. 
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Specifically the correlation coefficients between NFC and Normative controls 
interacting with NFC are rather high (0.78**), which can be explained by a 
constituent part of the interaction terms. In other words, these two variables have 
a shared factor of NFC. There exists the similar reason why there is high 
correlation (.71**) between LFC and Remunerative controls interacting with LFC, 
that is, they also share the term of LFC. Nevertheless, the correlations among 
independent variables do not indicate a major problem in proceeding with 
regression analysis.   
2. Regression analysis 
2.1. The strength of fixed effect models  
Regression models are used for most notably casual inference by studying the 
relationship between dependent variable y and a set of independent variables x 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005: 66). Specifically, this case study uses the panel 
data fixed effect model as we noted in chapter 7. The attraction of panel data is 
the possibility of consistent estimation of the fixed effects model, which allows for 
unobserved individual heterogeneity that may be correlated with observed 
variables (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005: 697). Fixed effect models make it possible 
to control unobserved effects of individual local governments which are assumed 
to correlate with the explanatory variables of central controls as time-invariant 
variables when we examine the effects of central control on local government 
performance. Another benefit of the fixed effects model is allowing us to use 
panel data to establish causation under weaker assumptions than those needed 
to establish causation with cross-section data or with panel data without fixed 
effects (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005: 715). Chapter 7 assumed that unobserved 
variables such as motivation or ability of local government are correlated with the 
observed variables of central controls because existence of central controls in a 
certain local government is affected by the unobserved characteristics of local 
government. Nevertheless, there are also practical drawbacks of the fixed effects 
approach. First, estimation of the coefficient of any time-invariant variables, such 
as attributes of metropolitan-cities or provinces is not possible as it is absorbed 
into the individual-specific effect (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005: 715). The variables 
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we examine in this thesis are all time-variant. Second, fixed effects estimates 
may have substantially larger standard errors than random effects estimates 
because the fixed effects estimates use only within-individual differences, 
essentially discarding any information about differences between individuals 
(Allison, 2009: 3). This point is to get rid of contaminated variations and use only 
the variations that produce approximately unbiased estimates of the parameters. 
If most of the variation in a predictor varies across individuals, but has little 
variation over time for each individual, then fixed effects estimates will be very 
imprecise (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005: 715). However, our panel data are not 
included in this case, since the variation of observed variables occurred across 
individuals as well as over time for each individual. 
    Chapter 7 provided two sets of models to examine the relations between 
central controls, crises and local government performance. The Individual Model 
examines the individual effect of an explanatory variable on dependent variables. 
How each control type has an influence on the performance of local government 
and how each type of crises, NFC and LFC, on performance are tested here (see 
chapter 7). The Normative Control is measured through the variation of sharing 
NPM ideas among Korean local governments through introducing programme 
budget and accrual accounting in a top-down manner. Remunerative Control is 
perceived to exist in the statistical model when the influx of local shared taxes 
increases. These are levied and collected by the central government and 
automatically transferred to the local government according to the rate set in the 
law, and affected the fiscal policies of local government. Lastly Coercive Control 
is measured by the direct spending intervention so called Emergency Spending 
which has been implemented by central governments since 2009 as a 
‘Keynesian countercyclical fiscal policy prescription’.  
    The Combined Model draws on the idea suggesting that crises have 
dynamic potential to affect the preference of government policies and sometimes 
may incur institutional changes, and thus, investigates how central control affects, 
by interacting with crises’ effects, local government (see chapter 7). Crises can 
cause changes in an established system, the cost of exchange and production 
(North 1990) and, by doing that, they can affect the performance of local 
government. The Combined Model establishes two sets of interaction models, 
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one for interaction with NFC and the other for LFC to reflect the various facets 
between different crises on the performance of local governments.  
2.2. The Individual Model for central controls 
The results obtained for the control types and local performances in the Individual 
Model are presented in Table 8-13 to Table 8-16. The question posed in this 
study is whether the central controls influenced local government performance 
and how the different control types influenced local government performance. 
Individual Model focuses on the individual effect of controls and crises on local 
performance. According to Tables 8-13 to 8-16, adjusted R2 is from .587 to .605 
indicating this model has the explaining power of nearly 60%. The F test shows 
that a null hypothesis of “The model explains nothing” is rejected in each case 
(p<.0001). The value of Durbin-Waston is at around 1.9, approximately equal to 2, 
indicating no serial correlation. The number of samples is 223 in the short term 
and 207 in the long term because one lagged year performance (t+1) and a two-
year period lag (t+2) are used in measuring dependent variables and the missing 
data results in eliminating one observation from the number of samples of the 
dependent variable. In this model, whilst the Coercive Control and Remunerative 
Control variables explain the variation of Performance of Local government 
variations, the Normative Control variable does not have a significant relation 
with Performance of Local Government.  
 
Table 8-13. Influence of Normative Controls on Local Government Performance 
Model1 : Individual Effect  
 Short term Performance Long term Performance 
Normative Control .592 -.640 
Ruling Party, Governor 1.682* 1.636 
per capita GRDP 18.691*** 20.414** 
Tenure .028* -.010 
Constant  -230.521** -243.314* 
N 223 207 
Adjusted R
2
 .603 .587 
Durbin-Watson 1.927 1.845 
F test p<.0001 p<.0001 
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    The positive expectation of H1 in which Normative Controls would improve 
local government performance has no statistical significance in the analysis as 
reported in Table 8-13.  
    H2 that the Remunerative Controls are positively associated with 
Performance of Local government was not statistically supported in Individual 
Model (see Table 8-14). Instead the Remunerative Controls proved to be 
negatively related with performance, which is statistically significant in the short 
and long term. Theoretical and empirical studies in public economics view 
intergovernmental transfer and own-source local revenue through different lenses 
(Rodden, 2002). Intergovernmental transfers create the appearance that local 
public spending is funded by a common pool of resources. Therefore, frequently 
recipient governments have ex ante endeavour to secure more transfers but are 
likely to neglect ex post responsibility. Fiscal capacity equalization through 
intergovernmental transfer has been criticized regarding efficiency because 
equalization grants induce strategic behaviour by local government, or gaming 
against the distribution formula. (Swan and Gravy, 1991; Martinez-Vazquez et al., 
2007). Further intergovernmental transfers incur transfer dependency making 
local government reluctant to pursue economic development objectives 
(Martinez-Vazquez. et al., 2007), and growing transfer dependency is known to 
be connected with the growing total deficits of local government (Rodden, 2002).  
     
Table 8-14. Influence of Remunerative Control on Local Performance 
 
Individual Effect  
 Short term Performance Long term Performance 
Remunerative Control -12.922** -18.464*** 
Ruling Party, Governor 1.697* 1.614* 
per capita GRDP 18.810*** 20.327** 
Tenure .029* -.010 
Constant -232.438** -241.897* 
N 223 207 
Adjusted R
2 
.605 .589 
Durbin-Watson 1.927 1.846 
F test p<.0001 p<.0001 
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Our empirical result proved that Remunerative Controls gauged by Shared tax 
has a negative relation with Fiscal Performance of local government. This 
evidence may be connected with the efficiency of financial resources. For 
example, according to the study investigating the effect of different funding of US 
public libraries, government-run libraries are more inefficient than private not-for-
profits, and greater reliance on local taxation is linked to less inefficiency 
(Vitaliano, 1997: 640). Therefore we can infer that intergovernmental transfer has 
a link with lower fiscal performance than own source revenue. This also implies 
that remunerative controls should be exercised toward expanding own-source 
local revenue rather than intergovernmental transfer. 
    The Coercive Control has rather complicated effects according to the prior 
studies and the practical cases of CPA in the UK (see chapter 6) so two 
hypotheses are examined: it is negatively related to local government 
performance (H3-1) and it may raise performance of local government where 
past performance is very bad (H3-2). As for H3-1, the Coercive Control 
demonstrates a significant, negative coefficient for both terms of Performance of 
Local Government (see Table 8-15). In the long term the negative effect of the 
Coercive Control on Performance is much stronger with a high significance (<.01). 
This suggests that strict spending controls by the centre are associated with 
lower fiscal performance of local government and this negative effect deteriorates 
in the long term. This finding contrasts with earlier studies (Poterba and von 
Hagen, 1999: 30; Borge, L.E. et al., 2008) where strict budgetary rules can be 
understood as a means of imposing a hard budget constraint that reduces the 
influence of service producing agencies and, thereby, contributes to higher 
efficiency. There is a possible reason why our result is not consistent with earlier 
findings. In general stricter budget control means that the central government 
puts more spending process constraints on local government. Unlike this 
convention, Korean central government reduced multiple institutional and 
procedural constraints, to encourage localities to spend more and quicker for the 
purpose of expanding government expenditures within a relatively short period of 
time (MOPAS, 2009). The Emergency Spending expedited local government 
spending. But its obligatory nature obstructed local democracy. Thus, in this study, 
Coercive Control negatively influenced Performance of Local government was 
supported.  
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Table 8-15. Influence of Coercive Controls on Local Government Performance 
Individual Effect  
 Short term Performance Long term Performance 
Coercive Control -18.117*** -28.530*** 
Ruling Party, Governor 1.697* 1.614* 
per capita GRDP 18.810*** 20.327** 
Tenure .029* -.010 
Constant -232.438** -241.897* 
N 223 207 
Adjusted R
2 
.605 .589 
Durbin-Watson 1.927 1.846 
F test p<.0001 p<.0001 
 
As for the group where local government performance is located in the 
bottom quarter (see Table 8-16), coercive controls is revealed to have no positive 
effect on raising performance but rather leads to serious deterioration in the 
performance. This result is different from the case of English local government 
where central controls are prescriptive instructions for each local government 
(Andrews et al., 2005). Coercive controls imposed by the Korean central 
government aimed at increasing local government expenditure not for disciplining 
individual local government. Thus the Korean local governments where the poor 
past performance occurred are much more susceptible to this coercive spending 
controls due to managerial limitation of poor performers. 
 
Table 8-16. Coercive Controls on Local governments with lowest performance 
Individual Effect  
 Short term Performance Long term Performance 
Coercive Control_ lowest performance groups -53.750*** -3.341 
Ruling Party, Governor -.522 -5.851 
per capita GRDP 58.567*** 5.528 
Tenure .096** -.223*** 
Constant -874.498*** -.475 
N 66 48 
Adjusted R
2 
.599 .623 
Durbin-Watson 2.110 1.859 
F test p<.0001 p<.0001 
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2.3. The Individual Model for fiscal crises 
The impacts of NFC and LFC on performance are also tested in Individual Model 
(see chapter 7 section 2.2.). Surprisingly NFC has a statistically significant 
positive influence on the Long-term of performances (see Table 8-17). But the 
effects of LFC on the Short-term and Long-term Performance are not significant 
(see Table 8-18). 
 
 
 
Stability at a non-crisis time in no way guarantees that the institutions relied 
upon are efficient (North 1990: 84). Many commentators (Krugman, 2008; 
Kindleberger and Robert, 2005) insist that crises have a negative relation with 
improving performance (i.e., economic growth or efficiency), by destabilizing the 
legitimacy of existing policies, goals and institutions as well as threatening the 
security obtained by relevant actors and stakeholders. In crises each level finds it 
is more costly to achieve the goals of local government at the same time. 
Conversely, the response to crises sometimes produces effective emergency 
measures. The norm driven by crises emphasizes responsibility and inspires an 
intangible power to concentrate all effort to ameliorate the emergent situation. 
The evidence supports the finding that confidence in the government to manage 
the crisis was stronger in Korea compared to other crisis countries (Kalinowski, 
2008) and the economic crises per se are positively related with the performance 
Table 8-17. lnfluence of NFC on Local Government Performance   
Individual Effect 
 Short term Performance Long term Performance 
National Financial Crises  3.727 26.804*** 
Ruling Party, Governor 1.697* 1.614* 
per capita GRDP 18.810*** 20.327** 
Tenure .029* -.010 
Constant -236.166** -268.701** 
N 223 207 
Adjusted R
2 
.605 .589 
Durbin-Watson 1.927 1.846 
F test p<.0001 p<.0001 
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of local government. The positive effect of crises seems to not be an accidental 
coincidence but a historic and cultural phenomenon which puts the country 
before individuals.  
 
Table 8-18. Influence of LFC on Local Government Performance  
Individual Effect  
 Short term Performance Long term Performance 
Local Fiscal Crises .956 .797 
Ruling Party, Governor 1.722* 1.622 
per capita GRDP 18.220*** 19.750** 
Tenure .029* -.010 
Constant -222.956** -232.606* 
N 223 207 
Adjusted R
2 
.604 .587 
Durbin-Watson 1.931 1.853 
F test p<.0001 p<.0001 
 
 
The factors identified as positively influencing the performance of local 
government are control variables, per capita GRDP, and Tenure (see Table 8-13 
to 8-18). The most common factor is per capita GRDP whose magnitude of the 
coefficient is significant in both terms. This means that fiscal performance scores 
of JPA are significantly influenced by the economic prosperity of the local 
population, like the English local government performance measure (Andrews et 
al., 2005). The effect of political party is revealed to be meaningful to local 
government. Local governments where an executive governor comes from the 
ruling party show better performance than local governments with a governor of 
the opposition party or with no party. However, the party of the governor does not 
matter in the group where local government performance is located in the bottom 
quarter (see Table 8-16). This implicates that badly performing localities may 
have complications such as the management strategy or leadership of the 
governor. Tenure is significant for Short-term Performance. It means that the 
longer the governor or mayor holds office, the better performance is in the short 
term. Tenure has no effect on two-year lagged performance. Further research is 
needed to identify if Short-term Performance may feed forward Tenure or re-
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election in the Korean context, drawing on the English case study where re-
election was affected, not by positive performance, but negative performance 
(see Boyne et al., 2009). 
 
2.4. The Combined Model with NFC 
2.4.1. Interaction of Normative control with NFC 
The Combined Model tests the interacting effect of each control mode with crises 
on local performance (see chapter 7).Over the sample period of the current 
research chapter 7 posited there were two financial crises, the Korean financial 
crisis in 1998 and the economic recession of 2008-9, through measuring 
economic growth rate. These national financial crises are expected to affect local 
government’s ability to manage performance.  
    The Combined Model examines during NFC the influence of each control 
type on performance of local government. If two variables of interest interact, 
denoted as (NFC) x (Normative Control) in Table 8-19, the relationship between 
each of the interacting variables and dependent variable relies on the value of the 
other interacting variable. Table 8-19 shows that this model has a considerable 
explanatory power seen from adjusted R2 which is from .589 to .605 and the 
hypothesis can be acceptable from the F test (p<.0001). The Durbin- Watson 
value is at around 2.0 so the presence of autocorrelation is not found. The 
coefficient of Normative Control measured by local government’s involvement in 
the NPM styled financial reform is negative through interaction with NFC. It 
demonstrated the view that when NFC is given, the influence of Normative 
Controls significantly decreases the Short-term Performance and more seriously 
reduces Long-term Performance of local government. Therefore, H5 that 
Normative Controls interacting with NFC would have a positive relation to 
performance of local government was not statistically supported in these cases. 
Considering the individual effects of Normative Controls and NFC in Individual 
Model which are positive regardless of statistical significance, the interaction of 
both variables produces the unexpectedly negative consequence to local 
government. This evidence supports that during crises the democratic mode of 
central controls, expressed as normative controls, has no impact on achieving 
better performance of local government.  
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    Several control variables are proved to have explanatory power on 
performance. Local government where the governor or mayor has longer tenure 
show better Short-term Performance. Per capita GRDP and Ruling party are 
influential in improving performance of local government in both terms as shown 
in Individual Model.  
 
Table 8-19. Normative Controls Interacting with NFC on Local Performance 
Interacting effect with the National Financial Crises 
 Short term Performance Long term Performance 
(Normative Control) X(NFC) -6.332 -31.812*** 
Ruling Party, Governor 1.697* 1.614* 
per capita GRDP 18.810*** 20.327** 
Tenure .029* -.010 
Constant -232.438** -241.897* 
N 223 207 
Adjusted R
2 
.605 .589 
Durbin-Watson 1.927 1.846 
F test p<.0001 p<.0001 
 
 
2.4.2. Interaction of Remunerative control with National Financial Crises 
Table 8-20 demonstrates the result of the interaction of Remunerative Control 
with NFC. The Remunerative control mode reveals the precisely negative effect 
that it reduces local government performance when NFC is given. Therefore H6 
that the interaction effect of Remunerative Control with NFC would have a 
positive relation with improved performance of local government is not 
statistically supported. Instead the effect of NFC intensifies the magnitude of 
Remunerative control’s negative effect in the long term with statistical 
significance. This suggests the fiscal expansion through intergovernmental 
transfer by central government during NFC does not contribute to improving the 
performance of local government.  
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Table 8-20. Remunerative Controls Interacting with NFC on Local Performance 
Interacting effect with the National Financial Crises 
 Short term Performance Long term Performance 
(Remunerative Control) X(NFC) -6.332 -31.812*** 
Ruling Party, Governor 1.697* 1.614* 
per capita GRDP 18.810*** 20.327** 
Tenure .029* -.010 
Constant -232.438** -241.897* 
N 223 207 
Adjusted R
2 
.605 .589 
Durbin-Watson 1.927 1.846 
F test p<.0001 p<.0001 
 
 
2.4.3. Interaction of Coercive Control with NFC  
Coercive Controls when NFC takes place have negative coefficients as shown in 
Table 8-21. Taking consideration of observing the significantly negative effect of 
Coercive Control on Short-term Performance and Long-term Performance in the 
Individual Model, we can witness that the same coefficient came to be intensified 
with the interacting NFC. This suggests the negative variable Coercive Controls 
seriously determined the interaction effect between Coercive Control and NFC. 
H7 that the effect of Coercive Control with NFC would be negative is supported 
statistically. 
 
Table 8-21. Coercive Controls Interacting with NFC on Local Performance 
Interacting effect with the National Financial Crises 
 Short term Performance Long term Performance 
(Coercive Control) X(NFC) -18.117*** -28.530*** 
Ruling Party, Governor 1.697* 1.614* 
per capita GRDP 18.810*** 20.327** 
Tenure .029 -.010 
Constant -232.438** -241.897* 
N 223 207 
Adjusted R
2 
.605 .589 
Durbin-Watson 1.927 1.846 
F test p<.0001 p<.0001 
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2.5. The Combined Model with LFC 
2.5.1. Interaction of Normative Controls with LFC 
Fiscal problems facing local governments may come from outside or from the 
inside local government. The fiscal crisis effect at the upper level is sometimes 
spread to the lower level of local government (Wright, 2002). One of the salient 
strategies followed by upper level governments in balancing the budget was to 
reduce funding of public education and unconditional fiscal support for local 
government. Thus the lower level of local government generally has a limited 
ability to find ways to escape fiscal crises and to maintain the existing level of 
public service. Another fiscal crisis of local government comes from wrong decision 
making and financial management inside the organization. This is related with the 
failure to cope with the financial emergency in the short term and changes of 
environment in the long term. In either of the two cases where local fiscal crises 
come from, it is difficult to expect a positive relation with local performance. 
    Hypothesis 8 that Normative controls during local fiscal crises have a 
negative relation with performance of local government is not supported by the 
statistical analysis. Table 8-22 shows that the impact of Normative Controls 
through interaction with LFC seems positive but is not statistically significant. 
Considering the effect of Individual Model, in which LFC has no significant 
influence on Performance of Local Government, the interacting effect of 
Normative Controls with LFC is not a contrasting result.  
 
Table 8-22. Normative Controls Interacting with LFC on Local Performance 
Interacting effect with the Local Fiscal Crises 
 Short term Performance Long term Performance 
(Normative Control) X(LFC) -.608 -1.337 
Ruling Party, Governor 1.704* 1.631* 
per capita GRDP 18.799*** 20.260** 
Tenure .029* -.011 
Constant -232.266** -240.813* 
N 223 207 
Adjusted R
2 
.603 .587 
Durbin-Watson 1.926 1.848 
F test p<.0001 p<.0001 
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2.5.2. Interaction of Remunerative control with LFC 
There is no statistical significance in the relations of local performances and 
Remunerative Controls imposed by central government when LFC takes place 
(see Table 8-23). In Individual Model, Remunerative Control was revealed to 
significantly decrease Short-term and Long-term Performance of local 
government. And LFC has no meaningful relations with performance. 
Considering each individual effect, in Combined Model, what the interacting 
effect of LFC with Remunerative controls reveals, is that it is insignificant as most 
parts seem to be determined by LFC. We can assume in the fiscally emergent 
situation central government’s positive remunerative controls sometimes have no 
policy impact in enhancing fiscal performance of local government. Conclusively, 
LFC does not influence the performance of local government and the interacting 
controls with them also have no impact on the performance of local government. 
 
Table 8-23. Remunerative Controls Interacting with LFC on Local Performance 
Interacting effect with the Local Fiscal Crises 
 Short term Performance Long term Performance 
(Remunerative Control) x (LFC) 1.540 1.182 
Ruling Party, Governor 1.705* 1.607 
per capita GRDP 18.238*** 19.751** 
Tenure .030* -.009 
Constant -223.258** -232.641* 
N 223 207 
Adjusted R
2 
.604 .587 
Durbin-Watson 1.917 1.856 
F test p<.0001 p<.0001 
 
3. Findings 
3.1. Patterns at a glance 
Research into fiscal aspects in central-local government relations allows us to 
explicitly observe how central controls are exerted through fiscal policies over 
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local governments. In this chapter the empirical findings on the relations between 
central controls, crises and local performance are presented based on the 
statistical models we established in chapter 7. The performance of local 
government that we are handling here is the composite of fiscal condition, 
capacity for development, and of each local government assessed through JPA. 
Therefore our findings can give us a logical picture about the relations between 
central fiscal controls and the fiscal performance of local government. Table 8-19 
summarizes the hypotheses of chapter 6, the models of chapter 7 and the 
statistical findings of the current chapter at one glance. 
 
Table 8-24. Summary of empirical findings   
 The effect on Fiscal Performance  expectation    Finding *      Model 
H1 Normative Control (NC) Positive    Neutral 
Individual 
Model 
H2 Remunerative Control (RC) Positive    Negative 
H3-1 Coercive Control (CC) Negative    Negative 
H3-2 Coercive Control (CClower) 
against the lower performance group 
Positive Negative/Neutral  
H4-1 National Financial Crises (NFC) Negative Neutral/Positive 
H4-2 Local Fiscal Crises (LFC) Negative     Neutral 
H5 NC× NFC Positive Neutral/Negative 
Combined 
model 
H6 RC × NFC Positive Neutral/Negative 
H7 CC × NFC Negative    Negative 
H8 NC × LFC Negative     Neutral 
H9 RC × LFC Negative     Neutral  
*  Marked with short-term and long-term effects 
 
 
In the Individual Model, the statistical results disclose that only Coercive Controls 
support the proposition that central coercive control negatively influences local 
government fiscal performance. Unlike our expectation, Remunerative Controls is 
revealed to have a negative effect on local performance. Normative Controls 
measured by new public management does not give significant empirical results, 
which seems to be connected with the fact that the characteristics of Normative 
Controls are relatively democratic, autonomous and not self-enforcing. Further 
theoretical grounds about the inefficacy of normative change in controls will be 
discussed in chapter 9.  
On the other hand, we include control variables that might influence local 
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government performance other than the explanatory variable of central control. 
The party, per capita GRDP and the tenure of the chief executive are tested as 
political, economic environments and internal factors respectively. First, following 
the expectation, when a governor or mayor comes from a ruling party, the 
performance of local government slightly increases in almost all cases. The 
coefficient of ‘Ruling Party, Governor’ variable is at around 1.7, which means that 
when the governor comes from the ruling party the performance of local 
government tends to increase 1.7 times. This result indicates that to some extent 
political affiliation and policy cooperation occurred between local and central 
politics through the political channel based on the same ruling party. This result 
also supports the view that Korean local politics is nationalized and the power of 
local government is centred on the head of local government. In the preliminary 
test (see section 3.3 of chapter 7), by contrast, the party of the majority of 
councillors has an insignificant impact on the performance of local government. 
The difference of the party effect between a governor and majority councillors 
can be explained by the council’s weak role and limited tools for intervening in 
the policy implementation of local government. Next, the exogenous economic 
factor, per capita GRDP, is revealed to be the most influential; it significantly 
increased local government performance in the short and long terms. Third, the 
tenure of chief executive also has a positive effect on the performance of local 
government. So this means the longer the head of local government remains in 
office, the better the performance the local government tends to achieve.  
Financial crises as the strong external shocks influence government 
behaviour, policies and determination (see chapter 3). Thus in Combined Model 
we examine how central controls have an impact on local performance while 
interacting with a financial crises. All the types of central controls interacting with 
NFC negatively influence local government with statistical significance. 
Normative control’s interacting effect with NFC proves to significantly decrease 
performance of local government in the long-term, although the central 
government’s Normative Controls is not influential enough to affect local 
government performance and NFC is positively associated with local government 
performance in Individual Model. This means that during economic crises local 
government tends to be adversely affected even by a more democratic mode of 
central controls. The interaction between Normative Controls and NFC is not 
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determined so much by the effect of each interacting variable but co-produces 
the unexpected result. This phenomenon occurs across the cases of NFC. Thus 
Remunerative controls as well as Coercive controls interacting with NFC prove to 
significantly decrease the performance of local government. These negative 
effects of central controls reverse the positive effect of financial crisis, which is 
revealed in the Individual Model, in the negative way. 
By contrast, in the Combined Model with LFC, Normative Control and 
Remunerative Control are neutral in influencing local government performance. 
In particular, the effect of Remunerative Control, which has a negative coefficient 
in Individual Model, changes to have an insignificant influence on performance 
while interacting with LFC. This means that during the local fiscal crises central 
government’s policy to expand local resource works inefficiently for the 
performance of local government. The test of Coercive Control is excluded in 
Combined Model, because there is no case to meet both the constraints of LFC 
and Coercive Controls at the same time in the observations.   
 
3.2.  Constrained constitutional status of local government 
Now the focus is on the impact of the central controls on local government that 
have been emphasized in every Korean central government since the extending 
of local autonomy in the 1990s. . As we explored in chapter 1, Korean local 
government is protected by the Constitution but at the same time the Constitution 
permits the state law to control the local government. Therefore the constitutional 
status of local government has been subjected to the state law and central 
government power. The limits set by the law have evolved since the revision for 
the implementation of local autonomy. As a result, democratization of central 
control has developed as an integral component of central local relations. The 
empirical evidence we found in the statistical analysis, however, shed light on 
how the constitutional autonomy of local government has been affected by 
central controls. Central control or the state law has not been good at developing 
and expanding local democracy. In a nutshell, two out of three modes of central 
control which is regulated by the state law impact negatively on local government.   
First, the normative control appears to promote an increase of democracy in 
the central-local relations after the 2000s but statistical research reveals that in 
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practice there has been no significant impact on local democracy. As local 
democracy grows, local policy modes become more democratized than ever 
before. The central controls evolved from ‘command and control’ and many 
institutional changes in the area of local policy aimed at enhancing local 
performance. Therefore in chapter 6 we expected that the new mode of central 
controls would work positively for local government. The evidence does not 
support this proposition. The normative control reveals no significant influence on 
local government performance, however this phenomenon was seen to change in 
the National Financial Crises. Normative Controls changed to negatively 
influence local government performance through interacting with National 
Financial Crises. The empirical analysis suggests inadequate normative controls 
operated by the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Mu-hyun governments which lacked 
executive instruments to enhance local performance as much as expected. This 
might be related to the argument that normative controls had ‘hidden’ new modes 
of central control as argued in chapter 5. 
Second, the coercive control has been the quintessential mode of traditional 
government policy with no effect to increase local accountability and further more 
local democracy. As democracy progresses, the coercive modes tend to weaken. 
The example of Korea showed that under the recent economic crises out-of-date 
coercive controls were revived through Emergency Spending. Apart from the 
economic effect of fiscal policy, coercive controls have a negative influence on 
local government performance across the models in this study. This negative 
effect is not different even in the group where local governments have a 
comparatively lower level of performance. By contrast with the English examples 
(Andrews et al., 2005; Lowndes 2003: 140), we can say that coercive controls in 
the Korean central local government relations has a consistently negatively 
impact on local government.  
Third, the remunerative control is the most preferred mode of central control 
but is revealed to have a negative effect to increase local accountability and 
further more local democracy. Central government has expanded local resource 
through tax reform for the purpose of increasing local fiscal autonomy or 
responding to increasing policy demand. Strengthening fiscal autonomy is 
expected to enhance local fiscal performance as well. But remunerative control 
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reveals a decrease in local government performance according to the empirical 
analysis. This result is related to the different spending responsibility for different 
resources. In other words, by expanding intergovernmental transfers 
remunerative controls did not make recipient local governments become more 
responsible for their spending from the perspective of fiscal performance.  
In conclusion, most central controls have no success in increasing local 
democracy which is measured by local performance, and they therefore fail to 
achieve the basic constitutional value of local democracy and the consensus 
about local democracy. This result suggests that the present central controls 
need to change to the direction of enhancing the value of local government and 
local democracy.  
3.3. The impact of fiscal crises 
The interesting finding is that the economic crises individually have a positive 
influence on local government performance. It empirically proves that Korea is 
resilient against crises. There may be several reasons to explain this. Most of all, 
centralism over the history of Korea produced the initial respect for the state and 
the social stability to concentrate on the recovery. Also the experience of a 
successful developmental state gave citizens trust in their government to manage 
the crisis; through the process of democratization, each individual and 
organization felt responsible for their own country (Kalinowski, 2008). In cognitive 
terms this draws on the deep-seated patriotism of South Koreans who are also 
constantly aware of the threats posed by life in a divided nation. Therefore the 
impact of financial crises on government encourages more popular compliance 
and may produce more accountable behaviour and more progressive thinking in 
performing service provisions and duties of local government. Again the 
suggestion that the experience of fiscal crises is able to provide “windows of 
opportunity” to reshape the public sector is supported here (see chapter 6 section 
3.1.). This chance should be used in seeking a more balanced approach of 
benefit for all to substitute the current market-oriented paradigm (Richardson and 
Copus, 2011).  
    Nevertheless the empirical result shows that the impact of financial crises 
interacting with central controls converts to a negative direction for the 
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performance of local government. Taking into consideration each individual effect 
of the two variables, it is not financial crises but central controls that perversely 
change the direction of the combined effect. In other words, the negative effect of 
central controls is more problematic than the context of financial crises, because 
the negative influences of Remunerative Controls and Coercive Controls are 
accentuated during the period of financial crises. The finding confirms that central 
government needs to be careful in exercising its controls over local government 
when faced by financial crises, there is a clear risk that it is possible to create 
unexpected results out of government control. 
 
4. Conclusion  
This statistical analysis has very substantial implications for central-local 
government relations and local policy making and therefore deserves close 
attention. Not longer is the justification for central government intervention in local 
government the aim of improving the accountability of local government. For 
decades the centralists believed that central government plays an important role 
of supporting local governments so they can achieve its objectives of improved 
performance as well as. However the almighty centre is a sort of dangerous 
thought. The current quantitative analyses indicate that central controls have 
restrained local government over the last decade. Unlike the experience in which 
Korea achieved noticeable development led by central government controls in 
the era of industrialisation, most central controls have not worked for the 
improvement of local performance. This dismal finding is beyond our expectation 
because we know that democratic changes in central-local relations could have 
achieved an inevitable corollary: increased local democracy and enhanced local 
performance. Why was the institutional change in central control towards a more 
democratic way not connected to corresponding improved performance? Further 
theoretical background and interpretation are presented in chapter 9. 
    In addition, although national financial crises were revealed to influence local 
performance positively, their combined effect with central controls seriously 
damaged local government performance. In short, central controls undermined 
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performance of local government more than financial crises did. The financial 
crisis is an external shock beyond the management of government. It may 
function per se as a positive opportunity to reshape the system or produce 
positive nationalism to mitigate the financial crises effect. Therefore the more 
distinctive emphasis should be on the surviving centralism and its negative effect 
on local autonomy.  
    Rather, better performance of local government rested on the political and 
economic circumstances. Experienced elected mayors and governors in local 
government play a constructive role in improving performance of local 
government. The longer elected politicians hold office, the better performance is 
in the short term. Mayors or governors of the ruling party were positively 
connected with improved local government performance. This means that the 
ruling party at the national level dominated the local politics as well. Out of the 
external economic factors, per capita GRDP, was the most influential and thus it 
significantly increased local government performance in the short and long terms 
    This chapter has derived important lessons about the nature of evolving 
central controls and their damaging effect, working from the empirical application 
of hypotheses as extended case studies. All that remains is to generate policy 
implications and to reach conclusions so as to synthesize the theoretical 
discussion and the empirical findings together like a jigsaw puzzle. Chapter 9, 
therefore revisits the main argument of the thesis on the basis of these empirical 
results and, in particular, it explores institutional transformation and features of 
central controls from the perspective of the historical institutionalism. Lastly, 
chapter 10 is a shorter concluding chapter which will outline the importance of the 
key findings, review the distinctive contributions made by this research, and 
speculate on the implications of this thesis for future research and policies.  
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Chapter 9. Institutional change and the effect of 
central controls 
1. Introduction 
So far, the first half of this thesis has discussed the conceptual elements and 
policy contexts including local autonomy, Korean experience of financial crises, 
performance management and fiscal institutions of local government; the latter 
part presented the statistical case study to establish the effect of central controls 
on local government. This chapter advances the theoretical and practical 
arguments drawing on the foundation of the empirical findings and seeks to 
explore the institutional change in central-local government relations. The early 
material presented the argument that the trend of pervasive central controls has 
been sustained by a path dependency drawing on the legacy of centralism. 
Nevertheless, there has been an incremental shift of central controls to a more 
democratic direction since the extension of local autonomy in the mid-1990s. This 
thesis contends that in the context of changing central-local relations the mode of 
central controls would influence the performance of local government. It might be 
expected that local government would benefit from an institutional change of 
controls in the pursuit of greater local autonomy and better performance. The 
financial crises considered in this study created periods of contingency during 
which the new institutional frame was imported in the 1998 Korean economic 
crisis and the logic of centralism was re-emphasized in order to mobilise against 
the recent global crisis. The empirical results showed that the different modes of 
central controls, which are asserted to represent incremental transformation of 
central controls, still have a negative impact on local government performance.  
How can we explain the persistent effect of central controls, which are 
saddled with a disadvantageous reputation, even in the era of local autonomy? 
Historical institutionalism is employed to elucidate the gap between our 
expectation and the empirical result. Historical institutionalism has commonly 
organized path dependence around explaining the persistence of a particular 
institutional pattern, we used the approach in chapters 2 and 3 in order to explain 
Korean centralism and the institutional factor of the Korean financial crises. The 
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positive feedback mechanism makes a certain course through which rules 
generate consequences that enhance the power resource of their advocates and 
broaden support. The literature on the centralism of Korea would strongly 
suggest a path dependent account of fiscal controls exercised by central 
government based on norms of central regulation.  
Consistent with the argument advanced throughout this thesis, the central 
controls of Korea have incrementally changed and thus central-local government 
relations have evolved from the superior-subordinator relationship to more 
democratic partnerships. Institutional change has been theorized in a functional 
way by the dynamic adaptation to the exogenous environment in sociological 
institutionalism (Peters G., 2012: 140). Historical institutionalism has a limited 
scope of explanation over the major change of an institution. By contrast, 
Mahoney and Thelen have developed a more gradual approach to change within 
historical institutionalism. They mention that institutions often change in subtle 
and gradual ways over time as agents, who are disadvantaged by current 
arrangements, routinely seek to revise and supplement the rules. The stability of 
institutions is not automatic or self-enforcing but requires on-going mobilization of 
political support by coalitions (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010: 8-9). In this view, 
change and stability are inextricably linked. In the face of both exogenous 
financial crises and endogenous challenges from local governments and central 
government departments must in turn engage in on-going efforts to maintain their 
power, at times by strategically modifying the mode of controls.  
However, the role of path-dependency has a limited power of explanation 
over the major change of local democracy. This thesis identifies a positive role 
played by mayors and governors through the empirical study in chapter 8. Also 
the major changes such as the financial institution and the recent introduction of 
local income tax cannot be explained by theories of path-dependence. In chapter 
6, we mentioned that institutions often change in subtle and gradual ways over 
time as agents, who are disadvantaged by current arrangements, routinely seek 
to revise and supplement the rules. The stability of institutions is not automatic or 
self-enforcing but requires on-going mobilization of political support by coalitions 
(Mahoney and Thelen, 2010: 8-9). Even though drawing on this view, we cannot 
explain the strategic and positive decision making for those reforms in the face of 
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both exogenous financial crises and endogenous challenges. Thus the 
prospective of path dependency is not perfect and satisfactory to support the 
empirical evidence from this thesis. In practice, to some degree, current political 
and administrative actors are free to choose how to behave and are free to make 
changes to institutional structure. In this respect central-local relations reflect the 
major ‘punctuation’ seen in Korean politics by the historic shift to political 
democracy seen in the 1987 free and direct elections of the President, the 
National Assembly and, eventually, local councils Therefore, this study 
acknowledges some limitation of the theory of path-dependency in explaining the 
institutional change but employs that as one of important tools to analyse the 
Korean policy context. 
This chapter focus on three principal arguments, each of which departs in 
important ways from the standard logic of path dependence in Korean centralism 
(see chapter 2).  First, over the last two decades, central elements of the original 
scheme have witnessed substantial revision: direct and hierarchical controls were 
overtaken by indirect and normative controls; coercive controls were narrowly 
rejected and then partially restored in crises. While central controls have not seen 
abrupt and sweeping transformation, the cumulative effect of the twenty years 
since extending local autonomy in the mid-1990s is the financial reform. Out of 
the path-dependency theory, the positive role of politicians and administrators 
may contribute to modernizing local governments through the financial reform in 
Korea.  
.   
The second major claim is that the most important changes in central 
controls have resulted from a dynamic process of exogenous shock as well as 
endogenous sources. Exogenous shocks include at first the introduction of local 
autonomy in the founding constitution, later the NPM paradigm in policy areas 
and finally the financial crises. Due to the endogenous factors, the authoritative 
politics and the centralized culture, the system of local government was 
paralysed by central government but the challenges from people and the 
opposition party gave no choice but to allow the devolution of power distribution 
by extending local autonomy.  
The chapter’s third argument is that the changes of central controls occur in 
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relation to the rules and regulations which characterise the institution of central-
local relations, but they have not yet ensured changes in the cognitive frame. 
This point may be related to the negative or neutral impacts of central controls 
that the empirical results showed in chapter 8, in spite of the institutional changes 
in central controls towards greater local autonomy. This point is developed in the 
next section drawing also on the first argument above.   
 
2. Revisiting research questions 
2.1. Did central controls affect local government performance? 
In order to echo a major theme of this thesis, the research questions are revisited 
here (see section 3 of chapter 1). Central control of local government is an 
institution, as it enforces the behaviour of local government (North, 1990: 4). 
Institutional regulatory processes in central-local government relations are 
formally designated and centralized or informally administered and decentralized 
(Scott, 1994: 64). This means that different enforcing mechanisms are supposed 
to differently shape the behaviour and interaction of the actors. In this view, the 
different modes of central controls are expected to have a distinctive impact on 
local government.  
Taking a look at the last sixty years, central controls showed ‘path-
dependence’ as a political legacy of historic centralism as we noted in chapter 2. 
However, economic prosperity encouraged centralism to make way for local 
democracy and then central controls exhibit incremental changes towards a 
democratic mode. Change may result from institutional defenders’ strategic 
modifications or mobilizations of control mechanisms, for example the centre’s 
assessment of local government performance (see chapter 4), otherwise from 
disadvantaged agents exploiting ambiguity and resources embedded in the 
institutions themselves: for example the localities emphasised the unfair central-
local financial structure in order to introduce a local income tax (see chapter 5). In 
our approach, the local fiscal institution is the consequence of the competing 
agents of controlling local government or of giving power to local government.  
This tension affects the significant assets that central or local government can 
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exploit in the policy process. The relations between MOGAHA and local 
governments outlined in chapter 5 witnessed this tension between centralists and 
localists. The disadvantaged agents gradually expand power and succeeded in 
making their own regulations appropriate for local government accounting, 
contracting and tax, independent from the laws for central governments.  
How do central controls as the political legacy of historic centralism place 
constraints on local government performance? The core function of central 
controls is stipulating rules to which local government is subjected as many 
scholars emphasize the crucial importance of enforcement mechanism as 
essential for a viable institution (North, 1990: 4). The impact of central 
government controls does not depend solely on the political structure. It inevitably 
involves an analysis of history, belief and culture which provides understanding of 
institutional change and its impact (Steinmo, 2014). Also central government 
needed to respond to exogenous shocks such as global economic crises. In the 
unitary country, local government has been exposed to and is seriously affected 
by these changes. The priority of regulations in intergovernmental relations 
comes from central controls, which decide how local governments solve 
problems, make decisions and handle disagreements. Therefore the fairly basic 
first question from chapter 1, namely whether central controls impact local 
government performance, is answered in the affirmative and is theoretically 
explained and empirically supported in the current case study (see chapter 8).  
2.2. Did the different mode of central controls impact differentially?    
In order to systematically understand the change of central controls we classified 
the modes of controls into normative, remunerative and coercive controls in 
chapter 6. The second research question from chapter 1 is about the different 
effect of the different mode of central controls. Is the normative control exercised 
by central government positively related with improved local performance? The 
noticeable changes of central government controls are ‘steering’ local 
governments, empowering them to solve their own problems and driving them by 
‘missions’ rather than rules, as Osborne and Gaebler (1992) suggest in 
Reinventing government. The rules and regulations containing intervention by 
central government were revised or supplemented with those mitigating controls 
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or those giving initiatives to localities in the process of the NPM style reform (see 
chapter 5). As a result, the controlling modes over local government have 
evolved toward normative and democratic ways. The normative controls concern 
the main issue of the local political arena or ensure the policy compliance of local 
government to the national goals. The current central controls over local 
government can obtain political support and compliance when they are declared 
to increase local autonomy. The normative mode of controls by managing ‘ideas’ 
and seeking ‘persuasion’, thus might lead to better performing local government. 
The empirical results, however, did not support this positive expectation (see 
chapter 8). Far from being sufficiently responsible, normative controls have been 
implemented with a centralist bias to some extent, as we noted in chapter 5. 
Presumably the different effect of each mode of central control may partly arise 
from the different degree of force of constraint that each mode exerts: local 
governments do have a choice as to whether they take up the normative controls 
and thus normative controls is much democratized and may differently affect the 
decision making of each local government, unlike the cases of remunerative and 
coercive controls. The NPM inspired financial reform of local government had 
lacked ownership by local government in the aspect of local autonomy. Also the 
normative change of central government seemed not to be supported by the 
cultural change. Therefore normative controls may not be so influential in 
affecting performance of local government.  
Remunerative controls’ positive relation with improved local performance is 
anticipated alongside the normative controls in chapter 1. Remunerative controls 
over the financial resources of local government, have been the key policy 
instrument for central government to make local government comply with the 
policy or induce them to act in the centrally desired way, either in the past or 
present. The common instrument in central-local government relations is 
intergovernmental transfer. Institutionally, centralists have used 
intergovernmental transfers as a tool in order to constrain the action of opponents 
for enhancing fiscal autonomy after extending local autonomy in Korea. Actually, 
the independent local finance was not activated as much as intergovernmental 
transfers before the introduction of local income tax and local consumption tax, 
as explored in chapter 2 (see also section 3.3.). This has resulted from the 
successful institutional defence of MPB over the last two decades during which 
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MOGAHA and local government did not mobilize enough resources to compete 
with MPB’s centralism. According to the empirical results, despite being a 
positive way of increasing local income, remunerative controls were revealed not 
to improve local performance. This negative relation of remunerative controls with 
local performance is linked to some extent with the sort of fund measured for 
remunerative controls (see chapter 6). The Korean experience perhaps reflects a 
more general syndrome. The problem of intergovernmental transfers is they do 
not entail a corresponding increase in responsibility of local government. This 
aspect may impact decreasing local performance. As demand for local 
democracy grows, falling back on intergovernmental transfer tends to aggravate 
the fiscal dependence of local government on central government.  
The third research question from chapter 1 is how coercive central controls 
impacted local government. The mode of coercive controls is not considered so 
much as a persuasive instrument with the advent of local autonomy. Neither the 
normative nor the cognitive culture considers it ‘appropriate’ or ‘takes it for 
granted’ that central government operates any mechanisms of threat and 
sanctions when greater local autonomy was in progress. But it is different and 
feasible when it comes to financial crises. During the period of marked increasing 
of local autonomy, the trend of central controls was also impacted by the financial 
crisis. MOGAHA and MPB revived coercive controls to respond to the financial 
crisis. MOGAHA directly controlled local finance and spending in the name of 
emergency regardless of legal basis. They may be another deviation from the 
recent trend of central controls. Some studies warn about the economic effect of 
emergency spending and politically coercive controls involved the serious loss of 
local democracy (see chapter 5).  
In summary, the different modes of central controls have not improved or 
have negatively impacted local performance since the popular election of mayor 
and governor. In particular normative controls showed empirically no significant 
relation with variation of local performance. In spite of the rule change in fiscal 
institution, the central control to constrain local government has been in an 
equilibrium that remains in place where there was insufficient value placed on 
local autonomy. Caution is needed in making too bold a conclusion but the 
dismal empirical results might be partly explained by incomplete institutional 
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change. In other words, central controls in part were changed at the level of 
regulatory aspect but did not complete the cognitive cultural change. This can be 
explained by the different pace of change between quickly-moving and slow-
moving institutions (see section 1.2 of chapter 6). The political institutions can 
change quickly but normative and cognitive aspects of institutions move slowly. 
The change in political institutions may lack the cultural basis needed to make 
them successful (Peters, 2012: 141). There may be uncertainty and conflicts 
between the long term legacy of centralism and the more democratic governance. 
Due to inexperience and lack of understanding about NPM-style financial reform, 
local government seemed to lack the capacity to process information about the 
new mode of central controls and to reach an appropriate decision from that 
information.  
The incomplete cultural change was revealed in the disjunction of the 
expected role and realized role of elected mayors and governors. Setting aside 
the evidence that the elected mayors and governors are positively related with 
improved local performance (see chapter 8), they did not exercise the expected 
strong political leadership during the recent financial crisis in order to reflect 
prosperous local demands in the national political debate. Thirteen of the elected 
mayors and governors out of 16 regions came from the same political party, 
the Grand National Party (GNP), as that of the president and the majority of the 
members of the National Assembly. They seemed to be constrained by the party 
discipline of GNP and did not respond to the expected role demand of ensuring 
local autonomy. Thus they complied with the national mandates during the 
financial crisis in 2008-9 rather than acting on behalf of the locality, promoting 
and protecting autonomous interests from the national interest. In addition, 13 
local councils were occupied by the same ruling party except Jeonbuk, Jeonnam, 
and Gwangju in which the Democratic Party held office (see chapter 2). 
Therefore the elected local politicians, both mayor and local councillors, were 
influenced by the same political party discipline and policy orientation, which 
hindered ‘the effective scrutiny’ over the executive local government by the local 
council (Leach and Copus, 2004). So to speak, facing the conflict between local 
autonomy and central control, the elected local politicians failed to alter the 
conventional dynamics of political decision-making. Instead they preferred to find 
security in the party based political interaction like ‘old wine in new bottle’ local 
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democracy (Copus, 2004a). The ruling power failed to recognize the need to 
strengthen local democracy, as the role of local government was not fully 
appreciated by the successive governments (Jones and Stewart, 2012).  
 
2.3. What was the impact of financial crises? 
This thesis is also concerned with the relationship between control and 
performance in the environmental context of fiscal crisis, whose focus is driven 
by the experience of economic and fiscal crises over past years in Korea. The 
1997-8 Korean economic crisis was the unintended consequence of a series of 
liberalization policies by the Economic Planning Board made in the 1980s (see 
chapter 3). This crisis was an opportunity to undertake reform and leap out of 
conventional practices. The public sector in Korea came to implement the 
unprecedentedly large-scaled institutional reforms including performance 
assessment, programme budget and accrual base accounting (see chapter 5). 
Central controls emphasized the responsibility of the NPM reform, and 
simultaneously the increase in local autonomy. On the other hand, in order to 
shield the economy from the terrible impact of global economic crisis in 2008, the 
Korean central government returned to the traditional centralism and started to 
exercise the direct control over local government finance. At this time, the trend 
of central control demonstrated a reversal of institutional change, that is, the 
more democratic ideology that had been guiding central-local policies after the 
extension of local autonomy seemed to revert to more conventional centralism 
(see chapter 3). This is a paradoxical reversal of historical institutionalist 
explanations which fall back on the external shock when they explain institutional 
change. One research survey which was published in February 2015 by the 
National Association of Mayors demonstrated how the people appreciated 
Korean local autonomy after the 2008 financial crisis. The respondents agreed 
with the positive role of local autonomy, answering that local autonomy 
contributed more to the distinctive development of the regions (43%) than 
increasing local democracy (33.8%) (NAM, 2015: 12). Most respondents, 
however, empathized with the centralism and felt that local autonomy should be 
marginalised in various fields in society (77%) (ibid: 10). The result of the survey 
confirms the central government reverts to the traditional centralism after the 
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financial crisis.   
The impact of the financial crisis, returning to centralism, constitutes another 
piece of evidence to disapprove that there was cognitive change in favour of 
democratic controls. Without deeper and lasting cognitive cultural change, the 
trend of central control could easily revert to the past convention. The agents of 
central government officials, elected local politicians and the electorate have the 
potential to change the cognitive political culture. Why did the normative and 
cognitive frameworks remain unchanged despite the change of rules?  The next 
part highlights what institutional transformations and restraints have happened 
regarding the evolution of central control modes.     
 
3. The institutional changes in central-local relations  
3.1. Dynamism of central controls  
The introduction of a local autonomy system which was chosen to provide an 
element of political democratization in the first constitution in 1948 foreshadowed 
the major change in central-local government relations. The local autonomy 
system was suspended for over thirty years by the military governments (see 
chapter 2).  As a result, the closed policy decision and undemocratic institutional 
arrangements yielded negative feedback effects. First, monolithic central controls 
provoked challenges from groups who were disadvantaged by strong centralism. 
The abolition of local autonomy excluded citizens from the political process and 
reinforced the centralization of power. The rank and file participated in a 
movement for democracy. Responding to people power, regulations started to 
schedule local autonomy from the end of the 1980s to the early 1990s. Second, 
the political choice to be a laggard in implementing local elections despite the 
legal grounds provided its opponents with crucial opportunities to reverse the 
situation. Opposition parties insisted on an urgent and strong local autonomy 
system and the reduction of central governmental interventions in local politics. 
Consequently, the President and central politicians could not maintain the 
authoritative centralism through emphasizing the national security as a divided 
nation; they could not necessarily prevent the extension of local autonomy. 
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Change did not emerge solely from the choices and strategies of institutional 
opponents. Indeed, central government was an important change agents in the 
historic development of the trend for more permissive regulation over local 
government. However, the empirical evidence sheds light on the excessive 
regulation of central control to the extent that most central controls have no 
substantial contribution to increasing local democracy, as we explored in chapter 
8. Over the last two decades central government has loomed much larger than 
the basic constitutional value of local democracy and the consensus about local 
democracy. The intention of the Constitution which limits local government by the 
law is perhaps to permit central government and the National Assembly to 
facilitate local government to realize local democracy through the state law. This 
result suggests that the present central controls need to change to the direction 
of enhancing the value of local government and local democracy which is 
pursued by the Constitution. 
Historical institutionalists frequently call attention to ‘punctuated equilibrium’ 
when it comes to explaining major institutional change followed by periods of 
stability (Krasner, 1984: 242; cited in Peters, 2011: 78).  In this view, the point of 
punctuation was when popular elections of local politicians resumed. Since then 
a ‘punctuated equilibrium’ of mitigation of central controls has existed in the 
central-local government relations in Korea. Local government has evolved into 
the partner of central government in implementing policy and providing services. 
The contour of central controls was specified in line with the financial regulations 
and reform in which we can clearly observe substantial changes of the central-
local governmental relationship in chapter 5. A series of endogenous processes 
caused the controls exercised by central government over local government to 
change. The conflicting values have coexisted in the policy mechanism to 
increase local democracy on one hand and to increase central controls on the 
other hand. Toward a more positive and democratic direction central controls 
were assumed to change with elected local politicians. The dismal touch of 
financial crises, however, would hamper these from having a fairy tale ending. It 
is in the nature of crises that they can shock policies and institutions into new 
paths (Wilks, 2014). Central government was exposed to pressure to enforce 
drastic controls over local government in order to promptly respond to fiscal 
crises and achieve the national goals, which caused a reversion to the central 
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pattern towards a greater local autonomy.     
3.2. Unfulfilled normative and cognitive changes  
Conventionally central government has authoritative, monolithic compulsory 
capacity to exert governmental power. In order to prevent the evil of 
centralization, local government has been considered as an important 
intermediate authority elected by residents, and has the power to deal with purely 
local business (Mill, J.S., 1910: 385-390), The term, ‘local autonomy’, has been 
perceived on equal terms with democracy in Korea, but it is important to establish 
who has power to influence and how evolving central controls enhance or impede 
the operation of effective local autonomy. Presidents and their governments were 
influential in triggering the change but the organizational characteristics of 
MOGAHA in the strategic situation did not ensure the full-fledged change.  
The political elites who were the leaders of pro-democracy demonstrators 
and then came to hold political power as President after the military regime 
contributed to the democratic change of central controls of local government. Due 
to their prominent leadership and consistent policies for the increase in local 
democracy, the local autonomy system could be stably institutionalized. The 
democratizer Kim Young-sam’s coalition with the authoritarian dictator’s party 
(see section 2.5 of chapter 2) provoked controversy. However consequently, he 
became a President and held the election of mayors and governors in 1995. The 
incoming President Kim Dae-jung was the most respectable democratizer. Based 
on neo-liberalism he reduced the number of local officials by 20% in order to 
overcome the Korean economic crisis by aiming for small government. 
Understandings about the nature of the strategic situation in which they found the 
role of central government, the characteristics or identities of elected mayors and 
council members and the common expectations as to how the local autonomy 
system would evolve, consequently produced strategic government 
reorganization. The Ministry of Interior which had existed with the creation of the 
Republic for the supervision of localities was merged with the Ministry of 
Government Administration into the MOGAHA in February 1998. Of MOGAHA 
the departments of Local Administration and Local Finance make policies to 
increase local democracy and protect local government interests from the other 
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central departments’ policies.  
While Kim Dae-jung was devoted to overcoming the economic crisis, Roh 
Mu-hyun diagnosed vulnerabilities which caused the economic crisis and tried to 
change the fundamentals of Korean political dynamics. He was detached from 
the established groups and thus rejected political authoritarianism. The NPM 
styled reform was adopted for his policies by following the advice from the 
academic circle. The public management reform put weight on outcomes, 
reduced government and market solutions like the Anglo-Saxon model. That is 
the reason why the normative controls emphasizing performance and 
responsibility through the financial reform were introduced in the Korean 
government. President Roh Mu-hyun and his close staff believed that sharing the 
ideas of ‘outcomes’ and ‘innovation’ in the process of the reform was connected 
with the way of increasing democracy and enhancing performance. MOGAHA 
conferred the discretion to local governments regarding whether or not they 
accept normative controls in order to enhance their responsibility. Perhaps 
MOGAHA did not have enough information about the NPM reform, thus decision 
making seemed to pass down the line in the name of participation. MOGAHA 
proposed and encouraged the NPM inspired reform and then local governments 
decided to accept it or not by considering their organizational capacity and 
condition. By resorting to normative mechanisms the central government could 
transform a direct, compulsory and hierarchical form of controls to an indirect, 
persuasive and horizontal one. MOGAHA abandoned multiple ministerial 
regulations of organization, personnel and finance of local government. As the 
local autonomy system developed and matured, however, the functional base of 
local policy making of MOGAHA tended to decrease because, in creating local 
democracy, central government should play an advisory, supportive and 
monitoring role in respect to local government (Goldsmith, 2003: 115).  
In the tradition of classic bureaucratic politics MOGAHA was obliged to 
defend its influence. The department of local finance of MOGAHA was 
threatened to be merged with the far-more centralist MPB whenever there was a 
debate for a government reshuffle. To ensure policy compliance in the central-
local relations and to maintain the substantial power of the organization, 
MOGAHA tend to disguise the controlling mechanisms in the name of normative 
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and democratic institutional change (see chapter 5). More legal based functions 
which are authorised by the National Assembly were believed to bring less 
possibility of MOGAHA being disintegrated. In addition, the static and closed 
personnel management system rarely gives the chance to change the monolithic 
policy vision of MOGAHA. Most officials come from the open-competitive exams 
and receive guaranteed retirement. Thus the department of local finance in 
MOGAHA has a very conservative policy vision, even though it is only they who 
represent the interest of local government at the central government level.   
The characteristics of changing agents are connected with the reason why the 
normative and cognitive institutional elements did not change more substantially. 
The change of norms might be interrupted by public officials’ strategic 
understanding because their minds are not blank slates on which cultural, 
normative and social information is simply recorded (Steimno 2014: 9). Culturally 
shared understandings and meanings are crucial to selecting between the 
possible strategic equilibria. They could not block the legal change because they 
had concern for political responsibility under the increasing pressure of local 
democracy. Instead, presumably their shared understandings of normative 
controls were ‘clothes which are unfit on the traditional centralized bureaucracy’ 
in the light of history and experience. Thus the normative control was introduced 
not as an outright rejection but a process of addition to the centralised culture. As 
a result, agents of MOGAHA and local officials became faint-hearts who changed 
the regulation but their mind did not accept the normative changes with the 
embedded assumptions of a positive state. Actually, normative controls seemed 
not to change the cognitive culture of central and local governments. This can 
explain to some extent the unexpected empirical results that the normative 
controls did not result in improved local government performance.  
Nevertheless, there existed real change in local democracy or performance 
for a while. Elected local politicians came to obtain more authority and power, 
while central controls tended to be more normative and democratizing in the 
political arena. Elected politicians in local government were revealed to play a 
constructive role in improving performance of local government. They 
strategically managed and occupied local government and also actively 
participated in the national politics as well. The relations between local officials 
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and the elected mayors have changed. Local public officials may have been 
more prone to follow the elected politician rather than to accept central controls 
where there was a policy conflict. Elected politicians as the chief executive hold 
full authority in personnel and organizational management of local government, 
so local public officials are immediately subjected to the elected politician. The 
statistical study indicated that the more experienced elected politicians are 
related with more improved performance of local government (see sections 2.2 
and 2.3 of chapter 8).    
The democratization of central controls has an important implication for local 
democracy because most local political rules are decided by central government. 
Two of the key vehicles of local democracy are representation and direct 
participation by the citizens which have been encouraged by central government. 
Various direct participation institutions were introduced recently, although the 
election of representatives was implemented right after establishment of the 
Republic of Korea. MOGAHA introduced the referendum in 2004, the resident 
lawsuit in 2006, and the local recalling system in 2007. The local recalling system 
endows residents with a formal channel to dismiss the head of the local 
government or councillors by residents’ direct voting. The residents could 
demand the vote by getting signatures from 10% of residents in the jurisdiction in 
the case of the governor of regional government. In addition, council members 
were changed from non-paid to pay-awarded in order to vitalize local councils by 
attracting local elites from 2006 despite the opposition and concern from the 
public 
At first glance, therefore, central-local relations in Korea appeared to 
become democratized and favourable for local government; however, beyond the 
local autonomy rhetoric there is no doubt that even normative central controls is 
not significantly effective in terms of local government performance. This thesis 
carefully suggests that the normative change of central controls might not be 
supported by cultural change and might just be regulated by MOGAHA’s biased 
and self-interested inclinations.     
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3.3. More fiscal power to local government  
With the growth in prosperity and the associated expansion of public services 
which are operated by local government, central government needs to take 
measures to expand the financial power of local government. One of the priorities 
in central-local government relations is intergovernmental transfer which 
frequently addresses vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalance between various 
levels of government. Korea’s Shared tax is based on the entire pool of central 
government tax revenues with coefficients set in law which provide local 
government a degree of predictability about the constant level of local revenue. 
However, this method imparts considerable rigidity to the central government and 
the fiscal tightening by central government can be diluted as an increase of 
Shared tax boosts the capacity of local governments to spend (Ter-Minassian, 
1997). Many mandatory programmes such as free education or the basic pension 
are transferred without choice to local government as a form of grants project. 
Fiscal conflicts between central and local governments have been growing with 
the increasing scale of grants projects.  
It is argued that many countries decentralize expenditure by ramping up 
intergovernmental transfers rather than building up the local tax base (Rodden, 
2002: 684). In many cases, only central government retains the power to 
determine the type and scope of local taxes and thus a tax system that fairly 
distributes the resource between central and local government is uncommon, 
which is one of the most crucial factors in the financial health of local government 
(Sharpe, 1981: 9). The problem is that an increase in intergovernmental transfers 
does not entail a corresponding increase in responsibility of local government 
and this study shows that statistically it is not related with improved performance 
of local government. In addition, over recent years the government has curtailed 
economic incentives and benefits due to the limited budget. The nature of fiscal 
crises legitimates reductions of policy instruments and justifies a retrospective 
resort to coercive controls.  
Nevertheless, the fiscal institutions of local government have witnessed 
unprecedented changes in less than twenty years of extended local autonomy. A 
series of tax reforms of local government since 2010 have contributed to 
intensifying the financial autonomy of local government by introducing local                                
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income tax and local expenditure tax (see chapter 5). Local taxation is a major 
structural change which deserves to be regarded as politically extending local 
autonomy in Korea. The statistics show that the ratio of dependent finance to the 
total revenue of local governments has decreased from 54% in 2002 to 42% in 
2013 and the ratio of local tax which is independently raised, has increased from 
32% to 34% in the same period (LOFIN, 2015). This trend is optimistic in the light 
of the theory that democratic decentralization can develop if there are 
concomitant financial resources (Manor, 1999). As a justification to increase 
financial power of local government, central government gradually increased the 
rate of shared tax from 15% of total national income in 2000 up to 19.24% in 
January 2015. Shared Tax is known as being more conducive to local autonomy 
in the sense that local government has a say in how the money is spent. The 
general portion of shared tax is not accompanied with the conditions that 
constrain spending policies of local government. It requires full spending 
responsibility of local government. If local government considered shared tax as 
common pool resource and competed to gain more, it seems reasonable that 
local government would be less motivated to spend it efficiently and take a 
corresponding accountability (Plekhanov and Singh, 2007).  
Also, the present study showed Remunerative Control through the increase 
of Shared tax did not have a positive influence on performance of local 
government (see chapter 8), even though a considerable monetary resource was 
handed over to the local government. This means that expansion of 
intergovernmental transfers did not make recipient local governments become 
responsible for their spending from the perspective of fiscal performance. There 
are several reasons to believe intergovernmental transfers generate cost and that 
local government may be more inclined to overspend, undertax and manage poor 
fiscal performance. These reasons may arise from principal-agent theory, or the 
common pool problem. Principal-agent literature outlines why politicians and 
public managers may lack proper incentives to effectively audit and control local 
spending (Balaguer-Coll et al., 2007: 435): for example, bureaucratic slack 
(technical inefficiency) increases with the increase of local government income 
(De borger and Kerstens, 1996: 162). The common pool problem stems from the 
separation of the costs and benefits of public spending. When a public project 
benefits predominantly a particular jurisdiction but receives financing through 
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common pool of tax, local governments pay only a small fraction of costs of a 
project while enjoying a large share of its benefits. The lack of full responsibility 
for the costs of a project results in excessive spending and creates a clear 
incentive for local government to compete for intergovernmental transfers that 
enable them to finance region-specific projects out of a common pool (Plekhanov 
and Singh, 2007).  In this sense, the introduction of local income tax and local 
consumption tax in 2010 is a ground-breaking development in the Korean history 
of local autonomy, as we noted in chapter 5. The local consumption tax, 5% of 
value-added tax in 2010 has been increased to 11% of value-added tax since 
2014 (KIPF, 2015). The local income tax with a single tax rate of 10% that was 
added to the existing income tax at the moment of introduction was switched to 
the independent taxation system using differing tax rates in accordance with the 
income tax base in the recent reform of 2014 (KIPF, 2015). In the future, the 
financial autonomy will be strengthened through independent taxes rather 
intergovernmental transfers.  
In summary, the increase of local income is not always linked with improving 
fiscal performance. Even the positive direction of remunerative controls does not 
increase performance of local government, if it is not linked with responsibility of 
local government such as in the case of own-tax revenue. In most cases where 
there is an increase in transfers, a corresponding increase in responsibility of 
local government does not necessarily ensue. Fortunately it is a huge 
development in decentralization policy in Korea. The portion of independent tax is 
growing in the finance of local government. The development and the expansion 
of local income tax and local consumption tax are expected to enhance spending 
responsibility of local government.  
        
3.4. The resort to coercive controls 
Coercive controls based on the ‘command-and-control’ regulatory policy 
instrument are the quintessential mode of control in hierarchical governmental 
relations. But we frequently witness a form of coercive control by central 
government, without allowing choice of local government despite the democratic 
intergovernmental relations. In particular, the recent fiscal conservatism 
demanded lots of patience from local government. This phenomenon might 
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support the idea that the institutional path of central controls has been repeatedly 
modified by exogenous shocks. The expanding government expenditure comes 
to greater prominence in adjusting the cyclical downturn caused by the global 
crisis (Kim and Hur, 2013: 21). The response of MOGAHA to the financial crisis 
to was revert to the traditional assumption that local governments were central 
government’s agencies complying to central mandates. The establishment of 
local democracy was sidelined to overcome the fiscally troubled conditions. The 
financial crises induced more direct controls of local government expenditure and 
more oversight of the functions of local governments (see chapter 5). During this 
period, the fiscal health of local government deteriorated severely: the deficit of 
consolidated financial balance of local government increased from a surplus of 
3.2 trillion (Won) in the financial year of 2008 to a deficit of 18.5 trillion (Won) in 
2009 and the burden to pay local debt increased by around 4% according to the 
2010 Local Financial Diagnosis (MOPAS, 2010). Coercive controls exerted on 
local government were perceived to be the most efficient and influential to 
achieve the aim intended by central government; however, they are shown to 
have a malign influence on local government as confirmed in chapter 8. The 
negative effects of coercive control were accentuated when it was combined with 
the financial crises according to the statistical results. 
Coercive controls exercised by central government are frequently correlated 
with improved performance of local government where that local government has 
failed to manage their financial soundness or good performance, which 
sometimes justifies central government’s intervention in local government 
(Andrews et al., 2005; Lowndes, 2003). However this is not the finding of the 
present study. Many coercive interventions proved to be ineffective and 
excessively costly because they addressed situations reasonably well managed 
by the forces of the marketplace, and those interventions that in principle have an 
effect up to a point also tended to be pushed beyond a point at which marginal 
costs exceed marginal benefits (Lemaire, 2003: 59). This finding stressed the 
optimal degree of central intervention; therefore, there was a marked parallel with 
the role of central controls in the central - local relations. Coercive controls should 
be more considerately adopted in policy implementation. For example, JPA can 
be seen as a coercive control from the point of view that local government should 
be assessed on its performance by central government without choice, and if not, 
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local government is threatened with a penalty and legal responsibility. 
Nevertheless, JPA has contributed to improving central and local government 
relations by recognizing and solving the problems of the policy evaluation in local 
government. Before JPA local government struggled to respond to more than 70 
kinds of individual assessments carried out by multiple central governments as 
seen in chapter 4. JPA integrated almost all assessments in one comprehensive 
performance assessment reducing the assessment burden, time and budget. In 
spite of the reshuffled government, JPA sustains the role of integrating national 
policies and improving performance of local government.  
We need a wiser approach to devising and exercising coercive controls in 
intergovernmental relations. Coercion is not desirable and sustainable if it 
demands the sacrifice of one part in the democratically changing central-local 
relations. By and large, coercive controls are exercised for the national policy 
goals. In this study, coercive controls on local spending did not contribute to 
improving local fiscal performance; instead it did achieve the policy goal centrally 
set: adjusting the economic cycle and stimulating the economy. Coercive controls 
can be persuasive when planned together with local interests. In this case, 
coercive controls chemically change to voluntary co-operation with central 
government. The preferred example is the introduction of JPA. With definite legal 
expression and sharing reciprocal interests ensuring local government 
compliance, coercive controls can be positively exercised in the central-local 
policy area.  
 
 
4. Conclusion  
In this thesis the central controls subject to the process of financial reform in 
Korea have assumed a particular trajectory, one to a considerable extent 
determined by the unique circumstances of the increase of democracy in local 
politics and of the emergency in the national economic condition. The tone of 
central controls has been relaxed from the previous hierarchical mandates of 
unilateral command. More democratic, persuasive and normative modes are 
perceived as important to ensure the increase in motivation or responsibility of 
local government, especially given the associated expansion of public services 
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operated by local government. In particular, MOGAHA’s normative controls of 
local government were introduced in the context of NPM reform under the strong 
demand for government innovation by President Roh Mu-hyun. Through the 
review of institutional changes and the statistical analysis in the area of local 
government finance, this thesis came to the dismal conclusion that the normative 
institutional change of MOGAHA, like the traditional modes of controls has not 
been connected with improved performance of local government in Korea. This 
evidence supports the view that central controls have hampered local 
government over the past decade or so. Even after the revival of local autonomy 
in Korea, the majority of controls are still negatively related to improved local 
government performance. This result may be explained from the perspective of 
institutional stability and external impact of central controls which central 
government holds in intergovernmental relations. Or focusing on the process of 
creating a system of institutional performance, the relaxation of central controls 
remains only at the level of regulation but do not expand to the norms and the 
cognitive culture of local government. The change of central controls was not 
sufficient and thus institutional performance could not be connected to improved 
performance of local governments (see section 1.2 of chapter 6).  
This chapter therefore examined the institutional under-development of the 
normative and cognitive framework of central-local relations.  The change agent, 
MOGAHA, identified its concern about the vulnerability of organizational 
sustainability while adjusting to the increase in local autonomy in the strategic 
policy situation. The closed personnel management system of MOGAHA 
reinforced culturally shared assumptions of the enduring positive role of the state. 
So they showed the behaviour of a laggard in climbing aboard the normative and 
cognitive level of change after the legal change. The legacy of the past was so 
influential in the public sector that the NPM styled government innovation 
seemed to conflict with the cultural historical backgrounds. Various historical 
factors such as the deep-seated patriotism of a divided nation, the state-led 
economic development and the overcoming of the financial crisis are enough to 
give the public trust in the central government. As a corollary, the normative 
control, giving more discretion to local government, could not play a positive role 
in increasing local performance. Before assigning blame for inadequate reform 
ideology, which put weight on market solutions so conflicted with the culture, the 
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extreme trust in and expectation of central government’s role needed to be 
‘changed for change’. 
The financial crises have created a great reversal of the decentralizing trend 
of central controls as seen in chapters 3 and 8. The policy responses revealed 
democratic progression was partly ignored and centralization in decision making 
came to the fore at the moment of crises. The restrictive circumstances in 
financial crises cajoled policy makers to resort to coercive tools. Coercive 
controls appear attractive methods to efficiently supervise the whole 
subordinated organizations and to directly solve the problematic conditions. In 
this way, crises legitimated strong central controls and suspended democracy. It 
was inevitable that local values and outcomes tend to be damaged from 
excessive and inappropriate interventions of central governments.  
Influenced by the history, central controls exist to ensure that the local 
governments are themselves subject to central regulations. Central controls 
should focus on the normative and cultural change for democratic change to give 
more authority and financial power to local government. This confirms that the 
institutional change occurs not through a monolithic or unified way but the 
complex interaction between rules and cultural framework.  
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Chapter 10. Conclusion: nurturing local democracy 
in Korea 
1. The incongruent changes and retarded performance 
Local governments are subject to strong institutional pressures imposed and 
policed by central government as regulator, auditor and inspector. The nature of 
local democracy involves the devolution of power and prevention of the evil of 
centralization by sharing power with the people. Korea embarked on local 
democracy as an historic, progressive and open-ended change to its political 
system in the early 1990s. This brought the epoch-making development in 
central-local relations. As we explored in chapter 1, the Constitution protects the 
Korean local government and also permits the state law to regulate the local 
government system. Therefore the existence of local government cannot be 
denied without the revision of the Constitution. The local government system, 
however, has been subjected to the central legislation and the control of central 
government. Since the epoch-making development in central-local relations, the 
institutional change has been directed toward to creating more effective local 
democracy. As a result, the Act of Local Autonomy and the Local Finance Act 
have been reinforced to give more power to local government and to develop 
more democratic central local government relations.  
The hypotheses and expectations outlined in chapter1 started from 
reflections on the researcher’s experience as a central government official in the 
local finance department of MOGAHA. This created a belief that the redesign of 
central controls had encouraged greater local autonomy. Contrary to our 
expectation, this thesis empirically found that most central government controls 
are still related to the negative or neutral influence on local government 
performance despite the formal arrangement of more democratic central local 
government relations.  
This empirical evidence shed light on the current status of local government 
which is more seriously subjected to the central government controls than is 
implied by the delegations contained in the Constitution. The systems operating 
to constrain local autonomy include the external institution such as the law and 
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internal environments such as the culture. These systems, especially central 
government controls, did not realize the basic constitutional value of local 
democracy and the consensus about local democracy.  
The interaction between regulative and cognitive institutions in operating the 
local government system has constrained the operation of local government’s 
tasks. In the aspect of regulative institution, the NPM styled fiscal reform was 
considered as a ‘more democratic’ mode of central controls in this thesis but the 
empirical evidence implicates that the NPM reform was not actually ‘democratic 
change’ but just a ‘technique’ of the new managerial paradigm, at least, in the 
Korean policy context. The emphasis on performance and autonomy of local 
government was a slogan of the NPM, apparently seeking to transcend strong 
centralism. In reality, the way of implementing NPM was not an outright rejection 
of centralism but perpetuated a centralist’s bias. The nature of the central 
controls over local government has been substantially conservative and resistant 
to the democratic change. On the other hand, in the aspect of agents of change, 
central government officials resisted the transfer of power to local government 
because they feared to lose their enormous power in central-local government 
relations. The devolution of power was a menace to the MOGAHA and MPB. 
They, therefore, showed a tendency not to abrogate the traditional role without 
alternative controlling mechanisms outlined in chapter 5. MPB could not try to 
incorporate the local finance into the national finance due to the changed political 
condition of local autonomy. Instead MPB intended to surreptitiously monitor local 
finance through the connection of the central local financial information system, in 
order to monopolize the government financial information. MOGAHA intended to 
vitalize local autonomy at least through the legal change but desperately 
intended to maintain central government authority over local government. As a 
result MOGAHA retained the ministerial power to issue orders and regulation in 
the process of reform.  
The cultural adhesion to expectations of central direction outweighed the 
piecemeal change of central government controls. Thus, local government 
officials were sharing the cultural historical understanding of the superiority of 
central government which was accumulated by the long history of Confucianism, 
the security needs of Korea as a divided nation and the successful experiences 
of state-led development. The local government leadership thus did not take a 
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leading part in the process of the reform. The financial reform of local 
government was led by central government and local government lacked of the 
available information and the formal channel to participate in the reform.  This 
result suggests that the current central controls need to change in order to 
enhance the value of local government and local democracy which is enshrined 
in the Constitution. The democratic changes of central controls remained only in 
the level of regulatory and normative aspects and were not supported by the 
cognitive culture in which the interactions between central and local governments 
process new information and reach appropriate decisions from the reform. 
 Also what cannot be ignored in interpreting the unexpected empirical 
evidence of sustained central controls is the application of the theory which is 
used to support the positive relations between political democracy and 
government performance in chapter 1 and 6.The normative controls represent 
the changed mode through which central governments tend to give more 
discretion to local governments and to suggest the idea of outcome and 
responsibility rather than to centralize power and to directly control local 
governments. The normative control, thus, means a ‘more democratized’ mode 
than the coercive control. The expectation of its positive effect was based on the 
literature about the relation between democracy and government performance, in 
which a positive relationship exists between the level of democracy and the 
government performance across countries (Adam, A. et al, 2011). The 
democratic change in controls exercised by central government is assumed to 
enhance the local democracy. In turn the increase of local democracy is 
supposed to link with improved performance of local government because the 
growth of local democracy holds elected local politicians accountable and thus 
motivates the elected mayors to enhance performance in order to remain in 
power. However, most of the effective practice of a democracy depends on the 
existence of a link between the citizens and the public management of local 
government (James and John, 2007:567). The connection between public 
management performance and political behaviour fills the gap in the theory which 
we used for the expectation of normative control. Elected politicians need to 
improve local service performance of which electors might take more account in 
local elections where the responsible public bureaucracies are under direct 
control of elected politicians (Boyne et al, 2009: 1274). In this sense, a gap might 
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exist between the JPA performance and the citizens’ voting. The published JPA 
performance information did not appear to substantially impact the following 
election of mayors and governors after the publication of JPA according to the 
recent electoral outcomes (see 4.4 of chapter 4). The inconsistent empirical 
result of normative controls with the expectation might be evidence disproving the 
links between JPA performance and electoral outcome. Thus the theory was not 
applied to the present thesis. Importantly, further research about the relations 
between pubic management performance and political outcomes is required to 
confirm this speculation.   
    This thesis also identifies a counter-intuitive effect in the operation of central 
government control over local governments’ financial resource. The remunerative 
control is employed for central government to expand local resources by 
intergovernmental transfers and was proved to work negatively for local 
government performance. The theory of different spending responsibilities for 
different resources can explain these outcomes. In other words, central 
government’s strict overseeing of spending earmarked subsidies could enhance 
efficiency of local government (Geys and Moesen, 2009), whilst unconditional 
grants received from the higher layers of government stimulate inefficient 
spending by local government (Moesen and Cauwenberge, 2000). Remunerative 
controls by expanding unconditional intergovernmental transfers did not make 
recipient local governments become responsible for their spending from the 
perspective of fiscal performance. We can conclude that MOGAHA and MPB 
must stop the convention of utilizing the shared tax system (unconditional 
intergovernmental transfer) in order to conveniently address the political and 
financial needs of local governments. 
    Another interesting finding is the connection between political factors and 
local fiscal performance. Elected politicians in local government were revealed to 
play a constructive role in improving performance of local government. The 
longer elected politicians hold office, the better performance is in the short term. 
They strategically managed and occupied local government and also actively 
participated in the national politics as well. The ruling party mayors or governors 
were revealed to have a connection with improved local government performance. 
This implies that party politics at the local level is nationalized, centralising on the 
ruling party. Considering the abolition of local party branches in 2004, the 
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problem of lack of communication between the party and the citizens, and unfair 
political competition between incumbent and the challenger in local politics might 
intensify the centralization on mayors with the ruling party.  
    Moreover, the questions also considered a growing concern about financial 
or fiscal crises. Unexpectedly, the statistical results demonstrated the complex 
effects of the financial crises. The positive impact of the financial crises reflects 
the experiences of Korea which has been resilient against crises, drawing on the 
deep-seated patriotism of South Koreans. But when interacting with central 
controls, their combined effects were suddenly changed to be negative. This 
evidence implies that the financial crisis can be an opportunity to induce 
responsibility and thus enhance the performance of local government but during 
the financial crises inadequate central controls may hamper the management of 
local government.  
The simple message of the statistical analysis demonstrates that despite 
changed political environment overall current central controls have no positive 
link with local government performance. Central controls seem to evolve into 
democratic governance after extending local autonomy but institutionally this 
change has been ‘retarded’ in Korea. Taking into consideration the stability of 
centralism (see chapter 2), the democratic change in central-local relations may 
conflict with hierarchical culture and convention. If the experimentation toward a 
greater local democracy was supported by the cognitive aspects of institution, it 
may enhance an increase in local democracy. Therefore central governments 
need to pay attention to changing the policy culture. The government officials 
prefer reforming the regulative institution to changing the culture. It takes 
considerable time to change the cognitive culture and history which inform the 
operation of the law. It is difficult to capture the subtlety, the importance and the 
implementation of cultural change. The cultural change, therefore, is easy to be 
ignored by the policy makers. However this thesis revealed that only the 
regulative change for local democracy did not produce the expected results of 
improving the performance of local government. The regulative institution should 
be supported by the shared culture, in order to achieve the goal of the reform. 
The Korean government lacks of more democratic, horizontal and creative 
intergovernmental relations in a policy culture that emphasises trust, equality and 
creative partnership, in order to nurture local democracy. In this sense, the lesson 
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of this study promotes awareness of the incongruent reform that focuses mainly 
on regulative change. The incongruent change cannot nurture local democracy 
because the systems operating local democracy did not chemically combine with 
the supporting norms and culture. Now the central government should make an 
effort to change the cultural aspect to bring the democratic central local relations 
and to increase local democracy. 
    
 
2. Distinctive contribution to knowledge and review of 
the research 
2.1. Contribution 
This research traced the historical context of central controls and local autonomy 
and thus allows a deeper understanding of the dynamic transition of central-local 
government relations in Korea. Also it undertook a statistical analysis to elaborate 
the effect of central controls on local government over the past decade or so. 
Therefore it provides the empirical evidence to inform central-local government 
relations and allows practical applications to the policy of local government. This 
study contributes insights towards an open-ended reform process that is still 
evolving. 
First of all, this thesis draws on primary data in Korean and the thesis as a 
whole presents perhaps the first extended discussion in English of democratic 
local government in Korea. It therefore provides a unique resource for those 
studying Korea or researching on comparative local government. Korean local 
government was paralyzed until the 1990s. Even after extending local autonomy 
with the influence of growing democratization and economic development, the 
issue of Korean local government has not been actively studied because of 
language barriers. This study provides important information about the historic 
context and the current institutions of the Korean local government (chapters 2 to 
5). In the light of the development of local autonomy, this study has the potential 
to offer useful data and valuable lessons informing the development of central 
and local government relations in the wider field of the public sector.  
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Second, this thesis contributes to the established body of knowledge as 
follows. Central controls’ varying effects identified in this thesis are consistent 
with the findings of the growing body of literature about performance, in which 
supportive central control through inspection by central government has no 
independent effect on public service performance (Andrews et al, 2011: 45) and 
over-control by central government has a detrimental effect on local performance 
(Revelli, 2005). However this is a different result with the orthodox understanding 
that the supportive regulation, which is considered by regulatee, is more likely to 
have positive outcomes in public services (Hughes, et al., 1997). In the aspect of 
policy instruments, the overall results in this thesis are parallel to the 
accumulated literature where coercive regulations have some devastating side-
effects and lack effectiveness in some policy contexts; economic policy 
instruments such as subsidies and grants are preferred instruments, but their 
effects vary according to the culture and political structure (Bemelmance-Videc, 
2003:10-11). 
The need for cultural change inside central government and political parties 
is highlighted in this thesis for the politics of central-local relations. The 
accountability to citizens has been frequently neglected by fractional party politics 
or in responding to a nationally preferred agenda. Central government 
departments have seen local governments as agencies for the provision of 
services in accordance with national policies rather than as local governments 
which are accountable to the needs and aspirations of local communities and 
citizens (Copus, 2014: 170; Stewart, 2014: 846). Sharing the mind-set of obeying 
central government and national parties at the local level was a positive cultural 
background for rapid economic growth but is not any more for the move to 
greater local autonomy. The Korean experience is being handed down to 
neighbour countries such as Mongolia, Vietnam and Egypt. They dispatch many 
officials to benchmark the Korean local government system. Korea is a typical 
transitional country which has moved from authoritarian government to 
democratic regime but had atypical ‘continuous revolution’. The study of the 
Korean reform will be an interesting country case for comparative research with 
other potential country cases. 
While the literature of performance management in the public sector has a 
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lot of information about how the performance principles affected how the public 
bodies operated, there is not much hard evidence as to what differences in 
outputs and outcomes all this change has produced (Pollitt and Bouckaret, 2011; 
Bouckaret and Halligan, 2008). In this sense, the present study provides 
empirical evidence that the NPM fiscal reforms have no substantial impact, at 
least on the fiscal performance. This implies that the NPM fiscal reforms 
encountered, so called, cultural resistance; local governments were just 
‘regulated’ by the central government norm. So this thesis provides a country 
case-study other than Anglo-Saxon and CEE countries in that Korea has 
sustained a series of NPM reforms without interruption even after government 
changes and responses to the recent financial crises. 
Third, this thesis undertook the first empirical test focusing on fiscal 
institution through which central government exercises control over local 
government. The empirical research discovered a theoretical link in the form of a 
negative relationship between central controls and local government performance 
in Korea. It stresses that an increase in the independent finance ensue a 
corresponding increase in spending responsibility of local government, as 
opposed to intergovernmental transfers. Thus the benefit of local income tax is 
linked to improved local responsibility. The previous study has investigated the 
effect of fiscal decentralizations on a range of characteristics within the public 
sector, which include the level of corruption, budget size, the level of economic 
growth and the degree of political stability (Osung Kwon, 2012). This thesis 
measured controls exercised by central government in the process of reform of 
the local financial system. It is worth diagnosing the current position of central 
local government relations of Korea in light of the degree of centralization. This 
thesis has theoretically analysed varied political and administrative 
consequences of centralization in the Korean context. This provides important 
lessons to government practitioners as well as the academic circle about the 
direction of decentralization. The traditional central controls need to be 
moderated by the consideration of the impact on local government and also new 
experimental modes of central controls should consider incentive structures to 
induce good performance of local government. 
 For the first time, this thesis obtained deeper data about performance of the 
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Korean local government and utilized it for an academic and didactic purpose. 
The performance assessment of the Korean local government (JPA) has been 
implemented since 1999 and but only the summary grades about each sector of 
local government has been open to the public. Until recently the detailed score of 
each sector has not been opened due to political and administrative reasons. If 
the detailed scores of each sector and performance indicators were made public 
it may cause excessive competition between local governments and unnecessary 
debates about the objectivity of assessed results. Further it could affect the 
support for local policies and re-election of the elected politicians of local 
government. This study managed to trace and collect the performance data with 
the support of MOPAS though it is limited to local government finance (see 
Appendix 3). This data will be so useful for the future study of local government 
performance of Korea.  
Last but not least, this thesis provides a unique case using the perspective of 
historical institutionalism in explaining the change of central- local relations and 
the financial crises. Historical institutionalists are giving increasing attention to the 
“interaction” between institutional structures and agents. This study focused on 
the interaction of MOGAHA strategies with the extension of local autonomy by 
looking at the conditions under which MOGAHA needed to take actions 
promoting institutional change but also the conditions under which they needed 
to survive the seriously reduced ministerial functions over local government. This 
study, thus, confirmed that institutions are complexes of rule and culture rather 
than unified and consistent constraints. This study also paid attention to the 
previous or initial policy decisions based on a process of liberalization which 
caused the Korean financial crisis which in turn played a role of the initial impulse 
for public sector reform from the end of the1990s to the 2000s. The resilience 
echoed the persistence of central controls as an institution even after the 
increased concern of local autonomy. However this study identified the possibility 
of more democratic change of central control through the institutional evidence 
such as the introduction of local consumption tax and local income tax. In this 
way, this research takes the first steps from which future study of 
intergovernmental relationships is approached by the context of historical 
institutionalism, since there have been mainly descriptive studies about recent 
crises and little literature on the relationship between financial crises, government 
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controls and performance which can be defined as outputs, outcomes, or political 
success, measured by attitudes and electoral outcomes.   
2.2. Limitation of the research 
There are limitations of this thesis in respect of methodology, despite distinctive 
contributions to the knowledge and review of the research about central local 
government relations and government performance analysis. The first issue is 
related to the regional level of observation of this study. Due to the panel where 
the unit of analysis is regional government, this study overlooked findings at the 
basic local level. The reason for focus on the ‘regional’ level is that data is not 
available for smaller units. The other aspect is the difficulty of discussing 
variations between the experiences of different regions. The JPA data does not 
directly show that some regions responded better to central control than others. 
The regions which accepted normative controls are assumed to respond better to 
central controls because the normative mode is optional for local government and 
we can compare the units which do experience normative controls with those 
which do not. As for coercive and remunerative controls, which all units 
experienced over time, this study argued how those controls influenced annual 
performance over a given period but do not explain why some comply better and 
other do not with central controls.   
Second, this study could not use the Hausman test to compare a fixed effect 
model with a random effect model. Nevertheless the features of the current 
statistical model support the validity and appropriateness of the current fixed-
effect model. This study is free from the drawbacks of the fixed effect estimator 
because the statistical models established in chapter 6 do not include any time-
invariant variables (see chapter 7).  The fixed effect panel data model could not 
provide a statistical explanation of the variation of performance when time-
invariable explanatory variables are dropped from the model and their 
coefficients are not identified. This research design takes not only the deviations 
of actual local governments’ financial decisions from centrally set financial 
standards but also the financial crises as the explanatory variables and they are 
all time-varying variables. In addition, the fixed effect model always gives 
consistent estimates but the random effect estimation is sometimes inconsistent. 
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To do a Hausman-test, an instrumental variable to each explanatory variable is 
needed and it is beyond the current statistical model.  
Third, the intensity of central controls was not measured due to 
characteristics of public sector and methodological limitation. This might be one 
of the practical reasons why until recently far less attention has been paid to 
modelling the direct effects of the quantity and quality of central controls on 
performance of local government. Central control which is measured as a 
numerical variable might help to explain the effect of central controls on regional 
variation in performances with a more robust approach. Generally, however, 
central control is exercised with the same intensity across the regions because of 
the operations of the unitary country and the rule of law in governmental relations. 
Even if we made the checklist with quantitative and qualitative properties of 
controls to measure the intensity of a mode of control, the intensity checked 
would definitely be the same across the regions and time-invariant, which may 
cause another methodological problem because a classic fixed effect approach 
will not produce any estimates of the effects of variables that do not change over 
time.  
The measures of normative controls are limited to sufficiently reflect the 
democratic change in central controls. This thesis measured the normative 
control when and which regional government participated in the reform of the 
programme budget and accrual based accounting. However after this reform 
there was revolutionary reform in local fiscal institutions such as the introduction 
of local consumption tax and local income tax in 2010. If we had included the tax 
reform in the measures of the normative control, this thesis may have obtained a 
different result about the impact of the democratic change of central controls. The 
impact of the new local taxes in 2010 on local government performance actually 
comes into effect in 2011 which is outside the period covered by this thesis.  
Lastly, due to the limitations of the present empirical approach, the focus of 
the study is on the only dependent variables: fiscal performance of local 
government. It is difficult to collect detailed performance information about other 
sectors except the categorical data from the results of the annual JPA. To obtain 
more productive results, other, alternative dependent variables may be needed. 
For example, they are the customer satisfaction of local public services, the 
degree of financial autonomy, or the rate of independence of finance of local 
 258 
government. Without information published by international or governmental 
research organizations, data for the performance of local government is difficult 
to collect for the purpose of a personal based study.   
 
3. Suggestions for government policy and future research 
3.1. Recent developments and suggestions  
Democratic central-local relations as well as the greater local democracy are in 
the process of ongoing evolution through continuous institutional change in Korea. 
This point underlines the contribution this thesis could make. Korea entered into 
the twentieth year of local autonomy chosen by people in June 2015. The 
Presidential Committee for the Development of Local autonomy (PCLA) 
published a comprehensive development plan of local autonomy in December 
2014. The new plan raises a question over the foundational structure as well as 
the contents of local autonomy. This initiative provides a topical and highly policy 
relevant vehicle for discussing the implications of this study in relation to the 
current reform debates aimed at establishing the future model of Korean local 
autonomy. First of all, this study has implications for redesigning local 
government structure. Currently regarding the plan of PCLA, there is a fierce 
controversy about abolishing autonomous district councils and changing elected 
district executives to appoint new ones at the level of metropolitan cities, with the 
exception of Seoul (see Figure 2-2). The department of local public 
administration in MOGAHA has a coalition with PCLA to abolish small authorities 
in the sense that the unnaturally divided districts were widely seen as one of the 
key problems in the existing structure which cause inefficient public services 
provision, inconvenience of residents and the high costs of administration. 
However, the change is in a quandary because the association of elected ward 
chiefs, civil groups for devolution and many academic experts criticize that this 
plan as a reverse of local democracy (Yonhap News, 28 Jan 2015). The current 
discussion is another example of the reverting trend of central controls to the past 
after the recent financial crisis. There is little recognition of increased difficulties 
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of communication in and between large-scale departmental structures under the 
same mayor. The policy makers and politicians need to remember that this 
structural change can undermine existing strengths in the greater potential to 
increase local democracy based on the close living community, as this thesis has 
continuously stressed, the centralism’s damaging effect on local government.  
On the other hand, breaking from convention, the various options of local 
government models are considered in the policy sphere as alternatives to the 
currently standardized strong mayor and councillor system (PCLA, 2014). For a 
while the power of local government monopolized by the chief executive caused 
sceptical opinions to spread over local autonomy, although the constructive role 
of the chief executive in local politics is empirically supported by the current study 
(see chapters 8 and 9). The new models take into account redistributing the 
strong power of the elected mayor to be more equally shared among the local 
council and people.  In this case, central controls on the constraint of the local 
governments’ structural model are expected to be lifted considerably and, instead, 
to remain just to provide the proper guidance and models for local government. 
Institutional change which allows more alternatives and choices for local 
government will contribute to enhancing the diversity and the freedom of local 
autonomy.  
As for the long-term aims within the plan of PCLA, the status and the role of 
regional government is planned to exclude the established roles of it as an upper 
local government and as an agency of central government (PCLA, 2014). The 
members of PCLA agree with this basic idea but have no detailed discussions. 
With regards to this, the current study can make known the appropriateness of 
the reform, because we found that the regional governments have played a major 
role in the sustained centralism in Korea from the period of the Goryeo in chapter 
2 and the appointed central officials still control the autonomous local 
governments. Without the role of central government agencies, the relations 
between the central and the regional governments, and the regional and the 
basic local governments would change to horizontal partnerships. For the 
purpose of preparing the future unification with North Korea, the reform of local 
governments should facilitate democratic central-local relations and develop local 
democracy.  
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The negative impact of central control which is empirically proved from this 
thesis has implications for the reform of decentralization. Decentralization has 
been an effective tool for the government reform but more active reorganization 
and power distribution is required to improve the central and local government 
relations. This also improves the efficiency of services provision and finally 
enhances the quality of life of the residents within a much closer distance. 
Basically, the government affairs should be differentiated between those which 
local government does better from those which the central government does 
better. The tendency to preserve the convention and the persistency of the 
substantial controls with inspection and finance are still witnessed in the 
behaviour of central government in the process of decentralization. Meanwhile, 
the transfers of the power and activities of central government were confirmed by 
committees but many of them are still left under the authority of central 
government because central government is reluctant to lose the instruments for 
controlling local governments. On this behaviour of central government, the 
current study supports more positive implementation of decentralization policies 
because most controls exercised by central governments are not related with 
improved local government performance. Central government and politicians thus 
should not stick to the conventional way of central controls. Instead they should 
attempt to identify and accommodate new modes of central controls and other 
contingencies that shape improved local government.   
To substantially fulfil the redistribution of affairs, expansion of the financial 
capacity of local government to support their increased responsibility is also 
needed. The financial reform should be made to address the more fundamental 
problem not just expanding transfers but curing the imbalance of financial 
capacity. A study noted that in developing countries, the increase of fiscal 
autonomy of local government tends to induce further complicated results 
because of corruption and the perception of the rule of law (Osung Kwon, 2012). 
This account is frequently the reason why the central government controls local 
government. However the evidence of the current study presents the view that 
central controls are not related with improved performance of local government in 
Korea. This implies that in a transitional country like Korea the positive effect 
attained from fiscal autonomy is much greater than local government’s 
malfeasance. In particular, regarding this view, the current study found that 
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intergovernmental transfers continuously increased and, instead, the 
independent finance was not activated as much (see chapters 2 and 5). Various 
modes of local taxation should be reinforced drawing on the experience of the 
local income tax and local consumption tax. This thesis identifies very clear 
benefits from independent sources of local income which are far preferable to 
financial transfers from the centre. Facing increasing numbers of local projects 
which are funded by grants, central government should establish clear legal 
standards for the reasonable grant rates according to different projects and local 
government’s capacity. With more independence over their finance, local 
governments could be reborn in the legal entity to take responding accountability 
from their electorate not from central government.  
Lastly, the current model of managing performance in local government 
needs to continuously evolve to the more developed stages of performance 
management and even further to performance governance which are proposed 
by Boukeart and Halligan (2008). The GAA needs to be a driver of performance 
based on an integrated managerial framework that relies on performance 
indicators. For this, performance information should be actively incorporated in 
the process of policy implementation and used in local service provision in 
addition to the reward and penalties for public officials as well as the organization. 
There is a danger that performance management by local government becomes 
discredited to ‘a superficial paper-chase’, subject to technical manipulation and 
tactics, making culture change of the local government even harder. Therefore 
local government in developing systems of performance measurement needs to 
integrate them adequately with mainstream budgetary and management 
processes in order not to ignore the management of performance and to motivate 
better performance. By doing so, JPA can provide legitimacy within the 
institutional environment and have the capacity to inform organizational change 
and service improvement to citizens. The emphasis of performance also reflects 
the momentum to improve political control of administration. A problem is that 
motivation for performance management is to control staff, budgets and activities 
rather than to learn about what is going on and to achieve continuous 
improvement (Sanderson, 2001: 311). Therefore the development of 
performance management requires coherent respect for the performance results 
across the functions of society as well as the consistent and comprehensive use 
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of performance information within each organization      
These ideas might be inserted into the policy process to establish the future 
Korean local autonomy model which currently involves PCLA and MOGAHA. The 
researcher is an official within MOGAHA and is therefore located in a position to 
propose these ideas in the internal debate over local government policy. In 
addition this thesis will be added to in the research database of the government 
and can be engaged with by officials of MOGAHA and advisory academics of 
PCLA.  
3.2. Suggestions for future research 
Further studies, rather than focusing on the negative effect of central controls, 
may need to take into account the other modes or features of central controls 
which are related with better performance of local government as part of 
incentive schemes for intergovernmental relations. They may need to cover a 
longer period in order to prove different effects of normative controls in 
accordance with the time lag of institutional change. This also may make a 
contribution to the literature on the different rates of institutional change or the 
evolutional change of central controls in a new-born democratic country. To 
obtain a more productive and generous conclusion of incentive schemes, further 
review of central controls may be needed in other functions such as personnel or 
organizational policies beyond the boundary of the fiscal institution of local 
government. If a certain feature or element of controls exercised by central 
government was discovered to have a positive relation with improved local 
democracy or local performance, it must be an interesting finding in the central-
local government relations.   
    The impact of different sources of local performance can be considered in 
further research to compare the effect of central controls. This research used JPA 
performance data produced by the Korean central government which was 
independent of local service consumers. However the performance of local 
government can be identified by customer satisfaction research other than the 
performance assessment by central government. For the various aspects of 
performance, the survey method can be used and the research model must be 
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established to control methodological bias. If the research succeeded in 
comparing the influence of central control between performance assessed by 
central government and the degree of satisfaction evaluated by citizens, it may 
prove to whom local government is more accountable.  
Also, local government performance should be empirically examined in a 
more comprehensive context. Future research can focus on how performance 
information affected electoral outcomes in Korea as we noted above. The subject 
may contribute to providing a connection between public management and 
political outcome (James and John, 2007). The recent study found the major 
elements of strategic management matter for the effectiveness of public service 
depending on which aspect of strategy content and process are pursued together, 
and how these in turn are combined with organizational structure and the 
technical and institutional environment (Andrews et al., 2011: 160). However 
comprehensive external and internal circumstances that may influence local 
government performance are important in the aspect of what circumstances 
make a difference to public service performance. In this sense, future research 
may need to consider more managerial elements as well as technical 
environments of local government performance.   
There is potential for comparative research on local government across 
countries, based on the information and resources about Korean local 
government of the current study. In particular, Japan and China can be good 
comparison targets because they have some similar historical cultural 
background with Korea. The comparison about the evolution of central-local 
relations, the role of political parties in local politics, and citizens’ participation in 
local politics is useful for the formation of future models of local democracy. 
Considering the prevailing policy context of local government, how financial 
crises impacted local government service provision in countries worldwide is also 
an interesting subject. Otherwise, the outcomes of the NPM reforms in the Anglo-
Saxon and CEE countries can be compared with the case of Korea, which may 
highlight how the factors of the culture, history and political system have an 
impact on the effect of reform. 
Research of local government and local democracy is very important 
because it decentralizes monopolized power and provides opportunities for 
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citizen participation in government. Wherever the power concentrates, it is likely 
to be abused and eventually it may threaten the right and freedom of people. So, 
local government plays the role of a political shield protecting the citizens from a 
potentially authoritarian centre. The practical addition is that local government is 
the most effective mediator for the delivery of services to demanding citizens by 
taking maximum advantage of local experience, familiarity and expertise in an 
increasingly prosperous society. The democratic local government can be 
achieved by the provision of sufficient ammunition, further evidence supporting 
the argument that local decision making is more appropriate and better than 
decisions emanating from the centre. The accumulation of knowledge, 
experiments and imagination contribute to the institutional development of local 
government and local politics. In this sense, the constructive criticism and 
prudential reflection is very crucial for the health of Korean democracy.  
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                    Appendices 
Appendix 1.  Description of the Variables 
MOPAS: The Ministry of Public Administration and Security (2008-2013) 
MOGAHA: The Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs(1998-2007, 2014-)  
BOK: Bank of Korea 
NEC: National Election Committee (http://www.nec.go.kr/engvote_2013/main/main.jsp) 
KSO: Korea Statistical Office 
 
Variables Measurements Data Source 
 
Dependent variables 
  
 Short-term performance   JPA score T+1 MOGAHA 
 Long-term performance JPA score T+2  MOGAHA 
 
Explanatory variables 
  
 Central controls   
   Normative Control Sharing the norm of performance 
  with local government involved in 
pilot-run or implementation of 
Program Budget and  
Accrual base Accounting, 1/0 
MOGAHA 2000,  
MOGAHA 2006 
   Coercive Control Direct control measured by 
  Fiscal Emergency Spending  
applied to all local governments 
1/0 
MOPAS 2008 
   Remunerative Control The increase of the Shared 
  Tax rate 1/0 
MOPAS 2013 
 Crises   
  National Economic Crises Minus Economic growth BOK 
  Local Fiscal Crises If the ratio of debt to budget is 
40% 1/0 
KSO, MOGAHA 
 
Control variables 
  
  Political Party Effect When chief executive 
  (governor or mayor) came  
  from the ruling party 1/0 
NEC 
   
per capita GRDP Regional income in nominal term KSO 
Tenure Periods of chief executive 
 holding office measured in  
terms of month 
NEC 
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Appendix 2. The published result of the 2011 JPA 
 Metropolitan Cities (7) Province (9) 
 
GA 
(Best) 
NA 
(Fair) 
DA 
(Weak) 
GA 
(Best) 
NA 
(Fair) 
DA 
(Weak) 
Local  
administration 
Seoul 
Busan 
 
Daegu 
Daejon 
Ulsan 
Incheon 
Kwangju 
Chungbuk 
Gyengnam 
Jeju 
Chungnam 
Jeonbuk 
Jeonnam 
Gyeonggi 
Gangwon 
Gyengbuk 
Social  
Welfare 
Daegu 
Ulsan 
 
Busan 
Kwangju 
Daejon 
Seoul 
Incheon 
Chungbuk 
Gyengnam 
Jeju 
Gangwon 
Jeonbuk 
Jeonnam 
Gyeonggi 
Chungnam 
Gyengbuk 
Health & 
Sanitation 
Daejon 
Incheon 
Busan 
Kwangju 
Daegu 
 
Seoul 
Ulsan 
Chungbuk 
Jeonbuk 
Gyengnam 
Gangwon 
Chungnam 
Jeonnam 
Gyeonggi 
Gyengbuk 
Jeju 
Environment  
management 
Ulsan 
Daejon 
Seoul 
Incheon 
Kwangju 
 
Busan 
Daegu 
Gangwon 
Chungnam 
Gyengnam 
Chungbuk 
Jeonnam 
Gyengbuk 
Gyeonggi 
Jeonbuk 
Jeju 
Local  
Economy 
Kwangju  
Ulsan  
 
Daegu 
Incheon 
Ulsan 
Seoul 
Busan 
Daejon 
Chungbuk 
Jeonnam 
Gyengnam 
Gangwon 
Gyengbuk 
Jeju 
Gyeonggi 
Chungnam 
Jeonbuk 
Regional  
development 
Seoul 
Ulsan 
Daegu 
Incheon 
Kwangju 
Busan 
Daejon 
Gangwon 
Jeonbuk 
Jeonnam 
Gyengbuk 
Gyengnam 
Jeju 
Gyeonggi 
Chungbuk 
Chungnam 
Culture  & 
Tourism 
Kwangju 
Daejon 
Busan 
Daegu 
Incheon 
Seoul 
Ulsan 
Gyeonggi 
Gangwon 
Jeju 
Jeonbuk 
Jeonnam 
Gyengnam 
Chungbuk 
Chungnam 
Gyengbuk 
Security 
Busan 
Kwangju 
Seoul 
Daejon 
Ulsan 
Daegu 
Incheon 
Chungbuk 
Jeonbuk 
Gyengnam 
Gangwon 
Jeonnam 
Jeju 
Gyeonggi 
Chungnam 
Gyengbuk 
Service  
Innovation 
Busan 
Ulsan 
Incheon 
Kwangju 
Daejon 
Seoul 
Daegu 
Gangwon 
Jeonbuk 
Gyengbuk 
Chungnam 
Gyengnam 
Jeju 
Gyeonggi 
Chungbuk 
Jeonnam 
 
Source: adapted from the disclosure of the 2011 JPA results (MOPAS, 2012) 
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Appendix 3. The collection of unpublished JPA scores 
 
The JPA data employed in this thesis, and especially the fiscal performance 
scores contained in Appendix 4) comprise original unpublished data. Prior to this 
research no disaggregated JPA data had been revealed to the public in any 
publication. Thus the collection of unpublished fiscal performance of JPA 
provides researchers with knowledge that could be used for further analysis and 
publication. 
 
The researcher has enjoyed privileged access the disaggregated JPA data since 
she is a serving public official supported by a Korean Government scholarship. 
She was employed by MOPAS as a deputy director in the local government 
finance from 2003 to 2011 and currently is on the staff of MOGAHA, which is the 
new name of MOPAS.  
 
The data collection was conducted by e-mails and telephone interviews with four 
public officials of MOPAS at Director and Deputy Director level. These serving 
officials kindly provided data files on the understanding that the material would be 
employed for academic research and incorporated into scholarly publications 
 
The raw data included the in-depth information of sector, programme, 
performance indicator, weighted value, score, rank and grade, and means of the 
group and entire local government. 
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Appendix 4. Fiscal performance of local governments from JPA 
 
 
government N year P(T+1) P (T+2) N year 
P(T+
1) 
P (T+2) N 
yea
r 
P(T+1) P (T+2) 
Seoul 1 1998 84.2021 84.75  81 2003 92.32  81.68  161 2008 88.00  76.33  
Busan 2 1998 80.50 84.15  82 2003 92.26  77.48  162 2008 77.00  75.33  
Daegue 3 1998 77.90 79.20  83 2003 85.91  81.61  163 2008 79.00  70.00  
Incheon 4 1998 81.60 83.45  84 2003 92.57  82.45  164 2008 76.50  58.67  
Gwanju 5 1998 74.40 79.45  85 2003 87.83  79.75  165 2008 81.00  78.33  
Daejeon 6 1998 82.30 82.50  86 2003 89.70  81.10  166 2008 83.50  62.00  
Ulsan 7 1998 79.20 85.50  87 2003 89.15  76.25  167 2008 76.50  58.33  
Gyeonggi 8 1998 89.10 83.95  88 2003 96.20  82.32  168 2008 91.75  63.00  
Gangwon 9 1998 75.00 81.05  89 2003 84.08  79.86  169 2008 71.50  69.67  
Chungbuk 10 1998 76.00 80.45  90 2003 88.33  80.79  170 2008 78.75  72.00  
Chungnam 11 1998 76.30 83.70  91 2003 85.63  86.29  171 2008 81.75  80.33  
Jeonbuk 12 1998 75.00 84.20  92 2003 85.34  80.23  172 2008 91.00  78.33  
Jeonnam 13 1998 74.10 88.10  93 2003 83.25  85.01  173 2008 90.25  89.67  
Gyeongbuk 14 1998 65.40 88.00  94 2003 84.97  84.17  174 2008 72.25  68.67  
Gyeongnam 15 1998 77.50 90.00  95 2003 88.34  86.25  175 2008 90.75  73.67  
Jeju 16 1998 73.90 83.90  96 2003 85.33  83.21  176 2008 82.25  65.67  
Seoul 17 1999 84.75  94.42  97 2004 81.68  81.68  177 2009 76.33  82.00  
Busan 18 1999 84.15  91.09  98 2004 77.48  77.48  178 2009 75.33  84.00  
Daegue 19 1999 79.20  89.90  99 2004 81.61  81.61  179 2009 70.00  89.00  
Incheon 20 1999 83.45  90.49  100 2004 82.45  82.45  180 2009 58.67  80.00  
Gwanju 21 1999 79.45  88.80  101 2004 79.75  79.75  181 2009 78.33  67.00  
Daejeon 22 1999 82.50  88.27  102 2004 81.10  81.10  182 2009 62.00  60.00  
Ulsan 23 1999 85.50  92.04  103 2004 76.25  76.25  183 2009 58.33  60.00  
Gyeonggi 24 1999 83.95  92.24  104 2004 82.32  82.30  184 2009 63.00  90.00  
Gangwon 25 1999 81.05  90.85  105 2004 79.86  79.90  185 2009 69.67  72.00  
Chungbuk 26 1999 80.45  92.53  106 2004 80.79  80.80  186 2009 72.00  64.00  
Chungnam 27 1999 83.70  92.37  107 2004 86.29  86.30  187 2009 80.33  78.00  
Jeonbuk 28 1999 84.20  89.97  108 2004 80.23  80.20  188 2009 78.33  81.00  
Jeonnam 29 1999 88.10  93.19  109 2004 85.01  85.00  189 2009 89.67  80.00  
Gyeongbuk 30 1999 88.00  90.12  110 2004 84.17  84.20  190 2009 68.67  81.00  
Gyeongnam 31 1999 90.00  95.32  111 2004 86.25  86.30  191 2009 73.67  73.00  
Jeju 32 1999 83.90  90.29  112 2004 83.21  83.20  192 2009 65.67  59.00  
Seoul 33 2000 94.42  92.30  113 2005 81.68  77.26  193 2010 82.00  69.73  
Busan 34 2000 91.09  88.61  114 2005 77.48  78.37  194 2010 84.00  77.79  
Daegue 35 2000 89.90    115 2005 81.61  76.55  195 2010 89.00  88.76  
Incheon 36 2000 90.49  87.48  116 2005 82.45  81.07  196 2010 80.00  78.06  
Gwanju 37 2000 88.80  89.76  117 2005 79.75  77.20  197 2010 67.00  80.16  
Daejeon 38 2000 88.27  90.89  118 2005 81.10  80.44  198 2010 60.00  64.28  
Ulsan 39 2000 92.04  92.09  119 2005 76.25  78.78  199 2010 60.00  77.79  
Gyeonggi 40 2000 92.24  93.14  120 2005 82.30  83.01  200 2010 90.00  85.15  
Gangwon 41 2000 90.85  92.60  121 2005 79.90  81.10  201 2010 72.00  66.82  
Chungbuk 42 2000 92.53  92.74  122 2005 80.80  81.26  202 2010 64.00  76.52  
Chungnam 43 2000 92.37  92.99  123 2005 86.30  82.78  203 2010 78.00  92.84  
Jeonbuk 44 2000 89.97  94.67  124 2005 80.20  83.24  204 2010 81.00  80.16  
Jeonnam 45 2000 93.19  95.35  125 2005 85.00  83.65  205 2010 80.00  81.87  
                                               
21
 This score is the lagged fiscal performance which is converted to a percentage and 
measured by performance indicators of chapter 7. Higher score means better performance.  
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Gyeongbuk 46 2000 90.12  91.61  126 2005 84.20  83.47  206 2010 81.00  95.12  
Gyeongnam 47 2000 95.32  96.46  127 2005 86.30  82.30  207 2010 73.00  81.87  
Jeju 48 2000 90.29  93.51  128 2005 83.20  80.69  208 2010 59.00  62.58  
Seoul 49 2001 92.30  90.35  129 2006 77.26  69.60  209 2011 69.73    
Busan 50 2001 88.61  85.01  130 2006 78.37  71.00  210 2011 77.79    
Daegue 51 2001   89.46  131 2006 76.55  77.20  211 2011 88.76    
Incheon 52 2001 87.48  90.45  132 2006 81.07  77.80  212 2011 78.06    
Gwanju 53 2001 89.76  83.49  133 2006 77.20  78.60  213 2011 80.16    
Daejeon 54 2001 90.89  89.38  134 2006 80.44  69.60  214 2011 64.28    
Ulsan 55 2001 92.09  90.66  135 2006 78.78  77.00  215 2011 77.79    
Gyeonggi 56 2001 93.14  90.38  136 2006 83.01  68.60  216 2011 85.15    
Gangwon 57 2001 92.60  78.99  137 2006 81.10  70.60  217 2011 66.82    
Chungbuk 58 2001 92.74  82.98  138 2006 81.26  79.60  218 2011 76.52    
Chungnam 59 2001 92.99  80.45  139 2006 82.78  60.80  219 2011 92.84    
Jeonbuk 60 2001 94.67  80.17  140 2006 83.24  82.40  220 2011 80.16    
Jeonnam 61 2001 95.35  78.21  141 2006 83.65  70.00  221 2011 81.87    
Gyeongbuk 62 2001 91.61  79.82  142 2006 83.47  75.40  222 2011 95.12    
Gyeongnam 63 2001 96.46  82.99  143 2006 82.30  76.60  223 2011 81.87    
Jeju 64 2001 93.51  80.16  144 2006 80.69  66.40  224 2011 61.58    
Seoul 65 2002 86.73  92.32  145 2007 69.60  88.00  225 2012     
Busan 66 2002 86.67  92.26  146 2007 71.00  77.00  226 2012     
Daegue 67 2002 80.71  85.91  147 2007 77.20  79.00  227 2012     
Incheon 68 2002 86.97  92.57  148 2007 77.80  76.50  228 2012     
Gwanju 69 2002 82.52  87.83  149 2007 78.60  81.00  229 2012     
Daejeon 70 2002 84.27  89.70  150 2007 69.60  83.50  230 2012     
Ulsan 71 2002 83.75  89.15  151 2007 77.00  76.50  231 2012     
Gyeonggi 72 2002 90.38  96.20  152 2007 68.60  91.75  232 2012     
Gangwon 73 2002 78.99  84.08  153 2007 70.60  71.50  233 2012     
Chungbuk 74 2002 82.98  88.33  154 2007 79.60  78.75  234 2012     
Chungnam 75 2002 80.45  85.63  155 2007 60.80  81.75  235 2012     
Jeonbuk 76 2002 80.17  85.34  156 2007 82.40  91.00  236 2012     
Jeonnam 77 2002 78.21  83.25  157 2007 70.00  90.25  237 2012     
Gyeongbuk 78 2002 79.82  84.97  158 2007 75.40  72.25  238 2012     
Gyeongnam 79 2002 82.99  88.34  159 2007 76.60  90.75  239 2012     
Jeju 80 2002 80.16  85.33  160 2007 66.40  82.25  240 2012     
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Appendix 5. Person Correlation 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                
P(T+1) 1               
P(T+2) .40** 1              
Normative 
Ctrl (NC) 
-.46
**
 -.56
**
 1             
Coercive 
Ctrl (CC) 
-.41
**
 -.25
**
 .57
**
 1            
Remunerative
Ctrl (RC) 
.11 -.04 .17
**
 .04 1           
National 
Financial 
Crises 
(NFC) 
-.28
**
 -.34
**
 .14
*
 .07 -.13
*
 1          
Local 
Fiscal 
Crises 
(LFC) 
.20
**
 .15
*
 -.26
**
 -.20
**
 .05 -.16
**
 1         
(NC) x 
(NEC)   
-.24
**
 -.45
**
 .37
**
 .20
**
 .02 .78
**
 -.13
*
 1        
(CC) x 
(NFC)  
-.35
**
 -.24
**
 .25
**
 .44
**
 -.25
**
 .53
**
 -.08 .68
**
 1    
   
(RC) x 
(NFC) 
.01 -.37
**
 .25
**
 -.16
*
 .28
**
 .53
**
 -.08 .68
**
 -.07 1      
(NC) x 
(LFC) 
-.05 -.04 .10 -.06 -.03 -.05 .33
**
 -.04 -.03 -.03 1     
(RC) x  
(LFC) 
.21
**
 .15
*
 -.21
**
 -.14
*
 .25
**
 -.12 .71
**
 -.09 -.06 -.06 .13
*
 1    
Ruling 
Party 
.07 .00 -.03 .07 -.08 .22
**
 .03 .27
**
 .18
**
 .18
**
 -.01 -.01 1   
per capita 
GRDP 
-.23
**
 -.35
**
 .55
**
 .48
**
 .18
**
 -.06 -.27
**
 .20
**
 .14
*
 .12
*
 -.07 -.18
**
 .03 1  
Tenure .12 -.00 .03 .24** .21** .02 -.04 .11* .15** .08 -.09 -.01 .16* .06 1 
*p<.05, ** p< .01 
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